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LAW AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE
Law As A Foreign Language:
Understanding Law School
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic.
And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion,
and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judg-
ment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and
yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.'
It might help if you were to compare the process of learning law. .. [to]
learning a language. One must of course know the rules of grammar and
the meanings of terms, but to know those things is not to know how to speak
the language; that knowledge comes only with use. The real difficulties and
pleasures lie not in knowing the rules of French or law, but in knowing how
to speak the language, how to make sense of it, how to use it to serve your
purposes in life.
2
What do you think the law is, that's all it is, language .... Every
profession ... protects itself with a language of its own .... Language
confronted by language turning language itself into theory till it's not about
what it's about it's only about itself turned into a mere plaything.'
I. CRACKING THE LAW SCHOOL CODE
A. Rite Of Passage
This article undertakes, in only a single injection, to implant
in readers new to legal culture a viewpoint otherwise acquired by
months of painful law school inoculations. I'm talking about an
appreciation of why the maxims and rules fluttering around legal
haunts so stubbornly refuse to stand still long enough for begin-
ning law students to take aim and fire. Of course this article's stab
at describing the elusive nature of the legalist beast doesn't a legal
education make. Yet what follows gives novices a leg up on ridding
themselves of unlawyerly illusions about captive rules stored away
in little black boxes that law teachers, for the price of tuition, will
unlock.
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 465-66
(1897).
2 James B. White, Talk to Entering Students, Occasional Papers, The Law School,
The University of Chicago 2-4 (1977) (on file with author).
3 WiLLIAM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF His OwN 284-85 (Poseidon Press, New York
1994).
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This short course in the wily ways of legal language teaches
that legal study is in the main something quite different from the
cartoon showing the professor pouring true rules straight into the
student's vacant brain. The legal mind, in other words, is notewor-
thy not as a warehouse for storing legal principles; rather it's a
mind uniquely equipped to do language exercises in a setting in
which rules are mere background music. Learning how to do (not
memorize) what legal people do with language means putting
aside little black boxes stuffed with principled gospel. Learning to
do law requires - and here's the hard part - shifting the mind's
eye to see legal training as a foreign language lab, and to view lawy-
ering as mainly management of a grab bag of alien-sounding formu-
las and doctrines. This lay-to-legal shift in perspective is what law
school's harrowing first year is all about, a year for loosening up
untutored minds for implantation of legalist seeds. Law school
business is mainly, then, the cultivation of a legalist point of view.
Law schools, in their snail-like way so frustrating to beginners
obsessed with bagging big fat rules, eventually coax students into
shucking off the unsophisticated notion that the vaunted rule of
law is to be taken at face value. This weeding out from first-year
minds of the simplistic, blackletter view of things legal, to make
room for the legalist's more flexible mind-set, is painful. This is so
whether the blackletter weeding is done by the slow poison of law
school's first year, or by the somewhat quicker fix of "Law As A
Foreign Language."
First-year students, because of the way they were brought up,
very reluctantly give up the idea that law study is mostly informa-
tion-gathering. Yet, to undergo the transformation necessary to de-
veloping a legal mind, a first-year law student must adjust to a legal
regime dedicated to taking legal concepts apart and, in ways akin
to the novelist's art, putting them back together in altered form.
This is a legal regime in which the judges' maxims have lost their
luster as stone-tablet depositories of structured official truth. In
the wordy new world that freshly-hatched lawyers enter, the coded
insiderjargon is verbal clay with which to mold, willy-nilly, foreign-
sounding motions, arguments, briefs, contracts, pleadings, statutes,
jury instructions, constitutions, corporate charters, wills, treaties,
ordinances, deeds, and appellate opinions.
Even the worldliest of newcomers to legaldom is shocked to
discover that much law talk, which at first seems to convey weighty
messages, proves to be alarmingly empty of meaning. Words in the
legal realm, in other words, sometimes add up to no more than
[Vol. 1:5
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ritualistic noises merely demonstrating good will, or concealing
thought, or (sorry to say) avoiding the necessity of thinking. It's no
wonder that legal innocents find it a bit of a bother - and some-
times a calamity - adjusting to the uncertain realities of a legal
education bottomed on stiff-necked, courthouse language masking
what legal people are about, albeit usually with worthy intentions.
To safeguard legal society's good name, law schools only
grudgingly and belatedly yield up to first-year recruits the knowl-
edge that legal discourse, although resembling English, is a code
language, a language made of straw shaped to look like brick. It's
no wonder, then, that the law faculty's first-year game of casebook
hide-and-seek becomes for many students a confusing, off-putting
experience. When facing casebook legalisms that seem to promise
firm answers to legal disputes, students find themselves grabbing
handfuls of unedifying smoke. Unaware that casebook language
conceals as well as reveals, novices stumble amidst the legal code's
irreconcilable conflicts, and wonder if they may be victims of a con-
spiracy to exclude outsiders from judicial secrets.
Law school casebooks and lectures, in short, fail to lay out an
orderly, fact-filled academic "subject" for the lawyer-to-be to com-
mit to memory, that is, to "learn." The truth is that the judicial
"truth" that law schools teach can never be learned in the same way
that history or math is learned. Students new to law study, given
this absence of a familiar "subject" that can be readily preserved in
class notes, are therefore understandably out of sync when first
confronting that dark stranger called The Law. Judges preach, in
their archaic second tongue, a rule of law, urging principle as an
escape from politics. But legal innocents can't help but see the gap
between what courts say and what courts do.
During law school orientation, first-year novitiates are assured
that The Law's body of rules is the social cement binding the body
politic, and that legal principles are part of the inner consciousness
of the race, and so on. But novitiates also receive clues that The
Law is a lot of other, even fuzzier, things unmentioned in high
school civics books. It's grasping these other things, matters far
more intricate and subtle than memorizing lists of legal prescrip-
tions lifted from casebook opinions, that make the path to The
Law a harrowing rite of passage. The good news is that while
merely memorizing rules would be as dull as dishwater, seeing and
understanding what lawyers do is a fascinating study of government
in action. If law study was merely rule-gathering, then the law
school's casebook method would be silly and wasteful, and would
1996]
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have long since been replaced by computer software called
Truerule.
Legal tradition's simplistic picture of courtroom affairs, pro-
duced for appeasement of laypersons, features evenhanded judges
disinterestedly calming litigious waters with neutral-sounding slo-
gans that identify lawsuit winners. These slogans dispensed by pas-
sive judicial servants are part of a self-contained, self-steering,
omniscient body of nonpartisan rules. A public ever fearful of raw
government power naturally finds comfort in this pretty picture of
nonpartisan passivity. The legal priesthood's rule of law, blessfully
untouched by political hands, is not only emotionally appealing,
but also explains how judges and legislators supposedly play very
different roles. The Law's champions claim that judges produce
common law decisions that collectively spell justice; legislators, on
the other hand, produce legislation prey to unprincipled partisan
politics.
So long as first-year students are burdened with this postcard
picture of detached judges watching the rules do all the work, so
long will learning how to think like a lawyer prove elusive.
Although casebook opinions feature self-serving testimony about
how detached and rule-oriented judges are, the obvious falsity in
such advertising forces realists to scratch beneath the courts' rule-
of-law posturings for firmer answers. In the end, persistent scratch-
ing will reveal that the similarities between what courts and legisla-
tures do far outstrip the differences. Hugo Black's government
service, as both legislator and judge, is a case in point.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black was, before his 1939
appointment to the high court, a U.S. Senator. During Black's
long service on the Court and in the Senate, this New Dealer from
Alabama cast votes, as both Senator and Justice, decidedly liberal.
Senator Black's liberal votes were derived without a doubt from his
progressive political soul. On the other hand, Black's later, but
equally liberal Court votes derived, or so the Senator-turned-Justice
claimed, not from his earlier New Deal politics, but from the seam-
less and ever so neutral web of The Law. As a final token of his
professed belief in The Law's political neutrality, Justice Black went
to his grave with his dog-eared, pocket-size copy of the U.S. Consti-
tution placed squarely over his stilled heart.4
Hugo Black was, to a great many, a great American. As for
4 Hugo Black Room, Law Library, University of Alabama Law School, Tuscaloosa,
Alabama (Mar. 1993).
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Black's overt worship of blindfolded justice,5 such public rituals
help make the decisions of lawyers who wear Supreme Court robes
emotionally acceptable. But serious students of The Law eventu-
ally recognize that Justice Black's display of legal purity is, even
though high-minded, a bit of a sham. Justice Black at rest with the
Constitution over his rule-of-law heart smacks of a romance novel.
Justice Black's public devotion to the rule-of-law myth reminds us
of something long noted: we Americans have a curious capacity for
believing absolutely in the absolutely untrue. The lay public only
imperfectly realizes that, as with statistics, so with (especially legal)
words, wordsmiths can make the untrue believable. The make-be-
lieve inherent in The Law, by which judges claim a neutrality they
can only aspire to, is a state of affairs long a part of the American
way of life. And it's this counterfeit component in legalism that is
the root of the confusion that law students encounter on entering
the domain of lawyers.
This confusion, so perilous to the peace of mind of law stu-
dents, is rooted in casebook opinions: the judges' rationales for
their decisions, closely read, exhibit a political spin of their own
that spawns layers of meaning. For readers new to the rhetoric of
law school subjects such as torts and contracts, there's the opin-
ion's surface meaning refracted (for public consumption) through
the prism of legalism. This surface meaning reflects the judicial
author's professional allegiance to a courtroom where doctrine
confronted with naked case facts is supposed to mechanistically
produce neutrally-principled decisions. Then there's the deeper,
not-so-neutral meaning accessible to legal sophisticates attuned to
the rule of law's mechanical shortcomings and to the politics inher-
ent in courthouse government.
The key to understanding ourjudicial governors is learning to
extract, from high court rhetorical extravaganzas, the tangled
messages. Opinion writers strive to prove that The Law, rather
than judicial discretion, dictates decision. In thus trying to prove
the impossible, appellate legalists overstate their case. The trick is
to strip away legalism's outer shell of half-empty words. The suc-
cessful student plumbs The Law's facile assumptions. The pretense
that rules sponsored by appellate litigants are made of sturdy
enough material to relieve judges from making hard choices must
be seen for the wishful thinking it is. The real significance of an
opinion appears only when the reader isolates the passage where
5 GERALD T. DUNNE, HuGo BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 413 (1977). See,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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the soft fuzzy core of the court's proffered principle emits its fog;
this is the core of ambiguity that plagues every opinion, and where
judicial discretion must furtively take up the slack and carry on to
decision. Historically, this split between rule-based decision and
discretion-based decision relates to divergent views about the na-
ture of legalism.
B. Formalism And Realism
Legal formalism says rules (formulas that, by capturing history's
lessons, thereby inform tomorrow's decisions), even in hotly con-
tested appellate cases, are the touchstone of decision.6 Legal realism
says, to the contrary, that judges decide cases in part by reasoning
from fuzzy formulas, but also by reacting emotionally and politi-
cally to case facts.7 The modem lawyer's intellectual makeup con-
tains threads of both formalism and realism, something of an unholy
mixture. Therefore, students keen on acquiring a legal mind must
for this reason prepare for a legal landscape marked by considera-
ble contradiction and fluidity.
Acquiring a legal mind necessitates stepping partially away
from Hugo Black's rule-fetishism, and inching in the direction of
the slightly scandalous notion of ajudiciary that judges by feelings
- by judicial hunches that are tied to political values. Law stu-
dents, once weaned from the blackletter posturings of The Law,
will view casebook doctrine as a text considerably short of gospel,
as the voice of master legalists playing elaborate word games. The
Law of the lawyers is of course a serious game, full of significance
and import, heartbreak and joy. But still it's a game of gathering
and ordering catch words into stylized lawyerly arguments. It's a
game, from the judges' perspective, of fitting judicial hunches into
formal legal niches as "proof" that the rule of law, after a fashion,
lives. It's a game, but one playable only by seasoned initiates.
In the fall, uninitiated first-year law students read that their
first case is, for example, an appeal from an order, relating to a
count in trespass on the case, of the general term of the first court
of appeals of the fourth judicial department, reversing ajudgment
entered on the decision of the court at special term - and, draw-
ing a blank, for the first but not the last time suspect that as would-
be lawyers they must lack the right stuff. In time, however, law stu-
dents discover that the shortfall is not necessarily theirs, but rather
that it is The Law that's askew, made unnecessarily complex, and
6 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 152 (2d ed. 1991).
7 Id.
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even a bit of a lie - even if only a little white lie. As law students
begin to get some control over the appellate language that has so
befuddled them, they realize they've been looking up the wrong
tree: the opinions, no matter how tightly squeezed,just won't yield
surefire gems of legal truth for predicting future cases. Instead of
an orderly blueprint for government, students sooner or later, ex-
cept those who wear self-imposed blindfolds, see the casebook's
mountain of words for the disorderly arrangement it really is.
Note along these lines the following complaints, all too typical,
from legal writers about the rule of law's refusal to march in or-
derly lines: "Constitutional jurisprudence concerning religion has
been described as 'a maze,' 'in significant disarray,' 'a conceptual
disaster area,' 'inconsistent and unprincipled,' and resembling in
several respects the more surreal portions of 'Alice in Wonder-
land.'";' "The current situation with respect to joint and several
liability in the United States is one of confusion and chaos .... -;9
"The state of the law [of the right to privacy] is still that of a hay-
stack in a hurricane ... .";10 "The law of defamation is dripping
with contradictions and confusion and is vivid testimony to the
sometimes perverse ingenuity of the legal mind."; 1 "So long as eve-
rybody understands that nothing more than a word game is being
played, there is nothing inherently wrong in defining strict liability
. . . in negligence terms.... Thus, although mixing negligence
and strict liability concepts is often a game of semantics, the game
has more than semantic impact - it breeds confusion .... ""
The lesson here is that when Oliver Wendell Holmes reminds
that life is hardly a science, that reminder applies as well when life
is wrapped in a skin of words and tagged, ambitiously, The Law.
Legal method and scientific method, despite all efforts of the bar
to link the two, belong to different planets. Removed as lawyers
are from the physical world of the hard sciences, lawyers in the end
must live and breathe words. And legal words are far too flimsy to
do the heavy lifting that would-be legal scientists, too taken with
orderliness and predictability, try to assign to mere language. A
8 Steven G. Gey, Mhy Is Religion Special? Reconsidering The Accommodation Of Religion
Under The Religion Clauses Of The First Amendment, 52 U. Prr. L. REv. 75, 75 (1990).
9 Richard W. Wright, The Logic and Fairness ofJoint and Several Liability, 23 MEM. ST.
U. L. REv. 45, 81 (1992).
10 Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).
11 Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic
Primer.on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. LJ. 1519, 1519 (1987).
12 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liabil-
ity: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 277-78 (1990).
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word is not a thing only if words always represented things, the stuff
of scientific reports, could lawyers be scientists.
1 3
C. Ambiguity In Language
But words are not things. They are not solid objects, but merely
symbols representing - pointing in the general direction of -
things. Furthermore, these verbal symbols we call words don't al-
ways even point to things. A word such as "fox" points to, among
other things, a furry creature living in the verifiable world that can
be weighed, inspected, and dissected. A lawyer's "negligence," on
the other hand, points to no solid matter, to no measurable object
subject to scientific analysis. "Negligence" concerns not what is,
but what ought to be, a word that unlike the (usually) politically
neutral "fox," conveys a normative message. The Law is full of in-
definite, abstract, general words containing ample empty spaces for
sending and receiving normative (ought) messages. And the chal-
lenge for law students is catching on to how lawyers and judges
control the normative content that flows in and out of The Law's
abstract line-up of "negligence," "due process," "consideration,"
"foreseeable," "malice aforethought," and all the rest.
Legal amateurs, unlike linguists and word-conscious lawyers,
make no big deal out of mentally separating those three letters on
a printed page that spell "fox" from that real flesh-and-blood crea-
ture that roams the woods. The amateur in words tends too readily
to merge the word with the most likely object the word represents,
forgetting the other objects that may be candidates for what the
writer of "fox" had in mind. This tendency to avoid ambiguity and
to see only beastly images when the word "fox" appears on the page
causes the amateur to overlook the nuances in language that en-
gage the legal mind. The reader of "fox" who sees a wild beast,
instead of the clever burglar that on this occasion appeared in the
mind's eye of the writer, is in trouble. The professional wordsmith
stays alert to the fact that writers may use "fox" to point to one of
several different objects. 4 These objects all exist outside the letters
f-o-x. It's the sophisticated reader'sjob to recognize that ambiguity
in language is common as dirt, and to make an educated guess as
to which object occupied the mind of the writer of "fox."
Now of course "fox" is a pretty simple sort of word. "Fox" may
refer to some crafty old Republican, or it may be the name of a pet
13 S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 28-30, 39-40 (2d ed. 1964).
14 See generally id. (discussing the relation between language and reality, between
words and what they stand for in the speaker's or the hearer's thoughts).
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cat. Still, the choices among the various objects on the planet are
fairly limited. "Negligence" is, however, found around the globe
and in all manner of situations smacking of carelessness - hence,
the ambiguity surrounding legal "negligence." In legal circles,
moreover, where speaking in code is de rigueur, even a relatively
unambiguous word such as "fox" may tomorrow mean anything the
legal community wishes "fox" to mean. Such, for example, is the
case today with the perverse twist we lawyers put on words such as
"intentionally" (which includes accidentally) or "person" (which in-
cludes a corporation) or "fact" (which for most English-speakers
refers to a slice of the real world, but for lawyers refers to such
obviously nonfactual, normative matters as a question of legal
"negligence").
To most people, words appear as orderly soldiers marching by
in dictionary-approved uniforms, lined up in rows of sentences dis-
ciplined by the strict logic of grammar. These are the orderly
soldiers of verbal fortune that guard our history, our religion, our
justice. We're trained to revere the written word. To read with
skepticism goes against the grain, especially with law students con-
fronted with grandiose high court text. Given this general worship
of the word, it's no wonder that most of us naked apes, both law-
yers and laypersons alike, cling to a faith in the magic of language.
Yet, even if in the beginning was the almighty Word, legal princi-
ples, nevertheless, are too fragile to subsist on faith alone. A word
is but, said Holmes, the "skin of a living thought."1
5
Just as words are not things, so likewise putting a name on
something doesn't guarantee that the something actually exists.
Too many of us foolishly believe that whatever has a name-The
Law, for example-must therefore be real-world stuff, something
that exists out there; and if no real entity answering to the name
readily turns up, the common reaction, instead of assuming that
the name covers up an empty hole, is to conclude that the name
must stand for a particularly mysterious something. Language is so
tricky a business that the modem era has spawned the language
expert.
Language experts talk about a sender of messages who
chooses a word, which is a symbol for a thing or an idea that the
sender has in mind. The word chosen by the sender, if the
message is to be received, must trigger in the receiver's mind the
15 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) ("A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.").
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same symbol.16 A legal writer sends a message: she writes "free
speech" on a piece of paper and invites all manner of strangers,
her receiver-readers, to figure out the message. Think for a mo-
ment of those radio signals the government transmits into outer
space on the off chance that extra-terrestrials are tuning in. What
will E. T.'s"7 out-in-space descendants think about when they hear
the beep-beep equivalent of "fox"? Beginning law students are sim-
ilarly faced with trying to figure out what messages, among all the
many possibilities, are being sent into space by pieces of The Law
such as Reasonable Care, Proximate Cause, and Fee Simple
Absolute.
When linguists talk about a ladder of verbal abstraction,18 they
reserve a top rung for key pieces of the legal code such as Proxi-
mate Cause or Insufficient Evidence. A ladder of abstraction lines
up words and phrases according to degree of ambiguity. The
greater the number of objects or ideas that a word or phrase can
possibly encompass, the higher the rung it occupies on the ladder
of abstraction.' 9
The ladder's bottom rung is reserved for the most concrete
item: fox named Reggie wearing fish and game band number
07863. Rung two begins the ascent into generality: silver Maine
fox. Rung three: red fox. Rung four: member of the dog family.
Rung five: animal. Rung six: living thing. And so on. The Law,
needless to say, is perched on a top rung, high up in a haze where
it's often hard to tell whether the living thing on rung six is a silver
fox or a lawyer doing legal research.
This article's introduction into casebook learning urges law
students not to be overly concerned when at first the judges' fancy
ratiocinations make little sense. It's natural for first-year students,
the first few times they dive into convoluted casebook dissertations
on The Law, to draw repeated blanks. "Law As A Foreign Lan-
guage" advises that legal stuff reads like Greek because it is Greek.
So relax. Adapt to the leisurely pace of learning a new language.
Learning how lawyers think and. talk takes months or even years.
Reading "Foreign Language" in the meantime, although no sure
cure for legal awkwardness, can help quiet first-year headaches.
This guide toward legal understanding is admittedly unkind to
legal orthodoxy, written as it is to take The Law down a peg for
16 HAYAKAWA, supra note 13, at 26-30.
17 E.T. (Amblin Co. 1982).
18 HAYAKAWA, supra note 13, at 177-80.
19 HAYAKAWA, supra note 13, at 177-80.
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easier viewing. Yet, this critique of legalism is offered out of
neither disrespect for the work of the courts, nor to engender dis-
respect for legal actors. The Law can't help it if the public prefers
the comforting rule-of-law myth over the notion that judicial robes
conceal furtive creators of The Law. First-year students, who
although by nature are drawn to the rule of law's prettified, apoliti-
cal description of itself, can only get a clear focus on The Law by
bringing into alignment the public and private faces of legalism.
This article, therefore, takes a pretty good sock at prettified juris-
prudence in order to draw the reader's attention to legalism's split
personality. This means I've foregone that unrelenting politeness
toward legal affairs that accounts for the semi-religious tone com-
mon to court opinions and bar association speeches - and for this
boorishness I ask forgiveness of a profession boasting members the
likes of Mahatma Gandhi, Sir Thomas Moore, Abraham Lincoln,
Hugo Black, and Nelson Mandela.
For law student readers unwilling or unable to give up illu-
sions about an apolitical, omniscient body of rules, this peek be-
neath the judicial robes may be distasteful. Although law school
classes in time, likewise, lay bare the partially mythical nature of
The Law, the classroom disrobing is usually done in a manner
more genteel, less confrontational than "Foreign Language's" de-
coding of legal talk. So it's for students unafraid to face an early, if
brusque, confrontation with legal reality that I offer this look at law
school. But with a warning.
Some few students, when they see The Law minus powder and
rouge, tend to turn nasty. Once the opinion's religious trappings
are removed, these newly born-again cynics see judges as conspira-
tors manipulating The Law with all the idealism squeezed out. The
trick, I think, is to find a happy medium in which the fledgling
legalist appreciates the gamesmanship in legal maneuvering, but
manages as well to see The Law in aspirational terms as a laudable
attempt at displacing anarchy and tyranny with fair, democratic
government. It's not only we lawyers, after all, who in various ways
take cues from myths in an effort to enhance life. We are dreamers
all.
This work, in sum, does several things. It takes a no-nonsense
look at that staple in the law student's diet, the appellate opinion.
It traces the history behind the law school's long love affair with
the casebook form of instruction. This article also explores why
the prose style of law-trained people is so often wretched. "Foreign
Language" contains two sections translating casebook prose into
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
plain English, an exercise that fits in with my view on legal training
as a language lab. Sections are assigned to critiques of legal sci-
ence and legal reasoning, and to surveys of first-year law courses in
torts and constitutional law.
"Foreign Language" should enable newcomers to legal dis-
course who are disenchanted with their law dictionary's inability to
dispel the fog to grasp more quickly the knack of truly seeing The
Law. Mark Twain wrote, in a similar vein, about his ignorance of
the true nature of the Mississippi River until he trained as a river
boat pilot.20 As a novice pilot, Samuel Clemens acquired a profes-
sional eye; meanwhile, his earlier romantic picture of the mighty
river underwent revision. Clemens eventually saw, alongside the
river's beauty, the river's treachery: faint ripples suggesting hidden
rocks or wrecks, a bright sun forecasting wind tomorrow, a floating
log signaling a rising river, a slanting mark on the water pointing to
a bluff reef that is apt to doom somebody's steamboat.2  I
To see The Law through legally tinted lenses is to see things
unseen by the untrained eye - to see both the dream and the
reality, the beauty and the beast. Law-trained people see in legal
prose the idealism that runs through judicial government, as well
as the artifice inherent in lawspeak. The law school casebook's
sampling of the folklore of legalism, in short, is best understood if
approached not with the attitude of the worshiper fawning over
church doctrine, but with the attitude of the anthropologist explor-
ing the rituals of native people.
II. INTRODUCTION TO LEGAuSM
A. So Many Words, So Few Answers
The common law, that loose, ill-defined, ethereal, judge-
crafted code of courtroom custom, exists in a nether world that,
like a dream, is subject to capture only fleetingly. Statutory and
constitutional law are likewise part of a wordy, judge-made wilder-
ness into which law students are sent with very little in the way of
map or compass. The path to The Law, paved as it is with the ap-
pellate courts' juiceless prose, is heavy going. High-toned, abstract,
vague, indefinite legal language, like the witches that impeded
Dorothy's trip down the yellow brick road, serves to block student
entry into legal Oz.2"
20 See MARK TWAIN, LIrE ON THE MISSISSIPPI (Harper & Row 1917).
21 Id.
22 THE WIZARD OF Oz (Metro - Goldwyn - Mayer 1939).
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Fledgling legalists profit by understanding early in The Law
game why heavy-handed casebook prose is so unlike plain English.
To hear lawyers tell it, the reason why legal language is so foreign
and inaccessible is that legal affairs, like the rare squiggles under
the microscope at which scientists peer, belong to a world beyond
the ken of ordinary folk. To communicate about esoteric legal
happenings, lawyers argue, demands a special language at which
only the legally learned are masters.
This "rare squiggles" excuse for cloudy legalese is one that law-
yers understandably favor; after all, law school graduates have in-
vested three long, expensive years in replacing plain English with
the legal tongue. Yet, whether the professional tasks we lawyers
perform warrant the violence we inflict upon the Queen's English
is doubtful. In any event, to novices, law school casebooks written
in lawyer English appear designed to disorient and mystify. And
it's these cloudy appellate rationalizations for judicial votes that is
the prism through which first-year apprentices must view the legal
landscape. Beginning students, thus, are at the mercy of Law-
speaking judges who, even if they wished to forthrightly state why
appeals are won or lost, are handicapped by a professional lan-
guage allergic to candor and clarity.
First-year students struggling with the mysteries of criminal law
and contracts are at some point - when the casebooks' endless
puzzles threaten to overwhelm - likely to begin scouring library
stacks for a readable guide as to what The Law is really all about.
Perplexed novices hope to find, preferably in one slender volume,
a narrative that will quickly dispel, in language plain and simple,
the confusion surrounding first-year casebooks. But unfortunately,
no such single volume panacea exists; the genius who might in a
single work capsule all of law school has yet to appear.
The best the law library can offer is a selection of student-
guides, composed by law professors and practitioners, that discuss
study habits and outline certain formal attributes of legalism. But
these conventional introduction-to-law-school manuals suffer, like
casebooks, from an addiction to fuzzy legal concepts and from an
inability to present The Law in any other way but in the sanitized
form endorsed by The Law's image-conscious keepers. What's
needed for first-year woes is some plain talk about legal discourse.
The lawyers' professional vocabulary, perhaps out of self-de-
fense, lacks the words appropriate for describing to outsiders the
odd ways of legalists. Practitioners of the legal arts are a secretive
society. The legal tribe's failure to develop an easily understood
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language for looking at itself squares with the profession's belief
that exposing legaldom's inner sanctum to public viewing would
threaten all legaldom. Bewildered law students in search of a quick
library fix must therefore be content with here and there the shed-
ding of, as "Foreign Language" attempts, a faint ray or two of light.
Of course, beginning students in large part must learn to han-
dle legal language the way one learns to ride a bicycle, by crashing
numerous times. Falling down and getting up, again and again, is
how our legal forebears have acquired legal minds. Still, an early
introduction into the secret code aspects of legal language can save
the novice needless falls and more quickly put The Law into focus.
This article's attempt at explaining the tangle that is casebook
prose asks readers, for the moment, to divorce themselves from the
reverence and awe with which many people approach the work of
judges. Pure gems of timeless truth may on occasion come down
from the appellate courts, but for students keen on picking up the
nuances of judicial literature, it's wise to assume that most opin-
ions, like political stump speeches, contain some portion of
humbuggery.
Looking skeptically at casebook rhetoric helps to get under-
neath the lofty language and to better appreciate the precise na-
ture of the work that lawyers and judges do. The Law is a valuable
instrument of government, but even so The Law, to be properly
understood, first requires a clearing of the air. Dispelling legal
myths creates the space needed to produce a more finely-tuned
picture of the legal business.
B. Acquiring A Legal Mind
The entrenched pre-law school way of looking at The Law as
holy writ obscures how much our government is no government of
laws, but rather a government of lawyers. The first-year search for
true rules reflects the conventional wisdom that The Law is a near-
supernatural collection of sturdy principles offering reasonably
clear answers to knotty disputes. Under this scenario, law schools
collect and pass on tried-and-true rules of natural law so that law
graduates can oversee the ordering of ajust society. This version of
The Law puts lawyers in the position once occupied by native
medicine men and ancient oracles - that of messengers delivering
God's (or at least nature's) sanctified prescriptions.
This notion of a fixed and eternal natural law, "higher" than
the ephemeral enactment of kings and legislators, is central to Ro-
man jurisprudence and to canon law. English jurists preached this
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"higher" law, echoes of which filtered into the American constitu-
tion. Thomas Jefferson looked to a higher principle inherent in
nature to justify his revolution. From this "higher" law developed
the secular religion that today is labeled The Law."5
Underlying natural law theory is the premise that order gener-
ally governs the universe.24 The Law is part of this universal order;
and being inevitable, The Law is thus not made, but rather is to be
discovered. This conventional theology sees the legal order as
emerging not from the community's needs and expectations, but
from the precepts of an a priori logic. Law, as thus conventionally
viewed, is seen as an abstraction, not as malleable material. This
natural law underpinning gives The Law its conservative complex-
ion, safeguarding fixed and eternal rules from the fluctuations of
human passion. Eternal verities, not temporary prejudices, is the
touchstone of the venerable laws of nature that tie humans to their
past.
At the furthest extreme from such holy writ thinking is the
attitude of the jailhouse lawyer. The jailhouse lawyer, impatient to
shed his prison stripes, reads prison library law books, searching
for the overlooked loophole that will open his prison cell. The
jailhouse lawyer cares not a whit for lofty principles. He searches
instead for a crack in The Law that the crafty can slip through.
The untutored jailhouse lawyer with the unholy loophole focus is,
however, in one sense like the student of holy writ: they both have
faith that the answer is in The Law. The trained legal mind, on the
other hand, examines legal text unencumbered by preoccupation
with the answer. The legal eagle conjures up various interpretations
of the legal text and supplies supporting arguments for each inter-
pretation; instead of the answer, here's three answers - take your
pick.
One way to avoid unlawyerly preoccupation with the answer
would be to approach legal studies the way political scientists do.
Political scientists readily pierce the appellate courts' holy writ
facade, viewing legal precepts and principles as ritual and symbol,
as dry bones to be rattled and shaken by modem medicine men
prior to learned announcement. For political scientists, skeptical
of legal doctrine's claim to other-worldly authority and certitude,
judicial power is either an instrument of the politically dominant to
control wealth and power, an instrument for countering the
majoritarian impulses of runaway legislatures, or perhaps an instru-
23 FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAwYERs! 22, 27, 30 (2d ed. 1957).
24 ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW & COMPARATIVE LAW 215-16 (1991).
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ment for providing the poor and the powerless a voice in demo-
cratic government. Give the political scientist more legal
vocabulary and a penchant for arguing either side, and he or she
would be almost a -lawyer.
Yet, I go too far if I am read to banish all vestiges of holy writ
from the legal mind. The worshipful attitude toward The Law
which is natural to first-year law students is, in modified form, pres-
ent as well in the fully developed legal mind. Government, espe-
cially judicial government, is partly grounded on a faith in our
governor's ability to govern in the general interest. The legal mind
can't completely discount the faith in the rule of law. That's what
is so tricky about the legal mind: lawyers see holy writ - and the
irreverent loopholes. This is why law teachers mentally combine a
reverent outlook toward legal doctrine with considerable skepti-
cism about the integrity of legal reasoning. No wonder law stu-
dents stumble when introduced to such contradiction. Yet, out of
such contradiction comes that odd mixture of faith and disbelief
peculiar to the legal mind. To see The Law in lawyerly fashion is,
in sum, a unique vision, unique in the way that a throat doctor sees
the batman logo, not as a black bat against a field of yellow, but as a
yellow pair of tonsils.
C. The Ideal And The Real
Law school's perverse mixture of devotion to and skepticism
about legal religiosity breeds something akin to Orwellian double-
think. Law students on the one hand are led to think that judicial
opinions are minor gospels and then on the other hand en-
couraged to play unholy word games with The Law, manipulating
doctrine as if lawyering were a sort of lawyer-Scrabble.
Law professors, it must be remembered, are key parts of a
legal society which purposefully casts The Law in a romantic light.
This romantic theory of a neutral rule of law, even though flawed,
is too comforting to give up completely. Law professors are part-
ners in a legal enterprise understandably reluctant to broadcast too
publicly the gap between the ideal and the real. The now-you-see-
it-now-you-don't way that law professors present The Law comes
from a desire to reveal The Law's will-o'-the-wisp nature, but at the
same time nurture the symbolic value of The Law in promoting
stable government. First-year novices, therefore, are to some ex-
tent left to figure out for themselves the meaning of the double-
think atmosphere to which legal minds must adapt.
Insecure neophytes confused in the early weeks of law school,
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and tempted to think themselves candidates for some legal trash
heap, should take note that the hocus-pocus element in opinions
takes considerable getting used to. Despite the early discomfort in
learning to manage judicial reasoning, law school is really pretty
easy stuff once you get the hang of it. Legal culture may seem for-
eign and inaccessible in the beginning, but for second and third-
year law students, speaking the legal tongue becomes second
nature.
Law school, of course, doesn't just teach a foreign tongue.
Law school offers a splendid glimpse at how government operates,
especially the part behind the scenes. Law school may be, as critic
Ralph Nader says, "a three-year excursus through legal minutiae
... [which develops] corridor thinking and largely non-normative
evaluation."25 Yet it's also a training ground for citizens like Ralph
Nader to develop legal language skills useful in monitoring govern-
ment in a country where legalese is government's principal
language.
Law school's first year, then, is a year to slough off, like a snake
does with its dead skin, the unlawyerly habits of an untutored
mind. Yet transformation into the legal mode of thinking is no
skin-deep matter. In an intellectual sense, to enter into the legal
realm is to be born again, so that thereafter, with the mind's legal
eye, a rule is no longer just a rule. The legal mind looks at the rule
and sees two ways to ease around the rule, or else a way, if the rule
is inconvenient, to change the question.
The legal mind is in a sense the antidote to the lay notion of
The Law as a non-elastic body of rules flush with prepackaged an-
swers. It's the elastic legal mind that is privy to the secret that "The
Law is... " in the words of W.S. Gilbert, "the true embodiment of
everything that's excellent... [with] no kind of fault or flaw,"
26 as
well as, in the words of Lord Tennyson, a "lawless science... [t] hat
codeless myriad of precedent.. [and] wilderness of single
instances."
2 7
As first-year students gradually give up the idea that legal
learning is principally stuffing one's self with doctrinal formulas,
law school becomes instead a language lab. Ability to give voice to
and to manipulate the open-ended concepts prevalent in legal doc-
25 Ralph Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, NEw REPBUC, Oct. 11, 1969, at 20.
26 W. S. Gilbert quoted in THE OxFoRD DIcIoNARY OF QUOTATIONS 226 (3d ed.
1979).
27 Alfred Lord Tennyson, Aylmer's Field (1864), in A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTA-
TIONS 661 (H. L. Mencken, ed., 1987).
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trine takes precedence over giving any enduring meaning to
casebook doctrine. The key to law school is learning to fashion
willy-nilly arguments couched in legal terms as to why this or that
piece of doctrine is a good or bad fit to the facts of the case at
hand. Law school, then, is where one lives for three years to master
a special form of debate. Few legal debaters mistake the judges'
formulas, with rare exceptions, as food for the eternal soul.
This language-lab view of law school classes admittedly sug-
gests a pretty narrow scope for legal training. It's the case, unfortu-
nately, that the larger world of values is generally excluded from
law study. Legal training, because the rule-of-law focus forces polit-
ical values under the table, smacks more of the technocrat than of
the social engineer. (Of course, the law school experience can
lead after graduation to bigger world-of-value things. After all, if
there is a political elite in this country, the label goes by default to
the community of law-trained people who run our governments,
our businesses, and even our private lives.)
Now, again, all this talk about language labs and verbal manip-
ulation games might suggest, erroneously, that courthouse govern-
ment is less than serious business. But serious business it is,
although as with war and politics, legal battles take the form of
adversarial combat. To learn to play the lawyers' game requires, in
addition to partially removing The Law from its pedestal of pure
reason, expanding one's capacity for recognizing and tolerating
rampant ambiguity in legal language. First-year students seeking
the answer complain that instructors hold back the answers to rid-
dles posed by casebook doctrine. Law teachers, on the other hand,
must somehow make excuses for the dearth of answers, and pro-
mote student tolerance for vague formulas adverse to yielding up
firm answers. This training in tolerating ambiguity is hardest to
take for those students who, tending to see the world in shades of
black and white, are allergic to gray.
Students suffering from a low tolerance for ambiguity should
take their cue from novelist Thomas Hardy's experience in "living
in a world where nothing bears out in practice what it promises.
." and who therefore "troubled [himself] very little about theo-
ies... [being] content with tentativeness from day to day."28 The
28 THOMAS HARDY, DIARY (1882), quoted inJOHN IRVING, A PRAYER FOR OWEN MEANY
519 (Ballantine Books 1989). See generalyJEROME FRANY, LAW AND MODERN MIND
(1930) (discussing psychological desire for orderly legal world, symptomatic of an
unconscious need to regain the security of the mother's womb; thus The Law be-
comes the surrogate womb offering protection from the politicized outside world).
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fact that legalism in practice is more a debating game than a sci-
ence offering certitude is no cause for despair. Yet each school
year a few true-believer, low-tolerance legal novices react to
casebook smoke-and-mirrors by becoming disenchanted and with-
drawing from law school either in body or in spirit.
Such was the experience of a famous literary figure from nine-
teenth-century Boston who gave his name to an even more famous
lawyerjudge son. The senior Oliver Wendell Holmes, before be-
coming a Boston physician and noted author, read The Law in a
relative's private library and attended Harvard Law School. But the
senior Holmes cut short his legal studies. He became "sick at
heart" with The Law: "I know not what the temple of the law may
be to those who have entered it, but to me it seems very cold and
cheerless about the threshold."'
Of course, if beginners who sample The Law consistently be-
come sick at heart, it may be time to try something else. The law-
yers' temple is not for everybody. Disenchanted students should
always reserve for themselves the option of withdrawing as did the
senior Holmes. But there is no cause for the tenderfoot to become
unglued just because the opinions often do. The judges' excuses
for decisions serve a purpose, even though it's a purpose that
catches beginning law students by surprise. Thousands of novices
each year learn that, after eventually giving up the struggle to tie
opinions up together with strings of blackletter rules, how much
fun it can be to play legal games, and how ambiguity in The Law,
like a blessing in disguise, can be a virtue. Obscure legal texts not
only trigger the need for lawyer (for a fee) translators, but rampant
ambiguity also provides spring in The Law's joints. Elasticity in
The Law gives the lawyer-judge room to roam. Doctrinal elasticity
allows for change and growth in the legal system.
Even the junior (and future justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court) Oliver Wendell Holmes had reservations as a law student:
"Truth sifts so slowly from the dust of the law." ° Yet at Harvard
Law, this future legal giant ultimately thought well of his legal
training, concluding that "my first year at law satisfies me. Cer-
tainly it far exceeds my expectations both as gymnastics and for its
intrinsic interest."
3 '
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., like the modem law student,
29 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. to Phineas Barnes (Jan. 13, 1830), in 1
LIFE AND LETTERS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOMES at 65 (John T. Morse, Jr. ed., 1896).
30 GARYJ. AxCHELE, OLrVER WENDELL HOMES, JR., 74 (1989).
31 Id.
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faced his first year of law school with unclear expectations about
what he was getting into. Professional legal studies, from the Civil
War period to now, remain somewhat suspect as a legitimate aca-
demic field. Law faculties, full of half-lawyer-half-scholar types, fits
uneasily into a university setting dedicated to teaching the myth-
free truth and setting minds free from cant. The Law is a wonder-
ful creation, but Shakespeare it is not. Law students, moreover,
tend to have more in common with business than with liberal arts
graduate students.
Only a minority of law students share the traditional scholar's
passion for learning for the sake of learning. Legal recruits, know-
ing little or nothing about what to expect from law school, sign up
for law classes for all sorts of reasons. Some recruits hope to prep
for politics, law practice, government, or corporate work; others
turn to The Law because a law degree is a family tradition, or, as is
frequently the case, because there is at the time nothing better to
do, and law school seems such a cool idea, despite all the lawyer-
bashing one hears. In any event, those who enroll for professional
legal training tend to prefer practical over philosophical learning,
skills training over jurisprudential inquiry, poker over bridge.
Speaking of lawyer-bashing, beginning students might well
sample the literature that names lawyers as the enemy. Prospective
lawyers should not close their ears to what critics of The Law have
said through the ages.32 Law school may be a cool idea, but it's
32 E.g., Luke 11:52 ("Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of
knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hin-
dered.") Less ancient than the Bible, but often reprinted, is Yale law professor FRED
RODErt'S classic WOE UNTo You, LAwyRs! supra note 23, which thoroughly trashes all
legaldom. Rodell belongs to a long string of critics who, through the ages, have bad-
mouthed The Law. WOE, easy to read, offers a witty review of what the iconoclastic
Rodell calls the "legal racket." RODELL, supra note 23, at 16. Besides sticking pins into
legal balloons, Rodell describes "The Way It Works," a plain-English introduction to
first-year contracts' doctrinal lineup of Offer, Acceptance, Consideration, and Per-
formance. RODELL, supra note 23, at 31-44. "The Way It Works" is the story of
ditchdigger Tony, a partially dug fifty-dollar ditch, and legal Acceptance. A legal Ac-
ceptance of a legal Offer adds up almost to an enforceable contract, as the case of
Tony v. Boss illustrates. Tony's boss says a fifty-dollar bill will be his if he digs a ditch
out to the hen house three feet deep and two feet wide (an Offer); Tony says nothing.
When his boss leaves, Tony digs the ditch half-way to the hen house. Whether Tony's
digging of half a ditch is a legal Acceptance of his boss's fifty-dollar contract Offer
cannot be answered, WOE teaches, by looking at legal definitions of Acceptance.
Rather, if the judges choose finally to call the Tony-boss deal a "contract," then ergo,
there springs into being an Acceptance of Tony's boss's fifty-dollar Offer. The point
is that the crux of the matter is deciding not whether an Offer was Accepted, but
whether Tony's boss should be held to his promise. Tony's half-dug ditch becomes, it
seems, an Acceptance only after the court stamps "contract" on Tony's ditch-digging.
Thus the concept of Acceptance has meaning only after the fact of the decision to enforce
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good for beginners to hear from all sides what they're getting into.
Lawyer-bashing authors such as Charles Dickens, who for example
in his novel Bleak House"3 does a legal burlesque that puts lawyers in
the worst possible light (or rather fog), shows how The Law's
pretentions toward infallibility can be made laughable. Law stu-
dents who've seen the English legal system in Bleak House's depic-
tion of Jamdyce v. Jarndyce (a probate of a will case), will be better
able to treat opinions realistically as a literature halfway between
gospel and farce.
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce is a probate dispute of such interminable
length and complexity "that no man alive knows what it means.
" 3
4
In Dickens's fictional critique, the annual fees extracted from the
Jarndyce estate have become, for the English bar, veritable
mother's milk. Whole generations of lawyers and judges die out of
and are born into the Jarndyce case. So long has Jarndyce v.
Jamdyce droned on that the case produces in Bleak House's pages a
metaphorical fog covering all London - all this by way of fair
warning to prospective law students of the weather surrounding
the English common law.
Fiction indeed knows no thicker pea-soup than that issuing
from Bleak House. And where in Bleak House "the dense fog is dens-
est," there sits Temple Bar, next to which, "at the very heart of the
fog, sits the Lord High Chancellor."3 5  The nineteen banisters in
attendance on Dickens's Lord High Chancellor, who himself sits
amidst crimson cloth and curtains "with a foggy glory round his
head,"3 6 manage with their legal nit-picking to further complicate
the boss's promise. Until decision, then, the so-called concept of Acceptance sits va-
cant waiting for an infusion of enough meaning to cover the case of Tony v. Boss. All
this by way of Rodell's showing that Acceptance - not to mention Offer, Considera-
tion, and Performance - is simply a lawyerly word that, even when stuffed with the
details of all the past contracts cases explaining Acceptance, doesn't tell us for certain
whether Tony's half-dug ditch is bona fide Acceptance. By the way, adds Rodell, dig-
ging half a ditch may be not only Tony's sweaty Acceptance, but also his Considera-
tion and his Performance - all legal prerequisites of a fifty-dollar "contract."
RODELL, supra note 23, at 36. Here is WOE'S opening paragraph for readers too faint
of heart to brave the whole book: "In tribal times, there were the medicine men. In
the Middle Ages, there were the priests. Today, there are the lawyers. For every age, a
group of bright boys, learned in their trade andjealous of their learning, who blend
technical competence with plain and fancy hocus-pocus to make themselves masters
of their fellow men. For every age, a pseudo-intellectual autocracy, guarding the
tricks of its trade for the uninitiated, and running, after its own pattern, the civiliza-
tion of its day." RODELL, supra note 23, at 7.
33 CHARLES DICKENs, BL.AX HousE (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1953) (1853).
34 Id. at 3.
35 Id. at 1.
36 Id.
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the obscure points of the Jarndyce probate. As the legal knots ty-
ing up the diminishing resources of the Jarndyce estate grow ever
tighter, and the slippery arguments of the bewigged barristers be-
come ever more opaque, the fog enveloping the English legal es-
tablishment becomes thicker and thicker.
D. What Is A "Chicken"?
Legal language, if rescued from Dickens's fog and placed
under some sort of linguistic microscope, would remind one of a
battle between red ants and black ants. The red ants, representing
the army of weasel words in the legal lexicon, are guerrilla warriors
hard to see lurking in the shadows of trees. This red army fights
under the flag of flexibility. The black opposition troops on the
other hand march stiffly across open fields in straight lines, bayo-
nets drawn, eyes front; these conventional soldiers represent
legaldom's rigidity by the stiff-necked rule; this black army flies the
flag of stability. This continuous battle between red flexibility and
black rigidity itself resembles nothing so much as the annual strug-
gle in first-year contracts classes to give meaning to the open-ended
legal concepts of Offer and Acceptance, a tug-of-war between the
forces of flexibility and stability.
Another piece of contracts talk that bedevils law students look-
ing for solid ground is something lawyers call Consideration. My
flea-bitten dog, if I promise to give it to you in exchange for your
mangy cat, is probably legal Consideration. Your cat, if you agree
to this deal, is likewise plausible Consideration in the eye of The
Law (The Law may have two faces, but by tradition is assigned but a
single eye). Lawyers refuse to call a deal a contract unless both
sides cough up Consideration, flea-bitten or otherwise, to back up
their promises.
The law dictionary defines Consideration as "something of
value," 7 which is fair enough, but there's a catch. This isn't just
any old "something of value." It's "something of value" in the "eye
of the law," which is "something" that refuses the efforts of all law-
yerdom to pin down. Which brings us back in a circle, as often
happens in Law talk, to what's meant by Consideration. One could
say, in exasperation, that Consideration is merely whatever at the
moment The Law wants it to be. But such a definition begs yet
another question, which is what's meant by The Law, which this
37 1 BouvrR's LAW DIcrONARY 612 (8th ed. 1914).
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article is at some pains to suggest is either an unfair question, or
else something almost too slippery to catch in a net of words.
Begging the question, as lawyers are apt to do, by explaining
one weasel word in terms of another weasel word, is a routine
which first-year students must learn to live with, much like people
who fish a lot get comfortable with fishy smells. Being told that
Consideration is defined as "something of value" is, however, a rel-
atively minor begging of the question. Though "value" is a fairly
vague, red-ant sort of word, still "value" is made of firmer stuff than
"the eye of the law." To define Consideration in terms of first
"value" and then "the eye of the law" is to beg the question twice.
Definitions, in Law, please take note, count for little. Legal defini-
tions are created by judges to mystify juries and to decorate court
opinions, and are like the plastic markers golfers use to spot the
place on the green for their putting ball: the markers serve only a
brief secondary purpose and then are pocketed and forgotten.
Not that "the eye of the law" is void of all content. Among
legal insiders up to snuff on contracts lore, Consideration has
some, albeit faint, boundaries. Legal beginners remain beginners,
though, as long as they fret overmuch about the paucity of clear
boundary lines. Lawgiver Moses used up, alas, the last of the stone
tablets. The judge-made, customary law of contracts and property
and all the rest is written in the dust on a windy day.
Law school features words detached from conventional dic-
tionary moorings and aimed in legal argument like darts thrown at
a game board. Legal argument is a means of scoring legal points.
Law school teaches how to score legal points. The capacity for ar-
gument, after law school, seems almost to have been bred into the
Juris Doctor's bones. When, as happened in one case,"8 a chicken
farmer offers "chickens" as Consideration for a contract, and then
later delivers "hens" instead of the young "fryers" the buyer wants,
any lawyer worth chicken feed stands ready to argue that a "hen" is
(or is not) a "chicken."
The Law, like the president of the United States, has a diverse
audience to try to please. The lawyer's rule-studded arguments are
like the politician's parade of crowd-pleasing slogans in that The
Law is a big tent accommodating diverse and often inconsistent
ideas. The Law, with its overlapping principles and parallel rules
flowing off in divergent directions, is like a river spreading out over
the marsh as it nears the sea, confined to no predictable, single
38 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) ("The issue is, what is a chicken?") (opinion of Judge Friendly).
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channel. Legalists preach that "ajudge must determine, not to the
incertain and crooked cord of discretion, [but] by the golden and
straight mete-wand of the law,"3 9 but in the end we lawyers, robed
and otherwise, in practice run the legal business pretty much the
way we please. The Law, like the novelist George P. Elliott said of
art, is first and last a defiant gesture in the face of the world's disor-
der. It's a defiant gesture, moreover, that leans awfully hard on the
magical qualities of language. To master legalism is to become ex-
pert at managing a metaphysical language that gestures defiantly at
a disorder it can never completely control.
Legal writing almost always, according to Yale law teacher Fred
Rodell, contains two flaws: "One is its style. The other is its con-
tent. That, [Rodell concluded], about covers the ground."40 Jer-
emy Bentham, another harsh critic of the legal scene, summed up
almost two centuries ago the lawyer's debt to his linguistic heritage:
"[T] he power of the lawyer is in the uncertainty of the law.... His
wish was to see all waters troubled: - why? [Because he feels], in
so superior a degree, a master of the art of fishing in them."4 1
Much of the blame for the vague verbiage complicating the
first year of law school can be traced to the political (in the
broadest and most laudable sense of the term) element inherent in
things legal. Just as war is said to be politics by another name, so is
The Law a form of politics thinly veiled. Appellate decisions are,
since judges cannot escape making value judgments, political deci-
sions. Such political-judicial choices must be made in order to fill
in the gaps in The Law that legal word-magic papers over.
Beneath the politically neutral veneer of legal culture, judges
(and juries) therefore face the same inescapable policy-making
chores that confront legislators. Unlike legislators, however,
judges are guardians of an important social symbol of political neu-
trality. Judges, therefore, must make like the puppeteer who pulls
strings from behind the stage. Because of the felt social need to
preserve the rule-of-law symbol, the judge must be an especially so-
phisticated breed of politician. And as close observers of govern-
ment know, the higher the post a politician (orjudge) attains, the
more numerous are the inconsistent postures that must be
smoothed over by a rhetoric tending ever toward the metaphysical.
39 LORD EDwARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENC-
LAND 51 (1642), quoted in FA. HAYEK, THE CONsTrrTUnON OF LERTY 168 (1960).
40 Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. Ruv. 279, 279 (1962).
41 Letter fromJeremy Bentham to SirJas. Mackintosh (1808), in 10 THE WoRKs OF
JEREMy BENTHAM 429 (J. Bowring ed., 1962).
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Professional legal life involves mixing and swallowing two op-
posing ideas. Law students, in coping with casebook legalism, must
learn to live with the straight-jacket idea that rules relieve judges
from having to make The Law afresh each day, as well as the idea of
half-empty formulas into which judges have no choice but to feed
political preferences. Given this double-jointed situation, judges
necessarily must lead shadowy intellectual lives, and first-year law
students must come to terms with the insincerity in how The Law
presents itself to the outside world.
This double aspect in things legal may be why a Harvard law
teacher once defined a legal mind as a mind that can think of
something tied to something else, without thinking of the some-
thing else to which the something is tied.42 Learning to live a
professional life bottomed on such mental incoherence can, for
novices, cause anxiety. This article's attempt at distilling some-
thing of the essence of the legal frame of mind - at describing the
"something" as well as the hard-to-discern "something else" - is
aimed at making The Law's incoherence tolerable.
Trying to boil down legalism by thoroughly decoding
casebook prose is something law teachers commonly don't do.
Many law teachers shy from revealing legalism's split personality.
The comforting picture of The Law as an a pr/ori, transcendental
world of rules external to human passions is a "truth," even if only
a truth by convention, which most legal people by training and by
inclination are apt to defend against overly fierce skeptical fire.
The legal profession's official story line about judicial neutral-
ity is easily swallowed, if only in aspirational terms. To question
openly the possibility of a pristine rule of law is, at best, a breach of
good legal manners, and at worst, an act of disloyalty to the body
politic. So if casebook preaching is to be taken with a grain of salt,
as I believe it must be, the salt must often be smuggled in.
The law school casebook, by the way, is a lawyer-training de-
vice developed toward the end of the previous century.4" Before
the practice of training lawyers in a formal academic setting took
root following the Civil War, hatching out young lawyers was, for
the most part, accomplished through law office apprenticeships.
And although when the twentieth century opened, law schools
were challenging the apprenticeship system for dominance, not
42 Thomas Reed Powell, quoted in THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERN-
MENT 101 (1935).
43 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s
TO THE 1980s 54-56 (1983).
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until much later did the American Bar Association complete its
campaign to make lawyering a class act by phasing out apprentice-
ships and giving law schools their monopoly.' The result is that
sometime early in the twenty-first century the law-office-trained at-
torney will finally reach extinction, and the academic law degree
will be the universal legal credential.
Professional legal training, once full-time law professors a cen-
tury ago began to create their near-monopoly, has stuck pretty
much to a single pedagogical track. This academic path to legal
learning - a bookish and supposedly scientific path - was cleared
and marked in the late 1800s at the Harvard Law School.45 The
Harvard faculty decided that law students learn best how to think
legally, not by imbibing a steady diet of blackletter rules, but rather
by reading and dissecting the opinions in which judicial elites ex-
plain, sort of, their appellate votes.
When Harvard Law scrapped the legal textbook's rule-focused
commentaries on historical judicial practices in favor of collections
of opinions, other law schools soon copied Harvard's casebook
form of instruction. So much so that today law classes around the
country look much alike. Sharp-tongued Professor Kingsfield of
The Paper Chase46 could have given his casebook-geared lectures in
contracts anytime between the Spanish-American and Persian Gulf
Wars, and they would have fit easily into the mainstream of legal
education. Certainly law school has changed little since the 1950s
when my classmates and I opened our first-year property casebook
to the tale of a fox pursued by hunters with the aid of, not hounds,
but lawyers.47 With that opening casebook chase we commenced
pursuit, the same as beginning law students do today, of that will-
o'-the-wisp called The Law that, for the lawyer, lasts a lifetime.
Wherever the truth lies between the idealist's rule of law and
the skeptic's rule of lawyers, The Law in its temple is an awesome
concoction: a blend of common, statutory, and constitutional law
into a grand legal trinity. So intricate is this jurisprudential trium-
virate that the novice student's transmogrification into aJuris Doctor
graduate requires a three-year immersion into the casebook's end-
less chase of the rule that will not be pinned down. Learning early
44 Id. at 172-80.
45 Id. at 52-53.
46 THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).
47 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). This old case is a favorite of
casebook editors. See, e.g., PROPERTY (Jesse Dukeminier &James E. Krier eds., 2d ed.
1988).
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on in law school that the casebook's messages are coded, and
therefore in need of deciphering, is lesson number one.
III. Puisurr OF DEATHLEss RuLEs AND WRY FOXES
A. Chasing After The Law
The struggle, during an anxious first year of law school to
translate into something sensible the casebook's coded communi-
ques, is for many lawyers not soon forgotten. The first-year effort
to pin down the elusive principles imbedded in the opinions was
for me like the blindfolded attempt at a party game to pin the tail
on the donkey. Then, halfway through the first-year casebooks, it
dawned on me that the impeccably correct cache of legal gems that
I imagined lay imprisoned inside the judges' rationalizations was
an illusion.
Something else about legal talk became, in that rookie year,
increasingly obvious: the legal lexicon, like magicians' hats, can
yield a surprising variety of rabbits. AJuris Doctor is one learned in
a respectable form of word-magic. In the legal beginning was the
legal word, and the legal word, when put in the pressure cooker of
a lawsuit, often turns into a can of worms. Opposing lawyers each
grab a worm, and each lawyer's wiggly prize is transformed into a
different interpretation of The Law.
As neophytes at legal wordplay, legal novices become entan-
gled in airy abstractions, in contradictory axioms, in verbal gymnas-
tics, in arguments and counter arguments ad nauseam: in words
galore. One such classic 1805 battle of wiggly worms involved the
fox hunt mentioned earlier, in which adversaries armed with legal
learning followed their wily prey all the way into a New York appel-
late court. Pierson v. Post," as this famous fox hunt is known to
lawyers, illustrates how the legal mind can transform a simple
sporting event into a lawyerly tangle.
The opinion in Pierson, long a staple of first-year instruction in
The Law of property, tells of fox hunter Post who, with his pack of
hounds, gives lengthy chase over public lands. 9 At hunt's end,
Lodowick Post believes himself to be the rightful owner of the fox
he has chased down.50 Post fancies himself the fox's owner even
though the fox in question was killed by another hunter named
Pierson who, seeing the fox run into a comer by Post's hounds,
48 3 Cal. R. 175.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 175.
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joins the hunt tardily and minus an invitation.5 Post insists that
the last remains of poor Reynard belong solely to him (Post) be-
cause, as Post's lawyer legally reasons, Post's close pursuit of the
wild beast is what primarily leads to its capture. 52
Casebooks are full of chases in which competitors get
detoured into court. For example, divorcing spouses chasing the
leasing rights to the couple's rent-controlled apartment; corporate
takeover artists chasing a target company's preferred stock; wily in-
vestors running down a capital gains tax deduction in the Internal
Revenue Code; auto accident victims seeking compensation under
the other drivers' liability insurance coverage. Casebook opinions
are, in this sense, post-chase essays "proving" in doctrinal terms why
some pursuers deserve, and some don't, their prey.
In the classroom, law professors supplement casebook cases
with hypothetical cases (by turning a harassed fox into, say, a pet
rabbit), and ask students to extract from legal doctrine a solution
for pet rabbit cases. First-year students, until disabused of their
faith in The Law's ability to pull "true rule" rabbits out of a hat,
strain to figure out which of the casebook's formulas contain the
name of the true legal owner of a contested rabbit. The following
discussion, which concerns a hypothetical version of Pierson
against Post, assumes, however, that ordinarily no rule fits snugly
these kind of disputes, which is why disputes get litigated. What
follows is intended as an antidote to overwrought student submis-
sion to the tyranny of rules.
A translation into plain English of the original opinion in Pier-
son v. Post is, by the way, set out in a later section. For the moment,
though, I've altered Pierson's facts. Note in what follows how the
legal system wraps itself around the bare facts of a dispute so as to
complicate an otherwise simple matter - how, that is, judge and
jury, hunters and foxes, and those rules, maxims, axioms, doc-
trines, principles, standards, canons, tests, formulas, precepts, and
guidelines that lawyers spin into contentious briefs, come together
in a tangle in court.
In this fictitious chase of Br'er Fox, assume a hunter named
Pierce jumps late into the chase and comers the coveted beast.
Pierce fires a poorly-aimed shot that grazes the fox's head, stun-
ning the animal. The other hunter, whose name is Peg, had with
his hounds jumped the fox and, until Pierce's intervention, had
been in close pursuit. Peg arrives immediately after the shooting
51 Id.
52 Id. at 177.
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to claim legal title to the fox (a claim rejected in Pierson v. Post on
the theory that actual capture, not mere close pursuit, is the key to
legal ownership). Peg, in this fictitious case, harangues Pierce, in-
sisting Pierson's capture-not-close-pursuit ruling was a misreading of
The Law. Pierce, exasperated with Peg's legal lecture, picks up the
(apparently) dead fox by its tail, and tosses the beast at Peg.
At this moment the stunned fox, its sleep disturbed by the
bickering over title, revives. In mid-air, the oft-chased beast be-
comes what the lawyer for a badly-bitten Peg would later refer to in
court as a lethal weapon. Peg's formal complaint in the damage
suit files tells the rest: "Defendant Pierce's wrongful release of the
wrathful beast proximately caused plaintiff Peg to suffer severe
bites and multiple lacerations; said personal injuries have led to
plaintiff's damages, by way of medical expenses, lost income, and
grievous pain and suffering, in the amount of $50,000."
"Query," as a teacher of fox-bite law might say to a first-year
torts class, "what does The Law say to us about liability for fox bite
in this hypothetical Peg against Pierce?" A rank beginner might
rashly conjecture that plaintiff Peg loses his damage suit because of
the old property rule that close pursuit falls short of establishing
ownership of a wild fox. But this overlooks the fact that Peg, in this
hypothetical lawsuit, isn't claiming ownership or asking for dam-
ages for property taken; Peg instead asks that Pierce, because
Pierce tossed a lethal fox, be made to pay damages to cover Peg's
fox-bite injuries. So the capture-not-close-pursuit rule of property
is irrelevant to the personal injury tort issue.
A beginner might next suppose that there must exist some
other legal principle settling the question whether plaintiff Peg can
recoup his personal injury losses from Pierce. Yet as time (in first-
year law classes) will tell, not even the cocksure professor of fox-
bite law has firmly in hand a principle that will yield the answer.
Airtight answers are such rare items that frequently the only an-
swers proposed in law classes are those extracted from student vic-
tims by professors posed to gun down first-year efforts to achieve
certitude. After such target practice at student expense, an exas-
perating Professor Kingsfield then poses another unanswerable
question, and the classroom game of hide-and-seek begins afresh.
This law school regime in which there are no firm answers, no
clear right and wrong, is one reason why law students who begin
first-year study as idealists risk ending up as legal guns for hire.
After a while, what is right and wrong tends to get lost in the legal-
istic shuffle. Law students must be wary, as they learn to think like
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lawyers, of losing their pre-law personalities, their friends and
spouses, their politics, and even their souls.
H.L. Mencken once observed that the legal profession "sucks
in and wastes almost as many [good men] as the monastic life con-
sumed in the Middle Ages."5 3 Mencken as usual fudges, but echoes
of Mencken's complaint linger. Crack the law school code if you
will - but beware lest dry legal doctrine smothers all emotion.
Juiceless doctrine purports, falsely, to explain everything. The
Law, intolerant of inexplicability, insists that each decision is driven
by a rule. Feelings, doubts, and hesitation are by convention out of
legal bounds. The law student sucked unknowingly into all this
forced and inhuman certitude can end up confined to a narrowly
structured cosmology, and lose all sense of a freewheeling,
unindoctrined imagination.
Now before analyzing further Peg's fox-bite case, think about
why The Law of the appellate-focused law school is nowhere nailed
to the wall for easy viewing. The reason is that The Law, so far as
easy viewing goes, is an ambitious failure. This is why the exper-
ienced lawyer worries less about what The Law says than who the
judge is. The unstated rationale for the law professor's classroom
routine of questions-but-no-answers is to show that the rules lawyers
deal in have soft centers. The judge, or rather her debate-conclud-
ing decision, it turns out, is The Law; the doctrines paraded in
briefs, arguments, and opinions are background music.
Disputes serious enough to wind up in court are there because
ambiguity in legal discourse forestalls settlement. Turning doctri-
nal ambiguity into decision calls for judge and jury to make
choices, to choose, under cover of rule-of-law ritual, winners and
losers. Yet in shifting the focus of study from doctrine to decision,
students must appreciate that doctrine, though it cannot dictate,
does influence judicial choices. Doctrine first of all affects the way
legal issues are phrased; and doctrine captures the lessons of past
judicial experience. Doctrine may not yield predictable results, but
it reduces the scope of discretionary choices judge and jury must
make. Judge and jury in the end make the hard choices for which
The Law's general propositions alone are too blunt an instrument.
In a changing world, history's lessons wrapped in doctrinal dress
will never be the sole standard for judging what's right for today.
The lawyers' body of rules, like a dead battery, needs a jump-start
from a judge and jury in tune with current demands and
expectations.
53 H.L. Mencken, Editoria4 AMERICAN MERCURY, Jan. 1928, at 35.
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The ideal of a rule of law, meanwhile, comforts those who
crave a legal universe of certainty and predictability. (Law stu-
dents, facing law exams amid casebook disorder, likewise crave a
solid framework to hang their cases on.) But students of judicial
theology must resist the lure of a rhetoric promising more orderli-
ness than life's complications permit. The messy truth is that the
cases students read are decided, despite the casebook's air of doc-
trinal inevitability, amid surprising disorder and human fallibility.
Were students assigned to read the competing lawyers' briefs
filed in appellate cases, this general doctrinal disorder would be far
more apparent. Appellate briefs are elaborate exercises in stretch-
ing legal axioms to their breaking points. The following fox-bite
discussion illustrates this doctrinal disorder. First though, a few
words about procedure. The way lawyers see it, everything that
goes on in the courtroom is either a matter of procedure or sub-
stance. Procedure concerns how and when a case proceeds
through trial and appeal, and how responsibility for decision is di-
vided between judge and jury. Substance concerns the formulas
for socially desirable conduct, formulas that in theory spell out to
judges and jurors directions for doing the right thing - you know,
The Law.
The following comments on Peg's hypothetical fox-bite suit il-
lustrate that when substantive doctrine proves to be, as it so often
is, pliable, what remains is to see how procedure takes over. By this
is meant that the typical indeterminate rule is fleshed out with the
policy preferences of judge and jury according to legally blessed
procedures for standardizing the roles played by judge and jury.
Understanding the precise nature of what judge and jury do, how-
ever, is complicated. Conventional legal textbooks repeat, for ex-
ample, the old saw about juries deciding only fact questions and
judges deciding only law questions. And perhaps in centuries past
this description fit the way judge and jury split the job of judging.
But no more.
You, dear reader, are here again asked to entertain a descrip-
tion of the legal (law-fact) process that is at odds with conventional
legal thought. Such stepping outside of The Law's official descrip-
tion of itself to take an unvarnished look at legaldom is difficult for
the novice, but, for a clear picture, necessary. In the law-fact area,
legal language is woefully inadequate as an indicator of what
judges and juries do. With respect to the division of functions be-
tween judge and jury, the legal textbook picture of the jury as sole
factfinder and judge as sole lawgiver is belied by the reality that
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judges regularly intervene in factfinding, and juries are heavily in-
volved in deciding legal (policy) questions. This means judge and
jury collectively choose among any conflicting factual versions of
exactly what happened, say, on the day Pierce unleashed his foxy
weapon at poor Peg; and judge and jury likewise cooperate in the
question-of-law job of deciding, on the basis of the earlier what-
happened determination, whether Peg ought under such circum-
stances to be awarded compensation.54
Learning the procedure for this judge-andjury partnership in
factfinding and lawmaking would be a hairy business even if the
textbook description of the law-fact division weren't so cockeyed.
When you add textbook confusion about the role ofjudge and jury
to the confusion about how much rules contribute to decision-mak-
ing, you see why The Law is a maze. The casebook's rationaliza-
tions are, after all, with all the nuances of procedure and subtleties
of legal lore, legal puzzles that even veteran lawyers strain to
decipher.
Lawyers earn their fees by being able to maneuver in such
troubled waters. Lawyers for a Peg or a Pierce can stuff briefcases
full of principles and maxims "proving" either side of the fox-bite
argument. Parallel sets of rules (and precedent cases) pointing
vaguely in different directions is a key feature of the appellate
world. Rules, as a close reading of opinions shows, tend to travel in
complementary pairs, each pair containing generalities out of
which opposing lawyers draw divergent arguments. After a few
months of indoctrination in casebook sophistry, the incoherence
in a system that both worships rules and at the same time avoids
capture by those rules becomes the norm-and that's when, from
the student egg, a lawyer is hatched.
Now for a closer look at how Peg v. Pierce touches on common
law (unwritten, but hinted at in opinions), statutory law (written,
but in legalese), and constitutional law (written, but not in stone).
Our primary concern is dividing up Peg v. Pierce into legal issues for
judge and jury to chew on. And this raises the matter of what kind
of questions do trial judges actually send tojuries, and what kind of
questions do judges keep, as it were, under their robes.
54 The law-fact distinction in legal discourse is noteworthy for the artificiality of the
distinction. See Jerome Frank, What Courts do in Fact, 26 InL. L. REv. 645, 652-53
(1932) ("The formal law description of the judicial process is false where juries are
involved."); Stephen A. Weiner, The CivilJuy Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL.
L. RF.v. 1867 (1966).
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B. Judge And Jury
To speak lawyerly about title to a captive fox (property) or
about fox-bite damage liability (tort), the affair must be transposed
into the terms in which lawyers at work think and speak. Ordinary
English is out, the vernacular of legalism is in. The dispute about
who, in fairness, should bear the costs of Peg's fox bite, instead of a
straightforward matter of moral choice, becomes in lawspeak a
legal issue. Legal issues revolve around legal concepts such as Neg-
ligence and Battery, two pieces of tort law of interest to the lawyers
in Peg.
Tort is an overarching legal category covering the whole per-
sonal injury area. It includes sub-categories such as Negligence
and Battery. Negligence and Battery are examples of a dozen or
more theories for recovering tort damages. A tort, by the way, may
involve either unintentional or intentional (defendant) conduct.
Negligence is an unintentional variety of tort; Battery is an inten-
tional tort. Revolving around Negligence and Battery, moreover, is
an array of even more subordinate pieces of The Law.
In Peg, Negligence and Battery are legal labels that Mr. Peg
attaches to his fox-bite complaint so that he qualifies for entry into
tort court. Whether Peg's suit for fox-bite fits more easily into the
Negligence or Battery pigeonhole will depend on discovering at
trial further particulars about why Pierce aimed the fox at Peg.
Law students, by reading a variety of tort cases, develop a feel for
which claims for wrongful personal injury fit into which categories
of tort.
Placing Peg tentatively into the Negligence category means one
trial issue likely to be raised is this: did defendant Pierce use Rea-
sonable Care to avoid injury when he threw the fox at Peg (Negli-
gence doctrine says that if Pierce failed to use Reasonable Care, he
is Negligent and therefore liable for personal injury damages)?
Now that this Reasonable Care issue has been isolated, who decides
it, judge orjury? Whether the Reasonable Care issue is for the jury
depends ultimately on judicial custom.55 Lawyers call Reasonable
Care issues "Fact" issues for juries. The circumstance that Reason-
able Care calls for a value judgment about "reasonableness" -
about who ought to pay for the biting accident - and is in no sense
an issue of empirical fact, is of no moment. Conventional judicial
rhetoric about the jury being limited to factfinding is misleading;
55 See BAsic CONTRAcr LAw (Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg eds., 4th ed.
1981).
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
Reasonable Care issues go to juries despite the circumstance that
"reasonableness" begs an ought answer, and involves no dispute
whatsoever about what, as a matter of plain English, happened
factually.
In the courtroom, where all issues are either Fact or Law,
many observers are so used to textbook platitudes about jury
"factfinding" that they never stop to think about the intellectual
chore thatjuries are actually asked to perform. Although juries do
help solve factual disputes about what witnesses saw, touched,
tasted, smelt, and felt, juries also help solve nonfactual disputes
calling for policy choices. The lawyers' Fact therefore may or may
not be plain English fact. Only in legal antiquity did juries decide
only factual matters of what happened; yet, the factfinder label
borne by the jury remains in place despite later expansions of the
jury's role into issues that at bottom are about who ought to pay.
This is why distinguishing between questions for the judge and
questions for the jury is a matter finally of courtroom custom -
with the legal labels of Law and Fact applied after the fact.56
The lawyers' Law-Fact distinction is, in short, unrelated to the
lay speaker's "law" and "fact." When the judge says issues given to
the jury are Fact, what the judge is really saying is that any issue,
once passed to the jury, by legal definition becomes an issue of
Fact. So, for instance, if in the unlikely event jurors are formally
asked their opinion on socialized medicine, then in the eyes of The
Law even such a political judgment becomes, inexorably, a finding
ofjury Fact. Common English words from off the street like "fact"
are in this way adapted for legal use by draining them of lay mean-
ing and filling them with new legal meaning. Legal language for
this reason bears more than a passing resemblance to that kind of
secret writing in which the content of words has been rearranged
to fit clandestine convenience.
Compare for a moment the common, garden variety law-fact
distinction as it's used among the planet's non-lawyer English-
speaking peoples. For the most part, separating the factual from
the nonfactual requires no intellectual gymnastics. Putting aside
for now the lawyer's twist on the Queen's English, the details of
what happened at the scene of the hunt the day the fox attacked Peg
56 See Nathan Isaacs, The Law and The Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1922)
("Whether a particular question is to be treated as a question of law or a question of
fact is not in itself a question of fact, but a highly artificial question of law."). See also
Willard H. Pedrick, Causation, The "W4ho Done It" Issue, and Arno Becht, 1978 WAsH. U.
L.Q. 645, 647.
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are, if disputed, clearly factual disputes, a clear-cut inquiry into
pure history (did Pierce see the fox open its eyes and so have rea-
son to suspect that the fox he tossed at Peg was playing possum?).
On the other hand, once some version of what actually transpired
that day is adopted for courtroom purposes, whether Peg, on the
basis of such a historical event, ought to collect money from Pierce
is, for plain English proponents, clearly a nonfactual moral-policy-
political-legal question.
What precisely happened on the day Br'er awoke and attacked
Peg is, like the old question about the precise New World spot
where Columbus first landed, a (plain English) factual issue be-
cause these are events found in the empirical world - events ob-
jectively verifiable. Peg's and Columbus's stories are pieces of the
past tied to evidence of what witnesses heard, saw, tasted, felt, and
smelled. A factual matter is an event or object ordinary citizens
point to by using words of description such as "furry red tail." The
beach where Columbus landed may never be identified with com-
plete certitude; but whatever, the inquiry remains a factual one, a
matter of finding enough empirical evidence to permit a descrip-
tion of that lost Caribbean strip of sand. This plain English "fact" is
physical, not metaphysical.
Suppose now that whatever factual dispute that exists about
what happened in the woods the day Peg was bitten is settled. No
descriptive issue remains. What remains is metaphysical, the policy
issue of whether Pierce ought to bear the costs of Peg's injuries. A
comparable (and non-empirical) question, to revert to Columbus,
is whether that great navigator should be judged blameworthy for
driving his sailors so hard that their health was impaired. Such
questions about Pierce's and Columbus's blameworthiness prompt
words not of description but of judgment such as "ought" and
"fault" and "reasonableness." Words of judgment signal a policy
evaluation of Pierson's or Columbus's conduct, the sort of intellec-
tual task we associate with legislators (or maybe judges) when
they're shaping the nation's politics. This is the kind of evaluation
into policy that only lawyers wedded to legal cant would label, as
they often do, an inquiry into Fact.
Deciding whether defendant Pierce failed to use Reasonable
Care, whether decided by judge or by jury, and whether given the
lawyers' label of Law or Fact, is in any event no mere empirical job
of describing a past real world event. Evaluating the merits of forc-
ing Pierce to pay damages is (in the broad sense) undeniably polit-
ical. What's called for is an ought judgment involving moral,
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
economic, and social factors. In sum, if plain English suddenly
came into vogue among the legal crowd, what Pierce did to Peg
would be a matter of fact; and what the courts should do about what
Pierce did would be, on the other hand, a matter of legal policy or
law.
The terms Law and Fact are therefore, to trial lawyers, nothing
more than a sort of legal shorthand for designating how lawsuit
issues are split between judge and jury.57 Law and Fact labels in
legal language camouflage the true nature of the roles of judge
andjury. To intone that the Reasonable Care issue in a Negligence
lawsuit is for the jury (which is customary legal procedure) marks
this matter a Fact issue. Yet the Fact label by itself fails to reveal
whether the jury's job is in reality that of historian, or policymaker,
or both. Since juries decide what-happened issues as well as who-
should-pay questions of policy, careful lawyers look behind the Fact
label and tailor trial strategy to fit the jury's actual role in the par-
ticular case, be it historian or policymaker.
Suppose, at the fictitious trial of Peg v. Pierce, the testimony
differs about whether Pierce knew, when he threw the fox at Peg,
whether the fox was dead or alive. Peg says Pierce saw the fox wake
up; Pierce claims he saw no movement, and thought the fox was
deceased. This issue about what happened (in plain English, a fact
question) would be passed to the jury as a preliminary part of the
Reasonable Care (Negligence) issue. Once the jury settles on a
preferred version of what Pierce knew and when did Pierce know
it, still the jury must - in judging whether Pierce used Reasonable
Care - in essence, judge whether Pierce's conduct merits making
Pierce pay damages.
So here is what the Reasonable Care inquiry boils down to: a
job for the jury as historian to reproduce the scene in the woods;
and a second Law-making job for the jury in judging whether
Pierce under these circumstances deserves being labeled Negligent
and saddled with Peg's fox-bite costs. Simply calling the jury's in-
quiry into Negligence a matter of Fact, as legal custom dictates,
obscures the broad waterfront which the jury is given to patrol.
Nor is the Law-Fact shell game limited to passing the pea between
judge and jury.
Appellate judges also use the Law-Fact distinction tojustify ex-
amining certain appeals from lower courts and agencies more rig-
orously than others. Legal theory says appellate judges are to
57 See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 279 (1930).
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scrutinize thoroughly a lower tribunal's conclusions of Law; find-
ings of Fact, on the other hand, merit a weaker, relatively cursory
check.58 The fact that legaldom's Law and Fact overlap so as to be
flip sides of the same coin makes it awfully convenient for appellate
judges to vary the intensity of judicial review to suit the moment.
High court judges artfully manage the situation by attaching the
Law label when opting for a vigorous review, and the interchangea-
ble Fact label when preferring a passive, once-over-lightly review.
Behind all this judicial power-playing with the elusive Law-Fact
distinction, there are laudable reasons for subterfuge. When
judges pass policy (Negligence) issues to juries unfettered by con-
crete guidelines (Reasonable Care) for decision, jurors have the
flexibility needed to shape grass-roots decisions to fit the current
community mood.59 On the other hand, judges can control, with
subtle Law-Fact maneuvers, runaway juries that need reining in -
and at the same time keep alive the tradition of using juries to
promote grass-roots democracy.
Understanding the legal process requires persistence in dig-
ging beneath the legalisms to see what's going on, in refusing to
assume, in other words, that Fact means fact. The judiciary's song
and dance about Law and Fact, moreover, doesn't begin to lay bare
the complicated way in which judges share the courtroom work-
load with jurors. So, given this briar patch of procedure and doc-
trine, let's look more closely at The Law of Negligence and Battery
and at Peg's fox bite claim.
C. Negligence Or Battery
The torts casebook, no big surprise, offers no final solution to
cases like Peg against Pierce. No law book anywhere can or does
spell out who must, in Law, pay the costs of accidental injuries.
What casebook study illustrates, instead, are the terms of legal de-
bate, the courtroom procedure for structuring argument, and the
method by which judges divide chores between judge and jury.
The code language in which lawyers and judges carry on this wordy
business includes, besides Law and Fact, such legalisms as Offer
and Acceptance from contract law, Manslaughter and Malice
Aforethought from criminal law, Fee Simple Title and Covenant
58 See ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 75 (Kenneth Culp Davis ed., 6th ed. 1977).
59 As Judge Learned Hand said in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFES-
SIONAL COMPETENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY THE REPORT ON THE ARDEN HOUSE CONFER-
ENCE, Dec. 16-19, 1958, at 118 ("We say to Uuries in negligence cases]: 'What do you
think is fair? What do you think is reasonable?' We call it a question of fact, but we
have to close our eyes when we say it, for obviously it isn't.").
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Running With The Land from real property, and of course those
two heavyweights championed by Peg's personal injury lawyer, Neg-
ligence and Battery.
To suggest that Negligence and Battery have exotic legal
meanings misses the mark. More to the point is a reminder that
the Negligence and Battery concepts are to a large degree empty of
any meaning, exotic or otherwise. The trick in adjusting to legal-
speak is understanding how these code terms sit back and wait for
judge and jury, with the prompting of imaginative lawyers, to fill up
their empty interiors with shifting meanings on a case-by-case basis.
Suppose, for example, that a Peg v. Piercejury, after agreeing
on a version of the factual circumstances surrounding the fox bite,
concludes that Pierce in fairness should pay Peg's losses. The jury
expresses its pro-Peg sympathies by labeling Pierce deficient in
Reasonable Care, which is a roundabout way of saying that Pierce
was Negligent, which is a roundabout way of saying that fairness
demands that Pierce pay. Until the jury injects its notion of fair-
ness into quiescent Negligence and Reasonable Care, these legal
labels are like mute actors in search of a playwright.
Thus, the jury by its judgment gives meaning to open-ended
Negligence. But it's a tentative meaning. Slightly different circum-
stances surrounding the tossing of a lethal fox, or the seating of a
different set of jurors, will alter in the next case the meaning of
Negligence. The legal system begins its work afresh with each new
case. Negligence, when the Peg v. Pierce hearing ends, becomes
again a half-empty vessel. In the next case, judge and jury will
again flesh out with intuitive notions of justice The Law's skeletal
doctrines.
Legal beginners, awash with casebook rhetoric that is hard to
shape into a manageable package of principle, may think, as I once
did, that the legal scene is hopelessly short of rhyme and reason.
But over time the malleable, question-begging aspect of legal doc-
trine begins to make sense. It all adds up to a system in which a
surface appearance of neutral rules satisfies the human craving for
equitable order, and yet The Law's formulas are loose enough to
permit discreet adjustment to meet current demands and expecta-
tions. Fuzzy doctrine in the end accommodates the changing atti-
tudes of judge and jury about public policy.
Tort law provides a semblance of structure in the form of a
rule. The rule says that if someone like Pierce is Negligent, and is
the Proximate Cause of injury to another, he must pay damages.
Negligence, defined in terms of (less than) Reasonable Care, is the
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trigger for liability. Yet the indeterminacy of Reasonableness obvi-
ously begs the question of whether Pierce ought to have to pay. It
is with reference to such question-begging doctrines that first-year
students, bombarded with novel fact situations, are asked to spot
the all-important legal issues.
So, although we cannot confidently predict whether Pierce in
court can collect fox-bite damages, we can practice at this point at
least what students of casebook opinions are asked to do. Students
are asked to spot, from among a stream of facts and the relevant
legal doctrines, what law teachers call the "issues raised." Note,
therefore, in our stream of fox-bite facts, the presence of an issue
other than the Negligence issue. A practiced casebook reader such
as Peg's lawyer, in reviewing the raw facts about Pierce's fanciful
fling of a fox might well consider, as an alternative to the Negli-
gence theory of suit, a Battery theory. This in turn raises the ques-
tion of how a complex of Battery doctrines translates into formal
issues of Law and Fact for judge and jury.
It would be neater of course if fox-bite (or auto crash or defec-
tive lawn mower) cases all fit into a single tort pigeonhole. But the
legal process, to the consternation of neat-nics, often tolerates
overlapping categories such that Negligence and Battery concepts
may each cover the same fox bite. Practiced legal minds adjust eas-
ily to the possibility that an angry fox can stir up a legal flap by way
of Battery, and at the same time start an argument on a Negligence
theme. Such fluidity in reasoning is one reason why law schools
produce so many politicians.
So, tort lawyers scanning Peg's fox-bite claim would give
thought to both Negligence and Battery (and perhaps even a third
tort theory of liability, Intentional Infliction Of Mental Distress)
and stand ready to argue for or against all such theories. Lawyers
can do this because their legal minds are full of casebook tech-
niques for debating Battery or Negligence. The casebook formulas
may be somewhat removed from a fox-bite scene, but yet are close
enough to serve as raw material for composing briefs for either Peg
or Pierce.
The fact that Battery is an intentional tort, and Negligence is
wrongdoing of an unintentional sort, doesn't necessarily mean
Pierce's throwing the fox at Peg fits under one of these tort theo-
ries and not the other. Although Pierson's conduct, to the lay
mind, could hardly be deemed intentional and unintentional at
the same time, the legal mind glides over such illogic. "Inten-
tional," as every law student soon learns, is one of those words so
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fuzzy around the edges that it slides imperceptibly into the equally
fuzzy edges of "unintentional."
As for the Battery theory of damage-suit recovery, here again
casebook formulas are loose as a goose. The Battery rule, in fox-
bite terms, says that if Pierce's ungentlemanly transfer of the fox to
Peg amounted to an intentional Hostile Touching, then Pierce in-
deed Battered plaintiff Peg, and must pay for his tort. Other
equally abstract statements of the Battery rule, by the way, are to be
found in appellate opinions; all, however, like the Hostile Touch-
ing formulation, fall short of settling for good our hypothetical Peg
v. Pierce issue of whether legal Battery with a furry fox occurred.
Peg's alternative claim of Hostile Touching thus raises another full-
blown issue of the kind law professors expect casebook-wise stu-
dents to recognize and articulate: did Pierson commit, by a Hostile
(and therefore intentional) Touching, a Battery?
The Battery-Hostile Touching issue, like the Reasonable Care
issue under the Negligence tort, is by judicial custom called a Fact
issue. So here again, the jury must try to reconstruct the fox-bite
scene, and then in effect judge, by attaching or refusing to attach
the Hostile Touching label, whether Pierson as a policy matter
should pay. In this way Battery, like its cousin Negligence, adapts,
by the jury's input, its coloration to its immediate surroundings.
D. Brooding Omnipresence In The Sky60
Negligence and Battery theories, alternative game plans for
hunter Peg's civil damage suit, are part of that common law no-
where written down in official, authoritative, stone-tablet fashion.
The reason there's no stone-tablet rendering of the common law is
that the common law of the judiciary is not like a stone, to be
passed from law teacher to student; the common law is like a river,
constantly on the move, constantly being refreshed.
Nor are judicial opinions, in legal theory, the official deposito-
ries of the common law. First-year seekers wonder where then, if
not in the judges' opinions, is the judge-made common law hiding?
Legal theorists say the judges' written reasons for decision merely
reflect (offer evidence of) the common law; the solid stuff of the
common law resides, law students are warned, elsewhere.
During the early weeks at law school, first-year minds, trying to
pin down concrete rules, grow curious about the bedrock source of
60 This is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous characterization of what The
Law is not. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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the common law. Yet at downtown law offices veteran lawyers sell-
ing The Law to a mystified public give little thought to where The
Law comes from. By the same token, advanced law students worry
little about legalism's philosophical underpinnings; law school by
the third year has turned into a game of spotting issues and
manipulating legal generalities, and the earlier search for bedrock
sources abandoned.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, that skeptical man of The Law who
on occasion did think about original sources, narrowed the search
by reporting that The Law is no "brooding omnipresence in the
sky."61 Holmes concluded that The Law is less than godlike and,
moreover, impossible to capture in phrases such as Reasonable
Care and Hostile Touching. For the handful of student-scholars
determined to track, along with Holmes and others, The Law to its
lair, law school offers an esoteric third-year seminar in jurispru-
dence. For those, however, who prefer to skip jurisprudence and
to have the matter boiled down to the nub, perhaps the best solu-
tion is to say that Law is simply decision, it's what judges do, not what
they say.
Whatever the origins of The Law, whether an inhuman force
of nature or simply courtroom decision, the law school's penchant
for focusing on the cutting appellate edge of litigation forestalls
certainty and predictability in casebook legalism. The casebook's
tracking of appellate proceedings often appears to be a wilderness
of single instances relieved only here and there by faint connecting
threads of doctrine. Because appellate cases involve the courts'
most elaborate machinery for resolving the most esoteric of issues,
it is little wonder that opinions are such an unholy mix of a wilder-
ness-of-single-instances and of a body-of-rules.
Complicating further the job of learning to think legally is the
practice among legal people of splitting into opposing camps over
how to depict and analyze The Law. Economic analysis, for exam-
ple, is currently in favor as a yardstick for measuring the worth of
certain facets of courtroom government. In addition, there are
moral, political, social, and psychological standards for appraising
the legal process. Law teachers, although by definition expert at
viewing human affairs through a hierarchy of legal rules, neverthe-
less exhibit a wide range of attitudes about what makes the hierar-
chy of rules tick. Law students never know from class to class what
version of The Law they're going to hear.
61 I1&
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Although law professors collectively endorse the idea of a legal
system primarily rule-driven, this is like saying Episcopalians are
wedded to scripture: we're talking lip-service here. Law professors
and Episcopalians respectively pledge allegiance to The Law and to
God, but otherwise, they both bring little intensity to the worship
service.
First-year students at some point give up trying to make com-
plete sense out of casebook reasoning, and turn to diluting their
rules with realism about what judges do with the rules. All lawyers
today, although subject to the pull of rule-of-law gravity, realize to
one degree or another that the search for the blackletter rule is an
important, but partly ceremonial rite. Between the lines of opin-
ions, savvy readers can't help but see the round holes into which
judges can't begin to insert square pegs. The casebook'sjuxtaposi-
tion of vague rules with ill-fitting case facts inevitably breeds rule-
skepticism. The rule of law, however important as a social icon,
fails finally as a description of the legal system. The rule of law is
not a seamless web of doctrine as "beautifully abstract," as novelist
Joyce Carol Oates ironically puts it, "as the rising and falling of the
tides, the clockwork orbiting of planets, the ghostly trajectory of
starlight across the void."62
For further evidence of the complexity in decision-making,
and of the pitfalls in staring too fixedly at bloodless doctrine, we
look now at the impact on our fictitious fox-bite lawsuit of statutory
law. Statutory law and common law intersect constantly, and often
ambiguously. The latter is the case when we come to consider the
effect on hunter Peg's damage suit of his having chased Br'er Fox
in violation of a state statute barring fox hunting on Sunday.
E. Never On Sunday
State criminal codes outlawing retail sales and outdoor recrea-
tion are out of fashion today, although pockets of day-of-rest legis-
lation remain.61 So it's possible that a latter-day Sunday
transgressor such as plaintiff Peg could face a fine or jail. These
criminal statutes are called blue laws. Blue laws originated at a
time when church morality found its way more readily into crimi-
nal legislation. Surviving Sunday blue laws manage to escape con-
demnation as an unconstitutional joinder of church and state on
the judicial theory, and I do mean theory, that Sunday day-of-rest
statutes merely promote a secular day of peace and quiet; Sunday
62 JoyCE CAROL OATES, AmERICAN APPETIES 189 (Harper & Row 1989).
63 E.g., 2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 493-500 (1992).
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just happens to be the day, or so judges claim, that legislators chose
to paint a restful blue.'
So how might a criminal ban on Sunday fox hunting connect
to a civil damage suit for a fox bite? In truth, a Sunday blue law
violation most likely wouldn't dampen Peg's lawsuit prospects. Yet
for the reasons that follow it's nevertheless unclear whether Peg
and his lawyer can dismiss out of hand an argument by defendant
Pierce that blue law violators such as plaintiff Peg should be dis-
missed empty-handed from tort court.
Conceivably the legislature, in banning Sunday hunts, might
have added a punishment clause to its blue statute disqualifying
hunters injured on Sunday from filing civil tort actions. Rarely,
however, do legislatures drafting criminal codes add to a violator's
punishment by purposefully foreclosing tort award possibilities. 65
Yet the fact that legislators draft criminal statutes with no thought
to affecting civil tort outcomes doesn't end the matter. Judges in
tort cases often take it upon themselves to punish civil damage-suit
litigants who incidental to an accidental injury violate some penal
statute.
The problem for tort students is guessing when a litigant's
criminal violation might produce negative tort results. Should a
jury in Peg v. Pierce label Pierce negligent for throwing the fox at
Peg? Pierce's defense lawyer may have no other defense to Peg's
lawsuit than to remind the court that ,on the Lord's day, Peg be-
longed legally at home, or in church. All of which brings us to the
edge of the extremely gray legal area, that of legislative intent.
Pierce's never-on-Sunday defense will likely trigger debate on what
exactly the legislature long ago intended to accomplish by outlaw-
ing Sunday fox hunts.
On only one condition does Peg's hunting violation bar his
personal injury claim: defendant Pierce must prove that the legisla-
ture's Sunday ban was intended to protect people such as Peg
against the risk of hunting injuries. And this is where the fog thick-
ens. What goes on in the collective mind of a two-house legislature
is often harder to pin down than the meaning of Law.
Statutory interpretation - the ostensible devining of legisla-
tive intent - is a complicated subject taking up much law school
time. Lawyers concoct imaginative theories for discovering legisla-
tive intent. The reason legislative intent produces so much lawy-
64 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 447-49 (1961).
65 See MARc A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATiVES 75 (5th
ed. 1992).
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erly thumbsucking is that, in a sense, there's often no such thing as
legislative intent. A legislature may pass a bill with general goals
collectively in mind, but when it comes to litigation over the partic-
ulars, the idea of a specific legislative intent frequently dissolves.
Legislative intent becomes, at this point, just another legal fiction.
Legislators, due to the frailties of language, the shortness of fore-
sight, and the compromises inherent in the democratic process,
have no choice but to legislate in broad, open-ended terms. At the
litigation stage, therefore, the idea of a relevant legislative intent is
frequently wishful thinking on the part of a judiciary looking for a
hook to hang their statutory interpretation hats on. Judges asked
to interpret empty or vague statutory terms often are reduced to
reading their policy preferences into a statute and then palming
the result off as "legislative intent." Judges use this "legislative in-
tent" ploy because, the rule of law dictates that the "legislative in-
tent" fiction be maintained so as to keep The Law free of the
horribles of judicial legislation.
This pretense about "legislative intent" is tied, if loosely, to
bedrock principle. Bedrock principle here says that judges in a
democratic society bend to the legislative will. Judges, in a "govern-
ment of laws and not of men,"66 are therefore in no position to
point out that the emperor wears no clothes - that lawsuits enter
unforeseen areas no legislature could have made allowances for.
Bedrock principle aside, the reality is that statutory codes work
only because judges in practice join in a lawmaking partnership
with legislators in creating The Law that dribbles out case by case
in the name of statutory interpretation.
The fact that "legislative intent" has much in common with
fake storefronts in western movies embarrasses modern-day expo-
nents of legal science. Rule-of-law apologists work mightily to
make "legislative intent" appear more than cardboard. Judges
squeeze statutory language (and legislative history) dry trying to
extract a drop of "intent." The history of a bill's passage through
the legislature is ransacked for evidence that some legislator may
have foreseen the danger in waking a sleeping fox. Statutory inter-
pretation opinions are full of talk about judicial aids for extracting
meaning from legislative text. These aids, which courts call canons
of statutory construction, illustrate how legal rules tend to travel in
66 E.g., MAss. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXX ("In the government of this commonwealth,
the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers,
or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive pow-
ers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.").
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contradictory pairs.67 For instance, one canon says statutes that al-
ter common law should be narrowly construed. The idea here is
that judge-made common law is so splendid a work that legislators
presumably will tinker only reluctantly with such near-perfection.
Yet on the other side of the canonical coin is the contradictory
canon that says statutes designed to remedy social ills (and in the
process displace common law) are to be, get this, broadly inter-
preted.6" You see why lawyers argue a lot.
Occasionally legislatures spell out the particulars of what they
intend to accomplish by passing a bill. But hardly would this be the
case in instances such as a never-on-Sunday statute. A legislature
wary of constitutional separation-of-church-and-state restraints
would hardly wish to confess in statutory print to pandering to a
religious lobby keen on keeping hunters in their Sunday pews. For
this reason, defendant Pierce would more likely point to judicial
precedent endorsing a secular day-of-rest rationale for blue laws -
and from this day-of-rest "intent" argue that the never-on-Sunday
command should be seen as including a legislative wish to reduce
hunting accidents. If judges can buy into this secular day-of-rest
fiction, and many do, then Pierce's selling the Sunday ban in Peg as
an outdoor safety measure is conceivable.
Selling judges on imaginative versions of legislative intent is
made easier by the fact that not only do legislative drafters often
shy from spelling out details, but also because the legislative history
of a bill's passage is often obscure or unavailable. Blue laws en-
tered the statute books back when legislatures kept few or no writ-
ten records of floor debates or committee deliberations. Judges
often face statutes whose vague generalizations, combined with a
faded legislative history, pose issues of legislative interpretation cry-
ing out for judicial creativity. Such is the case with Pierce's last-
ditch effort to avoid paying Peg's fox-bite damages by pointing to
Peg's Sunday sin.
In the unlikely but not unthinkable event that Pierce's Sunday
defense to Peg's damage suit strikes ajudge's fancy, the next step is
determining what negative impact a judge might assign Peg be-
cause of his statutory violation. At first glance the question of what
effect Peg's Sunday breach is to have on his personal injury case
would seem to be a statutory interpretation matter, a clear issue of
Law for the judge to settle. And most judges in most cases in most
67 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
68 Id. at 401.
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states will indeed say that the consequence of Peg's criminality is in
their Law-deciding hands. Thesejudges, furthermore, will declare,
as custom dictates, that Pierce's blue law defense is a complete
(Contributory Negligence Per Se) defense, and rule without the
jury's help that Peg, because of his Contributory Negligence, de-
serves no damages on his Negligence claim.
Some courts, however, will call the question of whether Peg's
Sunday violation should kill his tort claim an issue of Fact (Contrib-
utory Negligence) for the jury.6 9 If at this point you object to the
idea of a civil jury, rather than a judge, judging the meaning of a
criminal statute, consider this: Whether sinner Peg is to be denied
civil damages will not, regardless of who decides, involve any actual
legislative intent. Pierce's Sunday defense, remember, is tied to a
criminal statute drafted by a legislature with no thought given to
regulating damage-suit liability. So, even though judges in tort
cases involving criminal breaches speak the language of statutory
interpretation, what judges (or juries) actually do in such cases is
borrow policy ideas from the criminal code for importation into
personal injury common law. And once the borrowed criminal
policy takes on common law coloration, disputes often arise about
which accidents are covered by the borrowed statutory principle.
This in turn means judges must decide whether to label as Fact or
Law such statutorily-derived coverage issues. So in the end, what is
Law or Fact becomes itself a highly technical question of Law for
the common lawjudge. Got all this? If so, you're well on your way
to legal wizardry.
Dumping this whole Sunday-ban matter into the jury's lap
would, in Peg v. Pierce, take the form of asking the jury whether
plaintiff Peg failed to use Reasonable Care, and so was Contribu-
torily Negligent, on the day of the hunt. The jury would be told to
consider Peg's statutory Sunday crime as a part of Peg's total con-
duct which it is to review for Reasonableness. Under this scenario,
Peg wins compensation only if he passes the Reasonable Care test.
If, however, the jury concludes that Peg's Sunday crime is tanta-
mount to (un)Reasonable Care, such a finding of Contributory
Negligence cancels out any Negligence on Pierce's part and marks
plaintiff Peg a tort loser.
In tort cases involving a criminal breach, the trial judge's deci-
69 See generally, DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 141 (2d ed. 1993) (dis-
cussing the jury's role as the trier of fact in assessing negligence); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 231-32 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the
negligence standard and the effect this standard has in statutory violation cases).
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sion whether to involve the jury in gauging the impact of a statu-
tory violation may depend on which government entity adopted
the criminal regulation in question. The tendency is for judges to
treat breaches of statutes drafted by a state or federal legislature as
automatic equivalents of (un)Reasonable Care, and to enter a
(Negligence Per Se) judgment against the statutory violator with-
out asking the jury its opinion. If the breached regulation, how-
ever, is the legislative handiwork of a lesser agency of government,
judges customarily treat the regulatory violation merely as some evi-
dence of Negligence.7" This means the jury, in deciding whether a
litigant deserves the Negligent label, will be allowed to consider for
what it's worth a litigant's breach of, say, a county ordinance.
Assume now that Peg's lawyer persuades the jury to label de-
fendant Pierce a Negligent defendant, or else a Batterer, and that
plaintiff Peg escapes the never-on-Sunday defense of Contributory
Negligence. The jury, with the trial judge's collaboration, then
awards Peg, in addition to $50,000 in actual damages, an additional
$50,000 for something called punitive damages. This latter sum is
by way of punishing Pierce and discouraging others from engaging
in conduct the jury deemed "egregious."
Punitive damages are a controversial subject because of com-
plaints by manufacturers and others that juries are too quick to
label a company's conduct "egregious." Large damage-suit awards
inflated by punitive damages lead reformers to advocate that
judges give juries less latitude in deciding whether defendant be-
havior is "egregious," and, if "egregious," how many punitive dol-
lars to award. Peg v. Pierce thus encounters, due to this debate over
punitive damages, yet a third aspect of The Law, which is The Law
at its loftiest, which is constitutional law. This is the body of juris-
prudence made up of state and federal court decisions keying on
the text of a state or federal constitution.
F. Due Process Of The Law
Defendant Pierce's lawyer, who has her back to the wall at this
point, digs deep into her bag of defense arguments for something
to reduce for Pierce the sting of a $100,000 judgment. What
Pierce's lawyer comes up with - on appeal of the $100,000 award
- is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, which commands state governments to follow
fair procedures in taking a person's life, liberty, or $100,000.71 So
70 KEETON ET AL.., supra note 69, at 230-31.
71 U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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here is the final issue spawned by Peg v. Pierce: does a state court
system that offers little guidance to jurors in deciding whether and
how much punitive damages to assess deprive Pierce of his prop-
erty ($100,000) without Due Process of The Law?
This issue about the constitutional limits of jury power clearly
should be decided by a judge. Although occasionally juries are
given pieces of statutes to interpret, judges keep for themselves the
authority to judge constitutional issues. So what, then, qualifies as
Due Process in punitive damages cases? Did Pierce, socked with
$50,000 in punitives, get the Process that is Due? Ultimately, only
the nine justices sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court can settle this
issue. Pierce's defense lawyer, knowing that the long-simmering
Due Process controversy surrounding punitive damages is still be-
ing aired in the courts,7'2 combs the law library for precedents in
which judges have ruled trial procedures unconstitutional.
The best constitutional law opinions from which to draw Due
Process arguments are opinions dealing with trial procedures that
most resemble the contested Peg procedure for setting punitive
damages. Peg's fox-bite lawyers will search initially for Due Process
opinions involving tortjuries. If such near-precedents are in short
supply, the lawyers will improvise arguments drawing on language
from less similar cases. If necessary, legal arguments can be drawn
from conceptions of fairness and justice derived from sources
other than judicial opinions, such as legal treaties and periodicals.
Due Process briefs in Peg might also draw from relevant mid-nine-
teenth-century history concerning the drafting and ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. (This may be barren territory given
that the Reconstruction Congress which wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment had Civil War matters on its mind far removed from
punitive tort damages.) One faint historical possibility would be to
survey mid-nineteenth-century practices in jury trials, and to infer
from those practices what was thought to be fair procedure back
when the Fourteenth Amendment was written.
But enough of fox-bite jurisprudence. Learning The Law
through the prism of a casebook is, as you can see, a many-
splendored thing.
IV. LEGAL SCIENCE SPAWNS CASEBOOK
A. Origins Of Casebook
An old cartoon shows a professor drafting an exam in long-
72 See e.g., Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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hand with his right hand while having his left hand slowly crushed
in a vice. As the vice grows ever tighter, the exam-maker reacts to
his pain by gleefully composing ever nastier questions. Law stu-
dents sometimes see law professor editors who compile opinions
into casebooks as similar hand-in-vice sadists. Students keen on
having The Law presented straightforwardly are doomed to disap-
pointment by the casebook's sadistic way of merely hinting at the
shape and texture of legal affairs.
Yet presenting The Law as a straightforward (textbook) set of
ocean-wide generalizations about historical judicial practices, as
was early law school custom, proved numbing. Viewing what courts
do solely through the lenses of a static body of legal maxims gives a
misleading picture of The Law in action. A casebook devoid of the
blood and guts of real-life courtroom battles, and filled instead
with lifeless commentaries about general trends in judicial rational-
ization, presupposes a steadfast connection between dry legal doc-
trine and court decision that simply doesn't exist. So along came
the casebook filled with opinions that mix judicial theorizing with
stories about real people doing fierce legal battle. So although the
casebook's original purpose was to illustrate what was thought in
the nineteenth century to be the scientific nature of legalism, the
casebook eventually proved its worth as an antidote to the legal
textbook's overdose of encyclopedic generalization.
Casebook opinions, though still heavily weighted toward a
neutral rule-of-law slant, nevertheless show courts struggling to jug-
gle the rules to come up with decisions that we can live with. The
casebook is no longer strictly a showcase for overinflated notions of
The Law's scientific bent. The casebook, besides displaying the
habits and attitudes embedded in the language all lawyers inherit,
also reveals to close observers the looseness in the language out of
which legal rules are assembled.
Nineteenth-century "legal science" was the product of turning
the care and feeding of The Law over to a class of scholarly lawyers
reborn as pseudo-scientific professors of The Law. This legal sci-
ence movement, begun over a century ago, corresponded with the
establishment of the American Bar Association.73 The ABA disap-
proved of the then-popular idea that law practice is a mere trade.74
Legal science rescued the bar by upgrading the professional status
of lawyers. Yesterday's "legal trade" became today's "legal profes-
73 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 92, 96-97.
74 STEVENS, supra note 43. at 92, 96-97.
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sion." But this shift in status came too late to save Abraham Lin-
coln from the "tradesman" label.
Mr. Lincoln, able lawyer though he was, lacked scientific -
law school - training, and so as a lawyer never reached "profes-
sional" status.7' Lincoln learned The Law as an office apprentice,
reading not the few judicial opinions circulated in the pre-Civil
War period, but by reading general commentaries on The Law.
The textbook lectures Lincoln read were general discussions of
past judicial practices. These printed lectures provided updated
versions of English (and America's version of English) common
law. These textbooks were written in a manner suitable for appren-
tices to absorb, for lawyers to crib from and pass on to clients, and
for judges to read aloud while instructing juries or passing
sentences.
Lincoln, who in 1830 at the age of twenty-one worked in New
Salem, Illinois, "as a sort of clerk in a store,"7 6 began his legal edu-
cation at that time by reading Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of
England. Judge Blackstone's commentaries, being four volumes of
lectures given by Blackstone to students at Oxford University, was
once the apprentice's bible. About this time, Kent's Commentaries, a
four-volume Americanized version of Blackstone's works, was also
coming out. As the future Civil War president, in frontier fashion,
read Blackstone and Kent by candlelight, in the East, experimental
methods in legal training were underway. These experiments at
turning the legal habit of mind into an academic discipline were
called law schools.
Although these early New England ventures in formal school-
ing eventually took root, formal legal education didn't really catch
hold until after the post-war industrial revolution transformed
American life.77 The early law schools were, as is true today, both
private and public, college-connected and autonomous. Once for-
mal lawyer training got up a head of steam, the apprentice method
was doomed. After 1950, the making of future attorneys was to
become a law school near-monopoly.
Yet even so, as of 1950, surprisingly, half the nation's practic-
ing lawyers were former apprentices who read their legal commen-
taries catch as catch can while hanging around a mentor's law
office picking up unscholastic tricks of the trade.7" Today, with
75 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 19 n.72.
76 LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACy xlvi (Mario Cuomo & Harold Holzer eds., 1990).
77 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 23.
78 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 209.
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only two or three state bar associations still accepting apprentice
applicants, Lincoln-type lawyers will soon be an extinct breed, vic-
tims finally of a formal method of legal tutoring that had its begin-
nings during the Revolutionary War period.
Litchfield Law School, a privately-owned school founded in
1782 in a small Connecticut village, was the nation's initial experi-
ment in formal legal instruction. 9 Litchfield's classroom program
for mastering The Law, which Litchfield divided for curriculum
purposes into forty-eight titles, took fourteen months to com-
plete. 0 John C. Calhoun was but one early statesmen-to-be who
attended the legal lectures at Litchfield. Tuition, for the first year,
was a hundred dollars.8 1
Harvard Law School followed in 1817, opening its doors to a
charter class many of whose members lacked any previous college
experience whatsoever.8 2 Harvard Law helped turn law practice
into a full-fledged profession by hiring professors with scholarly in-
terests - a scholarly turn accelerated by the appointment in 1870
of Christopher Langdell (the father of American legal education)
as Harvard's law dean.8 3 If there are readers disenchanted with
the casebook-oriented character of modern legal education who
are desirous of knowing who's responsible for this state of affairs,
the answer is, first and foremost, Dean Langdell. s
Professor Robert Stevens's recent history of legal education in
the United States traces how Langdell and his Harvard compatri-
ots, who were intent upon upgrading The Law into a science, in-
vented the casebook together with a Socratic question-and-answer
style of teaching to facilitate their (scientific) dissection of cases.8 5
Within a generation or two, casebooks (and the accompanying So-
cratic assault upon defenseless students) became the centerpiece
of law school life, first in the elite law schools, and thereafter
spreading through imitation to other law schools.8 6 By the end of
the nineteenth century, Stevens reports, "[a] new group of stu-
dents had arrived" to law school, which "was essentially the gateway
to a professional career," through legal training by the casebook
79 KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERcAN LEGAL HISToRY 333-34 (1991).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 334.
82 Id. at 36.
83 Id. at 36-37.
84 Id. at 52.
85 Id. at 52-53, 55.
86 Id. at 53.
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method. 7
Although three years of mainly casebook study in a law school
approved by the American Bar Association is the modem path to
bar membership, oddly enough the old trade school idea has of
late risen from the dead and eased its way into, of all places, the law
school curriculum."8 One result is the modem "extemship," in
which law students are placed in law offices to serve as apprentices.
Law schools are also busy adding, under ABA pressure, clinical
courses in which practice-minded professors substitute for the
casebook a practice clinic set up within the law school, complete
with clients to interview and forms to fill out. Clinical students,
through hands-on experience, get training in gathering facts, ne-
gotiating, and other skills of the practitioner.8 9  But clinical
courses and externships are taken late in law school. The Langdel-
lian casebook still dominates, especially in first-year classes."g
Understanding why law schools dote on the casebook method
requires revisiting America's industrial revolution period. In the
latter decades of the last century, the country's love affair with the
new god of science reached full bloom. The rise of the factory
made a hero of the natural scientist. Harvard's Langdell decided
the scientific dimension that he and others believed inherent in
The Law ought to be isolated and emphasized in legal education.
The result was the creation of a legal science and of Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell's pioneering (contracts) casebook. Dean
Langdell and his faculty, anxious to dispel the notion that lawyers
are mere craftsmen, created a "professional" lawyer schooled in the
intricacies of legal science. 91 The law faculties that molded the
"scientific" lawyer, first at Harvard and then across the land,
dumped Blackstone and Kent - and here's where the science
came in - in favor of the appellate court opinion.92
"The Langdell approach," writes Professor Stevens, "not only
united itself strictly to legal rules but also involved the assumption
that principles were best discovered in appellate court opinions. " "
Langdell's fixation on rigid verbal formulas and hardnosed logic
led him to conclude that the law library is to the lawyer what "labo-
ratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, the mu-
87 Id at 75.
88 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 240.
89 See STEVENS, supa note 43, at 232-47.
90 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 232-47.
91 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 51-54.
92 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52.
93 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52.
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seum of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden to
the botanists."94 Thanks to the presumed universality of true sci-
ence, Harvard Law's once-fashionable laboratory principles cut
across state boundaries and provided, in theory anyway, unitary,
value-free, predictable theories for judging the most intractable of
legal issues. 5 Today most lawyers place this opinion-based notion
of a blackletter legal science under the heading of useful myths;
but in Langdell's day only the occasional legal skeptic such as Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes found legal science a jargon of quibbles.9 6
In devising a "laboratory" technique for panning principled
gold out of nineteenth-century judicial opinions, Harvard-nurtured
professors of legal science leaned heavily on that rigorous logic
supposedly peculiar to the legal mind. 7 Legal logic was thought to
enable the scientific lawyer to get at the true milk of The Law. For
the scientist, the true milk of The Law is not, by the way, necessarily
the rule enunciated in opinions. 8 The legal scientist strives to
uncover the true nature of The Law often hidden between the
lines of opinions inartfuilly worded; since nowhere, not even in
opinions, is The Law set out clearly and straightforwardly, it was
thought to require a legal scientist using legal logic to ferret out
legal truth.99 (First-year students hear echoes of this legal science
today when formalistic professors say casebook opinions are not
actually The Law, but are only pale reflections of the true distilled
essence of The Law.) The legal scientist concludes that judges in
writing opinions lack a sufficiently scientific cast of mind to be
trusted to always discover legal truth. Therefore, according to the
high formalism of legal fundamentalists such as Langdell, the true
rule of a case is a terse statement of what a case stands for in terms
of a strict legal logic, regardless of the opinion-writer's stated
rationale. 00
Harvard Law's Langdellians, believing they must distill true
rules from the mass of court reports, assumed that only an enter-
prising intellectual legal elite could cope with the complexities of
legal science. 10 ' The Langdellians, like the crusty Professor King-
94 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 53.
95 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52-53.
96 HALL ET AL., supra note 79, at 339.
97 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52.
98 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52.
99 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52.
100 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52-53.
101 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 54.
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
sfield, 10 2 preached survival of the legally most fit. The student of
legal science, declares the Centennial History Of The Harvard Law
School,
is the invitee upon the case-system premise, who, like the invitee
in the reported cases, soon finds himself fallen into a pit. He is
given no map carefully charting and laying out all the byways
and corners of the legal field, but is left, to a certain extent, to
find his way by himself. His scramble out of difficulties, if suc-
cessful, leaves him feeling that he has built up a knowledge of
law for himself.10 3
Anybody who has been to law school will recognize the Centennial His-
tory's scramble out of the pit.
Whatever science transpired in Langdell's laboratory, it was a sci-
ence unlike that of the natural scientist. Beginning with Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes (the anti-Langdellian father of legal realism), critics have
noted Langdell's departure from natural science's insistence on test-
ing propositions against observed phenomena."° Langdell instead
put on blinders, like a racehorse afraid of the rail. Observed phenom-
ena were, for the good Dean, and for some lawyers yet today, too far
outside the airtight bubble where legal affairs are, some say, to be con-
ducted. Legal scientists, and their formalist descendants, steadfastly
refuse to look outside the law library to see how the judicial branch
actually governs.
Dean Langdell and company preached that the backward-looking
rule, rather than the forward-looking judge, properly governs in the
courtroom."0 5 Harvard Law's revolutionary approach to teaching was
nothing more than putting modern dress on conventional legal reli-
gion. Holmes called formalist Langdell the country's leading legal
theologian.
10 6
These days the notion of a legal science is old-fashioned. Rule-of-
law folklore lives on, but in diluted form and under softer names.
Legal logic, which sounds so mathematical, has been toned down to a
relatively modest notion of legal reasoning. Langdell's bloodless sci-
ence fell victim to a twentieth-century politics of realism whose propo-
nents preach that judges should be chosen less for the rigidity of their
logic and more for the depth of their humanity.
Legal realism, the post-Langdellian idea that ours is a govern-
102 THE PAPER CHASE, supra note 46.
103 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52, 55.
104 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 55.
105 STEVENS, supra note 43, at 52-55.
106 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Review, 14 AM. L. REv. 233 (1880) (reviewing
the second edition of Langdell's CoNmRAcrs casebook).
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ment of flesh-and-blood judges and juries filling in holes in legal for-
mulas, is increasingly part of the modem lawyer's mental makeup.
Although opinion-writers today crouch behind legalisms, opinions
grow less and less doctrinaire. Lawyers today are far more apt than
their ancestors at the bar to acknowledge the doctrinal fluidity that
leaves decision up in the air. (In the English courts, where legal for-
malism retains much of its turn-of-the-century vigor, the doctrinaire
opinion lives on.' °7 ) For the last half-century, American lawyers have
begun to downplay logic and instead test their legalisms (for example,
the ancient Right Of Contract) against data drawn from the real world
(in which the Right Of Contract once unfairly, by today's lights,
blocked labor union formation through closed shop agreements).
Although Dean Langdell's case dissection through Socratic questions
and answers is still practiced in law schools, the old legal science em-
phasis is gone.
Whatever the merits of casebook dissection as science, the
casebook's entertainment value as compared to Kent's Commentaries is
clearly superior. The judges' tales of courtroom battle can make for
interesting reading despite the sluggish writing. The maxim that says
"negligence is the failure to use reasonable care," or the one that says
"if a zoning regulation reasonably serves traditional police-power
ends, the fact that esthetic factors may have played a part in its adop-
tion does not affect its constitutionality," comes alive only in the con-
text of a particular clash between warring litigants. Laudable efforts,
such as Blackstone's and Kent's, to shape the work of the courts into
an orderly, if abstract, historical form may pass legalistic muster, but
page after page of such scholarship, without benefit of a juicy set of
facts, paralyzes.
The modem law school's fascination with opinions spouting
watered-down legal science will likely continue, despite the leaden
prose and the judicial habit of circling around an idea three times
before zooming in for the kill. Reading casebook illustrations of how
rules are shaped, used, misused, stretched, contracted, revised, and
ignored inculcates a feel for how courts operate that would otherwise
be difficult for classroom-bound students to acquire. Again, learning
to read opinions means learning how to read between the lines.
One of the irritations of casebook tutelage is the anxiety begin-
ning students feel when they discover that for each casebook opinion
there are hundreds or thousands of other opinions offering variations
on the same legal theme sitting unread in the law library. If The Law
107 See generally STEVENS, supra note 43, at 131-32 (discussing the philosophy of
teaching law in England versus the United States).
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truly is reflected in appellate opinions, how in the world can students
hope to master this iceberg of opinions of which the casebook is
merely the tip? What happens in law school is that this tip-of-the-ice-
berg anxiety lessens as the student senses that legal learning is not
measured by the number of tort or contract maxims memorized. Stu-
dents who learn to play legal games in one field of The Law can pretty
easily get acclimated elsewhere.
The twentieth-century proliferation of opinions from the appeals
courts of fifty states, the federal government, and the territories, par-
tially explains, by the way, why the concept of legalism as a sure-
enough science fell from grace. Recall that the lynchpin of Langdell's
bookish science was that all materials relevant to legal science are in
the law reports. 108 Prolific appellate judges have long since made
composing, printing, and distribution of opinions such a booming in-
dustry that the resulting ocean ofjudicial outpouring has drowned the
legal scientist. Carving legal doctrine, long ago, on the face of a few
stone tablets was dramatic and conducive to an aura of permanence.
But now we use the computer chip to corral the enormous literary
output of the courts. Law students and lawyers can only manage to
dip their toes in this sea of opinions.
B. Dissecting The Opinion
In the days of Langdellian legal science, dissecting the opinion
was Harvard Law's classroom method for exposing blackletter gos-
pel, just as slicing into laboratory frogs reveals anatomical truth.
Then, as now, the threshold question posed by The Law's elaborate
system of precedent is a puzzler: just what exactly is this thing that
lies buried inside opinions that, once revealed through dissection,
should guide the judgment of later courts? This question about
what precisely ought to be the impact of case A upon case B permits
no simple answer.
The huge task that precedent builders face is putting together
from the opinion in case A a concise general statement - the
holding of the case - that everybody agrees properly covers case B.
Decision according to precedent means deciding like cases alike;
yet, other than intuition, legalists lack, despite all the appeals to
logic, any structured way of determining which cases are alike.
Legal logic runs dry before it's decided for sure whether case A,
which involves chickens, covers case B, which involves pheasants.
The result is that lawyers and students must be content with a
108 STEVENs, supra note 43, at 52-57.
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system in which choosing whether cases A and B are "alike" or "dis-
tinguishable" is very much in the eye of the beholder. Logic alone
cannot produce generalized statements of case holdings that "take
the guesswork out of choosing which cases are alike.""° Just as in
baseball the game's not over until it's over, so in the game of prece-
dent the scope of a prior holding's influence is somewhat up for
grabs every time an appellate court revisits the prior holding. If
the holdings extracted from prior cases are worded so narrowly
that each holding covers only the facts of the parent case, then of
course stare decisis (precedent) is clearly a dead letter in a universe
where no two cases are exactly alike. Yet to state the holding in
case A in language abstract enough to cover an unspecified
number of other cases creates a slippery slope of ambiguity; given
cases B through Z, each of which contains some but not all facts in
common with case A, lawyers lack a firm method for deciding
which of cases B through 2, for precedental purposes, are similar
enough to case A to fall within the precedental ambit of case A.
Suppose we agree on a holding, in a case forbidding a legatee
to take under the will of a testator murdered by the legatee, that
"[n]o one shall be permitted to ... take advantage of his own
wrong. .. ."10 What if next time the legatee merely kills the testa-
tor in an auto accident through careless driving (a civil wrong)?
Similar case? Does the civil wrong bar the careless legatee, under
the rule against taking "advantage of his own wrong," from inherit-
ing under the will? Intuition may suggest that faulty driving falls
short of being similar enough to criminal murder to deny the care-
less-driver legatee her benefits under the will. But intuition is
hardly science.
How then did the legal scientist of the last century shun intui-
tion, and through case dissection discover, with the aid of apolitical
legal logic, which cases are similar, and which are dissimilar? The
answer is that old-time legal science, not to put too fine a point on
it, was unscientifically grounded on faith. Legal words, it was
thought, could do things that to the late twentieth-century mind
seem slightly nonsensical. No amount of legal ratiocination can
supply a neutral, untouched-by-human-hands means of deciding
whether murder and sloppy driving belong in the same legal pig-
eonhole. Dissecting the opinion in the murderous legatee case so
as to extract an airtight guideline pointing to decision certain in
109 DAVID KAiRys, THE POLITICS OF LAW 14 (1982) (collection of essays penned by
exponents of critical legal studies - the "crits").
110 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
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the careless-driver case is an outmoded idea, one belonging to an
age that used words to draw black and white lines in a way alien to
the modern habit of teasing language into perpetual grayness.
Legal scientists a century ago told themselves they could iso-
late in case A certain items called "material facts." The trick sup-
posedly was to first poke through the opinion's exposed innards
and discard all immaterial facts. Then, with case A's remaining ma-
terial facts in hand, case A's precedental value would simply be ex-
tended to all later disputes involving identical material facts.
But legal scientists were deluded in thinking that they could
draw clear lines between material and immaterial facts. In today's
age of lost innocence we acknowledge that black and white lines
are rarely present in appellate decision-making, including deci-
sions about which facts are "material." Today even the most
Langdellian of legal scholars is apt to recognize, even though
grudgingly, that choosing when to apply case A to later cases is in
many ways a policy-making, not a rule-following, matter. Facts are
"material" because the court chooses to make them so.
The rule or holding of case A, as noted, may be the rule ex-
plicitly laid down by the court that decided case A; or the rule of
case A may, as a matter of legal'fashion, be a different formulation
adopted by a later court as the more appropriate statement of the
holding in case A; or the authoritative holding of case A may be a
formula composed by some influential legal scholar and offered up
as the preferred rule of case A. Don't forget: the judge's opinion
in Case A is but evidence of what The Law is, and maybe not always
good evidence at that.
Professor Llewellyn summed up precedent fifty years ago - a
summation that represents the modem substitute for a fizzled-out
legal science:
In a word, if one is to see our case-law system as it lives and
moves, one must see that the relation between the rule and the
cases may move all the way from copying any words printed by
anybody in a "law" book to meticulous re-examination of precise
facts, issues, and holdings, in total disregard of any prior lan-
guage whatsoever. And any degree or kind of operation within
that lordly range is correct, doctrinally, if doctrine be taken to a
description of what authoritative courts are doing .... il
111 Karl Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of ContracA 47 YALE L.J. 1243,
1246-47 (1938). Professor Llewellyn also teaches that "general propositions are
empty . . . rules alone, mere forms of words, are worthless." K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE Busm 2 (9th ed. 1991). A 65-year-old classic, BRAMBLE BusH is the printed
version of orientation advice that Llewellyn gave to entering students at Columbia
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So although in law school, students and professors continue to
carve up appellate opinions, the focus has long shifted from stagnant
rule-fetishism toward the flowing stream that is The Law in action.
Modem opinions continue to be couched in the logical form of facts-
plus-rule-equals-decision, as if drafted by descendants of Langdell, but
this is simply reverence for a dead science. Today, law students dis-
cover sooner or later that the relation between rule and decision is
problematical - classroom dissection of opinions reveals that two
plus two adds up, in Law, only rarely to four. When two and two add
up to five, and when such a result no longer causes anxiety, you know
then you are possessed of a legal mind.
From modem casebooks spill a Niagara Falls of words. On and
on the stream tumbles, tangled sentences spilling into impenetrable
paragraphs until student readers are led to suspect a cult of obscurity.
Opinion-writers, when their prose is criticized, insist by way of defense
that they are too pressed for time to polish rough drafts. This may
account in part for the murky writing. It is more likely that judges,
like other public officials bombarded with their constituents' oppos-
ing viewpoints, so often have little they wish to reveal publicly, while at
the same time wishing to appear to have made a clean breast of it. A
common solution is to write at great length about very little, and hope
that the muddy prose will suggest ajudicial mind too sophisticated for
the common herd to grasp.
Another factor dragging down almost all legal writing is that in a
Law School. BRAMBLE BusH, with its heavy dose of incipient legal realism, was a new
way to look at, among other things, the notion of precedent. One theory of the prec-
edential value of a case, according to Llewellyn, is that the rule as spelled out in a
judicial opinion is, no matter how broadly worded, the one and only true rule of the
case. This (most often expansive) version of precedent, maximizes the impact given
the precedent case. I&. at 74. This expansive version of precedent takes the general
wording of the earlier case and applies it to a range of later cases involving different
facts. This is the broad-beamed version of precedent exploited by lawyers and law
students when they create legal arguments by drawing from generalizations in old
opinions, while conveniently ignoring the factual details in the earlier disputes. The
alternative notion of precedent, on the other hand, says that the true rule of a case
may, in fact, be something other than what the earlier court said it was; the true rule
may be what a later court says the earlier court really meant - usually a shrunken
version of the precedent opinion's original language. This narrow form of precedent
can limit the impact of an earlier case to disputes bottomed on almost identical facts:
called limiting a precedent to its facts. Thisjudicial whittling down of a precedent by
deflating the original court's abstract statement of the rule is what cautious judges do
as a half-way measure toward overruling inconvenient precedents. Both broad and
shrunken theories of precedent are, assures Professor Llewellyn, tolerated - and
even blessed - by The Law. Id. at 73. Llewellyn also spoke of The Law as a foreign
language: "You are outlanders in this country of the law. You do not know the
speech. It must be learned. Like any other foreign tongue, it must be learned: by
seeing words, by using them until they are familiar.. .. " Id. at 39.
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legal profession in which obscurity is a virtue, practitioners lose the
knack for saying things simply. Some law firms must hire tutors to
give in-house, plain English writing lessons, this so that firm members
can understand each other's prose. Occasionally judges at judicial
conferences are moved to lecture other judges about the sad state of
judicial prose.
The genesis of bad legal writing is the law school emphasis on
having students model their writing after the profession. Most law
professors train students in the staid conventions of legalistic writing
because they think it is in the students' best interest that they write the
kind of ponderous prose that lawyers have always produced, and that
law firms and the judiciary expect of law graduates. Thus the circle
celebrating a turgid writing style is complete. This pressure to write
legalistically produces long tedious sentences strung into endless
paragraphs, a plethora of long, Latinate words, strings of "nots" and
other negative phrasing, addiction to the passive verb, mindless repeti-
tion, and a terminal, if learned, case of vagueness. Lawyers who over-
come their legal inheritance and write clear, vigorous, down-to-earth
prose are scarce as hen's teeth. Law students find in their casebooks
few samples of crisp, readable prose.
Law schools occasionally heed complaints about the way lawyers
write by beefing up legal writing courses. But cleaning up legal writ-
ing is hard to do alongside the primary law school mission of trans-
forming lay into legal minds. The legal mind and plain English
remain a mismatch. The lawyer's unplain language is what makes him
a lawyer. The student lawyer, bombarded with legal talk and legal
writings, cannot easily avoid aping her legal masters. Legal writing
instructors, furthermore, are Law-trained types and therefore reluc-
tant rebels against lawspeak. Even were legal writing instructors eager
to deflate and simplify the profession's pompous prose, first-year legal
writing students are usually too preoccupied with searching for true
rules and mimicking casebook prose to worry about making life easier
for poor readers.
There's also the problem of the language handicap under which
all lawyers labor. A legal writer, even one anxious to inform and en-
tertain with lucid prose, is limited by The Law's circumscribed vocabu-
lary. It's a professional jargon with a stunted imagination. Novelists
who choose death as a subject can shape their prose by picking and
choosing from among the riches of the English language. But legal
writers, on the subject of death, are walled in by convention with the
stilted language of the probate and criminal courts. In a probate case,
the dreary litany of the "testatrix who, being of sound mind, did give
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and bequeath a life estate," reflects the burden on the legal writer
denied space for love, hate, greed, and generosity.
There is another reason why casebook opinions often read like a
translation from the German composed by a tipsy translator. The
"opinion of the court" is in part the handiwork of a judicial commit-
tee, a form of composition sure to breed bad writing. Although a sin-
gle judge is assigned to draft an opinion, he writes for the whole
court, and in so doing consults with fellow judges and shapes opinion
text to reflect a collective sentiment. Writing and thinking are insepa-
rable twins, and trying to get three or seven or nine judicial minds to
think along the same tract for any significant period pressures the
opinion's author into purposeful ambiguity so that reluctant members
of the court will join the opinion. The contest among fellow judges
for power over an opinion's final form pushes that opinion's prose
further and further up the cloudy ladder of abstraction.
This ascent into metaphysics is how judges avoid taking firm
stands, which allows for flexibility in dealing with later cases. When
judges write cloudy prose, it not only gives the lie to the assertion that
legal language celebrates precision, but also protects courts from at-
tack. Bad writing, in which it's hard to distinguish between a horse
chestnut and a chestnut horse, is its own form of armor.
Even relatively decent pieces of legal writing, such as the follow-
ing Supreme Court excerpt, can be suffocating. The Court, in Ohralik
v. Ohio State BarAssociatim,112 is trying to tell the state of Ohio that the
state can punish a personal injury lawyer who dares solicit cases in a
hospital, despite the ambulance chaser's Free Speech protestations.
Here is the Court's less-than-riveting explanation of why Free Speech
claims carry less weight when an ambulance chaser gets too greedy:
Expression concerning purely commercial transactions has
come within the ambit of the Amendment's protection only re-
cently. In rejecting the notion that such speech "is wholly
outside the protection of the First Amendment," (citation omit-
ted) we were careful not to hold "that it is wholly undifferenti-
able from other forms" of speech (citation omitted). We have
not discarded the "common-sense" distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other vari-
eties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protection
for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amend-
ment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.
112 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitaliza-
tion, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.'
1 3
One hundred and thirty-nine words to say that ambulance chas-
ers deserve some, but not much, Free Speech. Readers of academic
writing are used to this learned style of writing in which a simple idea
gets blown up into an overweight conceptualization. Law students
likewise, after an initial period of panic, grow used to such overblown
legal writing in which an ounce of content is dressed up in a pound of
learned style.
Another angle for viewing opinion-writing is to consider the audi-
ence. For whom are appellate judges writing? The immediate audi-
ence is the trial judge who umpired the evidentiary hearing. It is the
trial judges' judgment calls made during original trials that losers at
trials want higher courts to reverse. This, of course, puts opinion-writ-
ers in the ticklish position of pointing out to fellow, if inferior, judges
their flawed performances, and helps explain why strong, clear appel-
late critiques are abandoned in favor of weak, "it could be argued"
approaches.
Like politicians skilled at appeasing opposing factions, appellate
judges reviewing the work of trial judges hide behind the softer pas-
sive-voice verb, shunning the stinging rebuke, the hard-hitting review.
The "polite" opinion, its hard edges thus rounded off, lacks the bite
of, say, the newspaper column that spits out in certain terms just who
the bastards are and why. The judge's pen, filled with the ink of pro-
fessional gentility, is no mighty sword, but rather, despite the assumed
air of superiority, a wet noodle. This high court gentility, alas, compli-
cates the chore facing student readers struggling to learn from pussy-
footing opinions just where the court, even waveringly, stands.
In addition to the trial judge under the appellate gun, the imme-
diate audience for an opinion includes lawyers and litigants. In appel-
late cases both parties typically have a piece ofjustice in their corners.
This means opinion-writers have the uncomfortable task of naming as
losers those whose claims have at least some merit. For this reason
also, opinions equivocate.
The more general audience for opinions is the practicing bar.
Opinions are written in part to show lawyers that appellate judgments,
considered in the light of similar past cases, fit more or less snugly
113 Id, at 455-56.
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into traditional grooves. To understand how case A fits into tradi-
tional legal channels requires a legal reader attuned to a continuing
dialogue of which case A is but the most recent drop in the ocean.
This is why first-year law students introduced to judicial prose often
feel as if they've walked into the middle of a foreign movie that lacks
subtitles. As for lay readers unlucky enough to be confronted with a
court opinion, such readers are supposed to be so impressed with the
mere shape and sound of the judges' hieroglyphics that they thank
their lucky stars they live under a rule of law, even though they can't
understand it.
C. Plain And Fancy Hocus-Pocus
Learning to write like a lawyer is a liability in some quarters,
but in law school it's a primary goal. Beginning students, taking a
natural pride in their new-founded legal tongue and in their early
legal drafting exercises, tend to get carried away. Students em-
brace legalism and forget English Composition 101. Also forgot-
ten, if ever learned, is that good writing informs and entertains.
Once a law student absorbs legal jargon and is reborn into the
legal faith, it's devilishly difficult thereafter for the legally saved to
write clearly and simply. I, as a card-carrying legalist, here criticiz-
ing the prose of fellow lawyers, write in the uncomfortable knowl-
edge that I will surely fall more than once into the very pit I'm
digging.
Legal writing is heavy going partly because of the profession's
felt need to dress up simple ideas so as to give off an air of scientific
impartiality. Legal, like academic, jargon has its Madison Avenue
component. Legal scientists, remember, were the ones who first
dressed the legal trade in academic regalia to persuade the public
that lawyering is a full-fledged profession worthy of high respect
and higher fees. Most legal writing, which informs poorly and en-
tertains not at all, has other aims. Law professor Fred Rodell sug-
gested one aim of legal writing when he labeled the legal class a
pseudo-intellectual autocracy "using plain and fancy hocus-pocus
to make themselves masters of their fellow men."'
1 4
A typical practitioner of "plain and fancy hocus-pocus" was the
late Irving Kaufman. A tough-minded judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Judge Kaufman was a leading practitioner of the formal
school of legal thought. He was the kind of modem lawyer who a
century ago would have gloried in The Law's deliverance from the
114 RODELL, supra note 23, at 7.
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rough hands of the tradesman into the lap of the professional man
of science. Kaufman on the bench preached the usual judicial line
about good judges sitting detached from the fray; about how the
rule of law taps in on the collected wisdom of the ages; and about
how judges must resist advancing a personal vision of justice (and
here's the modem twist) "except to the extent that his vision is
consistent with the law as it evolves in response to social
changes." 1 5
Kaufman, like many who wear judicial robes, would have the
gullible believe that The Law evolves all by itself; the detached
judge only afterwards jumps on the socially evolving bandwagon.
The idea that legal policy evolves, like a pansy from its seed, un-
touched by human hands, is pure drivel for peasants. The English
language can prop up only so many such myths, even though the
myths be noble aspirations, before the language collapses into a
babel. Such Kaufmanesque, immaculate-conception thinking, still
a consistent theme in mainstream legal rhetoric, is to legal writing
what mud is to the Missouri River.
Other, more mundane, irritations flowing from the way judges
write opinions include the judicial habit of avoiding litigants' real
names. Judges substitute for litigants John Thomas Scopes, Emile
Zola, Lodowick Post, and Perot Enterprises, Inc., such vague legal
nicknames such as appellee, petitioner, and defendant-in-error.
How much easier it would be for readers of opinions to keep in
mind who plaintiff- and defendant-in-error are if said legal persons
could retain their more colorful popular names. It's as if judicial
use of bland, impersonal pseudonyms proves that judges are igno-
rant of who the real parties are, and so reinforces the pose ofjudi-
cial neutrality; the pseudonyms reflect The Law's official disdain
for human feelings that get in the way of neutral rule-following.
Another poor writing habit, which judges thankfully are mov-
ing away from, is withholding until the end of the opinion the news
about who wins the case. Such suspense about final resolution suits
detective stories. But it makes the opinion's doctrinal reasoning
easier to follow when the winning party's name is revealed up
front. Advance notice of the lawsuit's eventual outcome also helps
clarify the relevance of the opinion's opening statement of facts.
The traditional withholding, until the final paragraph, of the
winning litigant's name, however, serves a symbolic purpose. Such
suspense gives the opinion more of a rule-of-law flavor; it suggests
115 By and Large, We Succeed, TimE, May 5, 1980, at 70.
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the opinion's drafter discovered only in mid-draft, after locating
and jotting down the applicable rule to apply, the court's ultimate
decision. Yet the superficiality of such a decision-in-the-making
pose is apparent even to students who, despite first-year fog, know
that judges must first choose a winner, and only then offer legal
proofs that their reasons are principled. First-year victims of "sus-
pense" opinions should do an end run by reading first the opin-
ion's last paragraph to see how the case comes out in the end.
Another thing that complicates entry into the casebook world
is the fake cocksureness permeating most opinions. Opinion-writ-
ers, afflicted with the habit of rhetorical overkill that they acquired
as lawyers and composers of appellate briefs, frequently begin
opinions with a declaration that The Law - and the court's duty
- is crystal clear. The reality that doctrinal uncertainty at the ap-
pellate level is the norm is avoided in judicial prose. Opinion-writ-
ers avoid the idea that appellate judging takes place in a doctrinal
mist because the truth about hard choices would taint the rule-of-
law pose.
Judicial practice, when confronted with equally weighty, but
contradictory, sets of rules, is to fudge and imply that the losing
lawyer's legalisms are "obviously" wrong-headed and unconvincing.
This may lead inexperienced readers of opinions to wonder how,
for goodness sakes, losing attorneys dare accept fees for appealing
such "obviously" frivolous cases. But the fact is, opinions underplay
the merits of the losing sides' briefs. Opinions instead are fudged
to make winners look virtuous, the "obviously" mode adopted to
boost the judicial above-the-fray image. Inexperienced students
therefore must be alert to the large element of judicial discretion
secreted behind the "obvious." When judges write that
"[o]bviously, the controlling rule in this case is. . . " or that "[i]t is
not to be denied that.. . " stay alert to the possibility of judicial
camouflage.
Because the allure of legal science has faded, along with illu-
sions about the meaning of words (and therefore rules) remaining
constant over time, lawyers' expectations about uncovering legal
gems in the rubble of opinions has been severely reduced. Still, for
students to reduce an opinion to a brief written summary is good
practice in learning to speak and think lawspeak. Squeezing the
opinion for every last drop of meaning is good practice as well in
understanding what the opinion neglects to say. Legal science may
be outmoded, but the idea of a laboratory - a foreign language
lab - is a good one.
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In law schools today, classroom dissection of opinions may be
accompanied with lectures. Lectures, when offered, are usually a
professorial mix of legal history, doctrine, lawyerly reasoning,
deconstruction technique, sociology, courthouse anecdotes, legal
philosophy, linguistics, and a lawyer joke or two. Law students
value law teachers who can deliver this classroom mosaic with
enough theatrics to make The Law entertaining. The Socratic
method of dissecting cases by having law teachers bombard hapless
students with legal riddles likewise leans heavily on the teacher's
ability to entertain, especially since so many students have trouble
seeing how Socratic inquiries are teaching them anything. Socratic
questioning, by yielding so few solid answers, ironically proves, by
indirection, that the life of The Law is, as Holmes told us, not ver-
bal arithmetic but subtle politics. 1 6
The Socratic trial by query has in recent years lost some of its
acclaim. In truth, the Socratic professor's habit of delivering a ton
of questions to every pound of answers has always received mixed
student reviews. Professors on their part have a sort of Hobson's
choice. They can deliver the traditional lecture on historical
trends in rules and the exceptions to the rules; but in so doing the
lecturer risks mass boredom, plus giving the impression that The
Law is driven solely by doctrine. On the other hand, Professor Soc-
rates can toss out unanswerable questions, but then students begin
to wonder if opinions are bottomed on anything but quicksand. A
third, and increasingly popular technique, is for law teachers to
play Socrates part of the time and to lecture part of the time, hop-
ing to find a happy medium.
Modern law professors differ from their nineteenth-century
predecessors mainly with respect to legal-religious conviction. A
law professor from the 1890s, brought back to life and reinstalled
at his lectern, would sound much like the modern law school lec-
turer or Socrates impersonator. Yet, as an exponent of legal sci-
ence, our born-again professor would more likely be sincere in his
affirmations of the rule of law, less likely to be, in the modern fash-
ion, of limited faith in the possibility of reasoned neutral decision.
Law teachers today, more attuned to the chameleonic nature
of legal concepts, most likely view the stolid body-of-rules version of
The Law as a useful myth. Modern law teachers study at universi-
ties where at least rivulets of legal realism flow steadily into the
mainstream of legal thought. The professor of legal science nur-
tured a faith that mechanistic legal logic would tease blackletter
116 OLVER W. HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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truth from the casebook; today's mainstream law professor, af-
flicted like Oliver Wendell Holmes with the age's skepticism about
systems of thought, struggles to keep some semblance of the legal
faith.
For Holmes, the age of science brought into question many
old faiths, including faith in the lawyer's bag of principles as a bet-
ter guide to government than the intuitions and policy planning of
political men. 17 Holmes, a Boston lawyer and briefly a professor
at Harvard Law who mixed with the literary and intellectual elite
on Beacon Hill, wrote famous articles about legal myth and legal
reality, and became a justice on both the Massachusetts and U.S.
Supreme Courts. 18 Holmes, moreover, took his scientific method
literally. Holmes tested Langdell's ethereal body-of-rules against
the empirical data of the sensory world outside the law library, and
found the established legal faith wanting.
Partly due to the influence of Holmes and later adherents to
the experience-not-logic school, casebooks today offer many opin-
ions that, although continuing to pay homage to logic and prece-
dent, also look to Holmesian "experience." In the case of modern
opinion-writers, the metaphysics of the nineteenth-century lawyer
is often leavened with down-to-earth realism about judicial discre-
tion and the need to shape decision to meet current political ex-
pectations. Holmesian "experience," in other words, generates an
unruly subtext running through The Law's rule-infested text.
In sum, Holmes and his realist followers have imported into
the lawyers' inner sanctum the torchlight of skepticism - and The
Law has had to make adjustments. With much of the old formalist
magic gone, legalism has become less a theosophy and more of a
practical means for using experience to shape future legal-political
directions. All this makes The Law more human, and makes law
study, given the dearth of structure absent true rules, more of a
course in judicial politics.
In any event, the current mixture of legal science and legal
realism makes for much incongruity in the law schools, where the
intellectual descendants of Langdell and Holmes persist in looking
at The Law through first one end of the microscope, and then the
other. Many law teachers over the years, seeking relief from doctri-
nal fog, have tried to step back and impose some over-arching the-
ory - of economics or moral philosophy or political science -
onto the legal system. Perceptive students will be attuned to such
117 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 457, 469.
118 LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL 68, 188, 190, 273, 357 (1991).
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nuances of the modern legal mind as it attempts to come up with
reasons to explain the work of the courts. This brings us to legal
reasoning, that step-child of legal logic, the focal point of casebook
studies and the subject of the next section.
V. LEGAL REASONING - AND OTHER DIRrY STORIES
A. The Unaccompanied Suitcase Case
Legal reasoning is the polite, Law-abiding name given to lawy-
erly wrangling. In its casebook version, such disputation is called
the opinion of the court. When an appellate lawyer performs legal
reasoning, a brief is born. Legal reasoning is how legalists extract
from the clutches of The Law the prepackaged answers to lawsuit
issues. Legal reasoning, with its indefatigable redefining of terms
and citing of look-alike cases, produces what lawyers call reasoned
decision. John Quincy Adams called legal reasoning "law logic-
an artificial system of reasoning, exclusively used in courts of jus-
tice, but good for nothing anywhere else."119 Legal reasoning,
then, is to courtroom government what powerful medicine is to
witch doctors: it's the stuff of legitimation.
Reasoning as lawyers and judges reason is how The Law moves
smoothly from here to there in the guise of a disinterested search
for legal correctness. Legal reasoning reinforces the idea that The
Law is self-contained and needs no advice from interdisciplinary
outsiders. As guardians of legal orthodoxy, we lawyers are both
beneficiaries and victims of the smokescreen of legal reasoning
that hides the political nature of what courts do. We are benefi-
ciaries because we sell our legal reasoning to a public devoted to
The Law's fabled neutrality; we are victims because of the bad
press given lawyers when legal reasoning is exposed as verbal
camouflage.
Reading case after case for three years equips the dedicated
law student to imitate the lawyer-judge in proving, by a careful jux-
taposition of maxim, precept, and doctrine, that a horse chestnut is
in fact a chestnut horse. Students learn to spin, that is, a legalistic
web connecting the legal maxim of the moment with either deci-
sion A or its opposite B, or even C or D, in any case using the tricks
of the legal trade to divert attention from the fact that legal reason-
ing, at bottom, has a leak. The proof of this leakage lies buried in
every case in the casebook. Reading each opinion's generalizations
carefully - and skeptically - reveals that the most legal of words,
119 THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 269 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost, eds., 1986).
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no matter how carefully arranged, cannot alone do the tough ap-
pellate job of deciding between A and B. As an example of the
"chestnut horse" nature of legal reasoning, consider the following
hypothetical airline crash case, one patterned closely on actual
litigation.1"'
An international treaty covering suits against international air-
lines limits the damages collectible by a passenger injured in a
crash (or by the family of a deceased passenger) to, say, $75,000.
But there's an exception to this $75,000 damages limit. If a litigant
passenger, instead of claiming airline Negligence, can tie her inju-
ries to an airline tort of Willful Misconduct, the ceiling on damages
goes way up.12 So what happens, legally, if Pan Globe Airlines's
security measures go awry and, contrary to regulations, a stray suit-
case, unaccompanied by a passenger, finds its way onto a flight
from London to New York, and the stray suitcase conceals a terror-
ist's bomb?
Pan Globe of course did not purposefully accommodate the
terrorist whose bomb, alas, explodes in flight over the Atlantic.
The unaccompanied suitcase got on the flight without Pan Globe
officials knowing it was a stray. So, one might well assume that Pan
Globe's liability, if any, would be limited to a Negligence award of
$75,000 per passenger. Yet Pan Globe and its liability insurance
company may, thanks to the elusiveness of legal reasoning (and to
a legal system geared to compensating some accident victims hand-
somely), wind up on the liability end of a Willful Misconduct law-
suit. This means that despite the international treaty's damages
ceiling, Pan Globe crash victims and their relatives stand to collect
millions.
Willful Misconduct, an intentional tort, and Negligence, an
unintentional tort, clearly belong to separate legal camps. The
idea behind the international treaty on airline crashes is to en-
courage passengers to rely on flight insurance for big-bucks com-
pensation for accidental (unintentional) injury or death, even
though attributable to airline Negligence. Only in Willful Miscon-
duct cases is the airline to lose its treaty ceiling on tort damages.
This division between unintentional accidents and intentional
injury, as we saw with Negligence and Battery earlier, is easy to
120 See Arnold H. Lubasch, Pan Am is Held Liable byJuy in '88 Explosion, N.Y. TIMEs,
July-11, 1992, at Al, A2.
121 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 [hereinafter The
Warsaw Convention]; In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1991).
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blur. "Intentional" is in the forefront of that long list of legal
words with variable meanings. And for blurring the line between
accidental and intentional injury, nothing does the job quite so
well as a good dose of legal reasoning.
Now, blurring doctrinal distinctions and fomenting ambiguity
by severing connections between words and their meanings may
sound sinister. But lawyers and judges who bend doctrine to favor
airline accident victims in cases such as the terrorist's bomb are, in
a sense, servants of the people. In recent decades, with the univer-
sal presence of liability insurance, Americans have clearly favored
liberal expansion of tort liability - especially where corporate de-
fendants, presumably with deep, cash-laden pockets, are involved.
Legal reasoning, then, can be an instrument of public service in
recasting the meaning of "intentional" so that widespread pro-pas-
senger sympathies in the Pan Globe case can be satisfied. To put it
another way, legal reasoning is the mechanism that allows the law-
yers for Pan Globe passengers, with the help of an accommodating
judge, to do an end-run around the international treaty's limit on
accidental damages. In such a manner does the common law ac-
commodate itself to shifts in public opinion. Some may see this as
unseemly; others call it justice.
The judicial end-run around the $75,000-per-accident liability
ceiling takes place by virtue of cleverly worded instructions to the
jury regarding Pan Globe's slip-up allowing the stray suitcase onto
the doomed airplane. Remember, this is ajury typically inclined to
award damages to badly injured accident victims. Notwithstanding
The Law's claims to political impartiality, sympathy clearly plays a
role in the way judge and jury administer the tort system. In Pan
Globe-type disasters, even though terrorists plant the bombs, sym-
pathetic juries instinctively favor forcing airlines to compensate
crash victims and their families handsomely - if only The Law can
supply a method. And here, in a slippery jury instruction defining
Willful Misconduct, a federal court provides the method:
Willful misconduct is the intentional performance of an act with
knowledge that performance of that act will probably result in
injury or damage - or it may be the intentional performance of
an act in such a manner as to imply disregard of the probable
consequences of the performance of the act.1 2
Note that in this jury instruction the normal meaning of Willful
(intentional wrongdoing) is shunted off, like an empty railroad car, to
a side track. The emphasis is subtly shifted away from any knowing
122 Lubasch, supra note 120, at A2.
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transgression perpetrated by Pan Globe. The instructing judge
turned the treaty's notion of intentional wrongdoing into something
like unintentional Negligence. Under this instruction, "intentional
wrongdoing" is so watered down that Pan Globe's perhaps miserly hir-
ing of only two rather than three security guards may become the "in-
tentional performance of an act in such a manner as to imply
disregard of the possible consequences"'I s - and so trigger huge
Willful Misconduct awards unencumbered by the $75,000 treaty limit.
Note that the jury instruction suggests the probabilities of an acci-
dent, as in "probably'result in injury" and "imply disregard of the
probable consequences." The judge's language on probability mimics
Negligence law in which Negligent conduct is defined as unreasonably
unsafe conduct, the "probable consequences" of which is injury.
Given this transformation of Willful Misconduct into mere Negli-
gence, it's little wonder that ajury facing the grieving families of 200
dead passengers, and a defendant airline that cut costs by skimping on
security guards, can find Willful Misconduct in an unaccompanied
suitcase.
This recasting of Willful Misconduct to include unintentional ac-
cidents is a prime example of the power of legal reasoning. Legal
reasoning, despite some fancy talk about deductive and inductive
mental gymnastics, is almost always nothing more than plain ordinary
reasoning, some of it sensible, some of it nonsensical, but in any event
common to lawyer and nonlawyer alike. In other words, adding the
prefix "legal" to "reasoning" does not transform the commonplace
into the uncommon gem of the first water. In fact, if there is anything
unique about legal reasoning, it is in how legal terms are so constantly
being adjusted to fit different settings by being outfitted with altered
definitions.
One of the early disappointments that confronts first-year stu-
dents is how often the law dictionary proves unhelpful in deciphering
an opinion's legal concepts. Legal concepts are fragile constructs that
are prey to changes in the wind; legal words such as Intent and Juris-
dictional, given fixed meanings, would lose their usefulness in legal
reasoning. Legal combatants, when forced into a corner, tend to treat
the meanings behind legal labels much like a railroad ticket: good for
this trip only.
Lawyers whose clients are in a bind urge upon the courts slightly
outlandish definitions of Willful Misconduct, Battery, Due Process, or
whatever. The common law, like the U.S. Constitution, sheds its skin
123 Lubasch, supra note 120, at A2.
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and grows a new one occasionally, in part by a process of endorsing
newly-minted definitions of legal concepts. The first-year contracts
casebook underscores this game of revolving definitions with its sales
contract case that asks what the contract in question means where it
reads "chicken." 24 The buyer in the case, as noted earlier, contracted
to buy "chickens," but what the buyer more particularly wanted, but
failed to spell out, was young fryers. When the seller delivered ma-
ture, too-tough-to-fry hens, the dissatisfied buyer made a federal case
out of the meaning of "chicken.""2 5
Legalistic chicken debate is of course the sort of thing that gets
students of The Law laughed at in movies and books. Lawyers, despite
appearances, are even able to laugh at themselves when their jargon
erupts into absurdity. We lawyers couldn't live with ourselves and our
legalese if we didn't make jokes to release some of the hot air in legal
discourse. Examples of this anxiety-reducing humor are the make-be-
lieve opinions that circulate around law schools. One such mock judi-
cial opinion, written for legal laughs, concerns a regulation banning
horses from a city park. The issue in the opinion, which the mock
court, with a straightjudicial face, answers "yes," is whether a bird can,
under some circumstances, be deemed a "horse." The power of legal
reasoning is such that turning a bird into a horse is only slightly be-
yond the pale.
Another aspect of lawyerly reasoning is the lawyer's use of the
legal fiction device, a sort of half-baked logic reminiscent of the kind
that deters flat earth people from riding off into the sunset. This is
the type of logic that once caused common law judges to decree that
when a man and a woman marry, they merged into a single male en-
tity in the eye of The Law, meaning the husband controlled all marital
assets. Reasoning of the same sort resulted in the old common law
fiction that a woman, because she possesses the requisite female
plumbing, is presumed capable of giving birth no matter how ad-
vanced her age. A more up-to-date example of this black-is-white rea-
soning is the way judges avoid language in worker's compensation
statutes denying compensation to the families of workers who commit
job-related suicide. Suicide, reasons the legalist, is willful self-extinc-
tion. But since workers who kill themselves are obviously thinking ab-
normally, they must lack the brain power to be willfuL Since,
therefore, these suicidal workers only unwillfully killed themselves,
124 E.g., BAsic CoNTRAcr LAw, supra note 55, at 335 (citing Frigaliment Importing
Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (1960)).
125 Figaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 116.
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compensation benefits, despite the statutory bar in suicide cases, are
due. Suicide, in other words, in Law, is only sometimes fatal.
Such make-believe extends even into constitutional interpreta-
tion. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, written
to bolster the freedom of freed slaves, is today given such an imagina-
tive reading that corporate America is turned into a Fourteenth
Amendment "person" and given a full measure of Due Process protec-
tion.1" 6 Then there's that most amazing, and most resilient, legal fic-
tion, one that pervades all legal life, none other than its honor - The
Law.
Some of the above examples of the illogic of lawyerly logic are
admittedly extreme. But not outrageously so, considering the illogic
of attaching a Willful Misconduct label worth millions to a lonely suit-
case that security guards inadvertently failed to connect up to a board-
ing passenger. Recall also the Peg v. Pierce-type suit in which a
criminal statute can control case results even though the statute's
drafters never dreamed they were writing civil tort law.
A related use of legal logic that is too logical by half occurs in
situations where the legislature obviously intends to regulate activities
A through Z but through an obvious oversight omits activity Q from
the text of the statute. A court that reasons with a legal vengeance will
take the legislature at its literal, if misspoken word, and refuse to bring
Q within the statutory regulation. We call this exclusion of Q a form
of legal reasoning, although remember that such dogged logic is not
exclusively legal, as can be seen in the case of fundamentalist Protes-
tant sects that ban pianos from their churches. The Biblical basis for
banning instrumental music is fraught with legalistic reasoning: since
New Testament descriptions of early Christians at worship mention no
instrumental music, it follows, as does night the day, that God intends
that Christians worship a cappella.
Professor Steven Burton illustrates how far legal reasoning has
fallen from its scientific days in the legal laboratory. Burton finds rea-
soning by example and other such traits of the legal mind "useful,"
but I gather not terribly so:
[L]egal reasoning in the analogical form remains the underly-
ing mode of thought.... [TI he combination of analogical and
deductive forms of reasoning is useful in many cases but does
not [alone] solve the problem .... One cannot conclude that
legal reasoning really is analogical. Nor can one conclude that
legal reasoning really is deductive. In some respects it is both,
and in some respects it is neither.... Even if legal reasoning "is
126 See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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not capable of founding exact logical conclusions," its interpre-
tative method should be understood fully before the implica-
tions for legitimacy are evaluated.1
27
You see the perils of trying to put legal reasoning in capsule form.
It's more helpful simply to point, as legal educators do, to what law-
yers do in practice and stick a "legal reasoning" label on it. Nobody
has ever worked out a sweeping theory about how reasoning by exam-
ple and all the rest actually work. Lawyers in this respect are like those
novelists who confess to little understanding of how they create their
art.
All this inexactness about legal reasoning hits first-year students
hard when they initially try to fit casebook cases into some kind of
order worthy of the name "precedent." If the rule of law is truly a
system of rules in which like cases are decided alike, the student needs
to know how to tell which cases are alike and therefore fit under a
single rule. So why don't law professors spell out the analogical-de-
ductive-inductive-common sense mode of legal reasoning that will en-
able students to distinguish the cases that fit under rule A from those
that fit under rule B?
B. Analogical Reasoning
Analyzing casebook opinions and writing student briefs in-
127 STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 82-84
(1985). Also of interest to law students is EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REAsoNING (1949). Levi illustrates the peculiar nature of legal reasoning by
tracing the decline and fall of the old rule exempting manufacturers from liability to
consumers for injuries caused by Negligently-produced products. Id. at 9-27. What
happened was that the common law gave birth in the mid-1800s to a tiny exception to
the then-bedrock rule of manufacturer nonliability for injuries caused by defective
products carelessly made. The tiny exception was a sub-rule permitting Negligence
awards against manufacturers and distributors of certain Inherently Dangerous prod-
ucts, loaded guns, for instance. Over the years, this sub-rule's list of Inherently Dan-
gerous items was expanded. Initially, a bottle of mislabeled poison purchased at retail
triggered distributor liability. Then later, defective guns and hair wash gained Inher-
ently Dangerous status; eventually the circle of Inherently Dangerous items widened
to include defective scaffolds, coffee urns, and aerated bottles. By 1916, the New York
Court of Appeals had opened the Inherently Dangerous window so wide that Buick
Motor Company was deemed vulnerable to the Negligence suit of a Buick owner in-
jured because of a defective wheel. MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
The circle was now complete. The original rule of nonliability began with a defec-
tively constructed wooden coach, Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842),
and, in less than a century, swallowed its tail by recognizing as an Inherently Danger-
ous exception another coach in the shape of a Buick car afflicted with a defective
wooden wheel. The sub-rule allowing limited manufacturer liability had thus ex-
panded until, washed down with legal reasoning, it swallowed the parent rule of nonli-
ability. This brand of legal reasoning can also be called an institutional change of
mind about the politics of tort liability.
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volves heavy doses of lining up precedent cases arguably similar to
the case at hand. Dissimilar cases, which are the cases that strike
the legal reasoner as analogical mismatches, are thrown on the
scrap heap of cases-not-on-point. The Roe v. Wade pro-abortion de-
cision,"'8 for instance, is deemed by the Supreme Court to bear a
likeness to the Court's earlier case of Griswold v. Connecticut.
12 9
The Roe Court explained that Griswold is "similar" because the jus-
tices in Griswold, by ruling that states can't bar married couples
from using contraceptives, recognized a constitutional Right Of
Privacy; and since child-bearing is likewise a private sexual matter,
it follows that Roe is also a Right Of Privacy case, and, therefore,
governed by the Griswold privacy precedent.13
This reasoning by analogy is a far cry from science. Still, if
legal reasoners are, as is usual, representatives of a class that shares
pretty much the same cultural and social values, such intuitive rea-
soning by example works as a way of thrashing out minor differ-
ences and ensuring minimal consistency in legal ordering. The
trouble comes, as in the instance of Roe v. Wade, when pro-choice
and pro-life forces raise the level of discord to the point that ana-
logical reasoning about metaphysical privacy rights is too frail a ves-
sel for carrying the contending arguments.
Consider the classroom hypothetical known to all torts stu-
dents in which a stranger on a bridge ignores the cries of a swim-
mer drowning in the river below. The stranger, by tossing a handy
life buoy to the swimmer, could easily prevent the drowning. Yet in
a Negligence suit against the heartless stranger, legal custom says
the defendant stranger is not liable, no damages are due.1
3 1
Before we ponder what cases are similar and therefore controlled
by the stranger-on-the-bridge case, we need to think about what
words to use in stating the no-duty-to-rescue rule of this drowning
case.
Here are three possible ways to state the holding in a drown-
ing case in which the heartless stranger escapes tort liability: (1)
refusal by a stranger to rescue a swimmer is no tort; (2) refusal by
either a stranger or a friend to rescue a swimmer is no tort; (3)
refusal to rescue, whatever the relationship or context, is no tort.
Each time the rule moves, from (1) to (3), up a rung on the
ladder of abstraction, the breadth of the rule expands. Thus, ver-
128 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56 (citing Grino04, i&).
131 KEETON ET AL., supra note 69, at 375-82.
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sion (3) of the no-rescue rule covers all reluctant rescuers whatever
the circumstances. So which of these rules negating Negligence
liability for the stranger on the bridge is the "correct" rule for pur-
poses of precedent? To put it another way, is the case of the stran-
ger on the bridge similar or dissimilar, for purposes of precedent,
to the case of the friend on the bridge? And what if the friend
pushed the swimmer into the river?
Here we come to the crux of the problem of reasoning our
way to an answer about when cases belong under the same rule -
when, that is, the similarities between the cases are more important
than the differences. The awful truth is that we lawyers lack any
finely tuned way of grouping similar cases and distinguishing dis-
similar cases. The Law runs out of rules just when a rule is most
needed for identifying case differences that are important. Thus,
lawyers must, in the absence of meaningful guidelines for distin-
guishing cases, play it largely by ear.
A law teacher challenging a class to state with legal finality
whether case A is like case B is being disingenuous. The law
teacher knows that legal finality in such matters isn't in the cards.
Yet by struggling to make case B look like case A, students sharpen
their skills at argument by analogy.
Students, facing daily the task of distinguishing cases, learn
that the system of precedent is elastic. Lawyers can, by distinguish-
ing B from A, foster change; or by analogizing A and B, maintain
the status quo. It all depends on whether the rule of case A is
stated broadly or narrowly. What lawyers and judges do constantly
is whittle down the ancient facts of case A to fashion a new and
narrower holding; or, on the other hand, they restate in grander
form the old holding in case A to cover a broader range of facts.
An example of the latter would be to revise the no-duty-to-rescue
rule covering strangers by couching the holding in more general
terms so that it absolves non-rescuing friends from liability as well.
Legal reasoning, then, is no formula for extracting "correct"
holdings or identifying sure-fire "like" cases. Identifying precedent
cases comes close to being a matter of intuition; justice is in this
sense the outcome of judicial hunches. Looked at as pure cere-
mony, legal reasoning at least gives the system of precedent its sem-
blance of inevitability. Legal reasoning helps judges dress
decisions in logical wrappings, and at the same time avoid being
hog-tied on other occasions by the restraints of backward-looking
precedent.
Getting back to the stranger on the bridge, suppose the stran-
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ger is a doctor who neglects to voluntarily treat a swimmer merely
injured. Tort doctrine, again, contains no firm criteria for nailing
down whether this uncaring doctor belongs in the same pigeon-
hole with the lay stranger in the no-liability drowning case. Prece-
dent's flawed underpinnings is a major reason why learning The
Law is in the end learning a process and language of decision in
which rules play a limited role.
Skepticism about The Law's claims to airtight reasoning and
pristine neutrality, though as old as the hills, was relatively muted
in the U.S. until the Great Depression spawned the New Deal era
of radical legal transformation. This was when the pre-1937 U.S.
Supreme Court read the U.S. Constitution to stifle government
regulation of business. This laissez-faire version of The Law
blocked, for a time, Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal regulatory
programs, and the conservative justices found themselves no
longer "above the fray"; their robes could no longer conceal the
pre-1937 Court's conservative political role. As a result, The Law's
reputation for deathless logic and political abstinence took a beat-
ing from which it has never recovered.
132
New Deal lawyers and law professors critical of a then-con-
servative judiciary went public in the 1930s with the charge that
Supreme Court justices were, always had been, and would by neces-
sity always be, political animals. Left-leaning legal realists pointed
out that it wasn't the objective imperatives of legal doctrine, but
right-wing politics that prompted the Court's pre-1937, anti-New
Deal rulings.13 3 This revelation in the 1930s of the political atmos-
phere from which judges, no matter how learned or elevated, can
escape, was the springboard for this century's legal realist move-
ment. The lesson was that judges, like the Wizard of Oz,34 should
be judged not on how much fog they produce, but on how wisely
they govern. The Wizard of Oz, the little old man who behind his
curtain cranked out impressive clouds of smoke, was unable,
though a good man at heart, to perform magic. 135 Judges likewise
lack extraordinary powers, surmised New Deal legal realists. The
claim that only high court judges are fit to reveal constitutional
truth will never again find the ready acceptance it once did.
132 See FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLmcAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM
1790 to 1955, ch. 7 (1955).
133 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 7 (2d ed. 1988).
134 THE WIZARD OF OZ, supra note 22.
135 THE WIZARD OF Oz, supra note 22.
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C. The Abortion Case
High court judges churn out opinions not because of a felt
need for self-revelation, but because we the people insist that
judges account for their actions by "proving" they conform to the
rule of law. This "proof," however, cannot be produced in any fully
satisfying intellectual sense. Too much is asked of legal reasoning,
prompting skeptics such as Ambrose Bierce to compose wicked
lines such as "[a] lawyer [is] one skilled in circumvention of the
law.
" 13 6
Few in the legal community wish to disabuse the laity of its
idealized model of reasoned decision. Parading a distinctively
legal mode of reasoning, even if the distinctively legal is oversold, is
deemed by the legal faithful a legitimate way to assure the public
that judges are made of better stuff than the legislators who must
cast votes without the aid of The Law. Faith, as the Bible says, is the
evidence of things not seen, the substance of things hoped for.
1" 7
The Supreme Court's famous, or infamous, Roe v. Wade injunc-
tion against the states from putting severe restrictions on the abor-
tion option is an example of legal reasoning heavily wedded to
faith.13 8 This is not to say that freedom of choice is wrong or that
the Court acted extra-judicially in tying the hands of pro-life state
legislatures. Putting aside the ultimate political and moral merits
of Roe, the Court's pro-abortion opinion in that controversial case
is a prime example of the fancy footwork that, in the land of legal
legerdemain, we call legal reasoning.
The burden of Roe's majority opinion is to tie the justices' pro-
choice, anti-states' rights theme to a piece of the Constitution. Un-
able to agree precisely on a constitutional rationale, the justices
point variously in Roe to the Bill of Rights as well as to the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.13 9 The Bill of Rights, those original ten amendments to the
Constitution, are of course restrictions on Congress and not on
state legislatures. As for the Due Process Clause, the post-Civil War
Fourteenth Amendment was aimed principally at insuring former
slaves their civil rights. So, how can legal reasoning tie either the
Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment to freedom to choose
abortion?
Mainstream constitutional reasoning gets windy here, so hold
156 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 187 (1911).
137 Hebrews 11:1.
138 See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139 Id. at 176-77, 185-89, 192-95.
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on to your hats. For some time now the Court has ruled that state
as well as federal legislators are barred from legislating away civil
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights. And the constitutional rea-
soning for saying state legislatures must genuflect to the Bill of
Rights hinges on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here's the legal history leading up to Roe v. Wade.
The Supreme Court reread, after World War II, the Four-
teenth Amendment's promise that "liberty" can be restrained by
the states only under "due process" procedures, and found fresh
meaning. This mid-century revisionist Court reading expands the
nineteenth-century abolitionists' notion of "liberty" to include
most of the original Bill of Rights freedoms; this means the Bill of
Rights is today a limit on state, as well as congressional, action. Not
only that, but once the Court freed the "liberty" concept of its Civil
War ties, the justices felt free to add freedoms not mentioned in
the Bill of Rights to the list of Fourteenth Amendment limitations
on state legislatures.
This Due Process legal reasoning so far comes to this: the
original intent of the framers of the Constitution and its amend-
ments doesn't alone control the Court's reading; and Due Process
"liberty" is elastic enough to permit reading into it the Bill of
Rights, plus other freedoms from government restraint that five of
nine lawyers sitting on the high court think fitting. But how about
a freedom to abort - and the fact that the Constitution is, as is so
often the situation in constitutional litigation, silent on the subject?
Here again legal reasoning is up to the challenge of finding a
constitutional niche for Roe. The constitutional niche central to
Roe is ajudicial creation called a Right Of Privacy. As noted earlier,
a Right Of Privacy, not in word but in spirit, was discovered in the
Fourteenth Amendment years ago" when, during the Warren
Court era, the justices told Connecticut in the Griswold case that its
ban on contraceptives was unconstitutional. Yet, many are troubled
by the fact that we have a Constitution mute as to both abortion
and privacy rights.
Lawyers in debate often argue, though usually with little effect,
that where the Constitution is silent on a subject, that subject is no
proper concern of the Constitution and its caretaker justices. The
text of the Constitution lacks explicitness about the abortion ques-
tion, and so, say legal reasoners for right-to-lifers, the justices over-
step themselves by removing state bars against abortion. The same
140 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485.
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"silence" argument, by the way, would negate many of the current
Court's "liberty" readings, including the Court's requirement of
free counsel for indigent criminal defendants: the Constitution's
text stops short of promising free counsel, and so for the justices to
read free into the text is, arguably, out of bounds.
This silent-Constitution logic carried to the next step would
grant state governments an escape from Court oversight on issues
of free speech and free exercise of religion - this because the
Constitution's text nowhere says straight-out that state govern-
ments cannot censor speech or regulate religious practices. The
ultimate silent-Constitution claim concerns the Constitution's em-
barrassing failure to name Supreme Court justices as the final fed-
eral arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution's vague and
ambiguous words. But for almost two centuries Marbury v.
Madison's14 1 declaration of judicial supremacy has sounded loud
and clear despite a silent Constitution. Lawyers in the next century
will no doubt continue to make silent-Constitution arguments, but
will do so knowing a silent text often speaks in a shout.
Meanwhile, in decisions such as Griswold and Roe, the justices
shift attention away from the Constitution's failure to treat sexual
privacy explicitly by spotlighting Fourteenth Amendment open-
ended "liberty" and "due process." Boiled down, Griswold and Roe
rest on the general idea that Due Process promises individual free-
dom, including a freedom from "liberty"-denying restrictions on sex-
ual privacy. More particularly, some of the Griswoldjustices found
a Right Of Privacy in the marriage bed to be a part of the "liberty"
that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process puts outside the reach of
state legislatures.1 42 Thesejustices read "liberty" broadly enough to
reach the marriage bed without calling on the Bill of Rights for
help. Other Griswold justices found a Right Of Privacy lurking in
the Bill of Rights as a sort of silent partner to the explicit Free
Speech, Free Press, and (freedom from) Unreasonable Searches
provisions previously incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.143 From Griswold's legal reasoning the jump to Roe was easy.
The legal reasoning underlying Roe, couched in the lawyer's
traditional "obviously" mode, can be summed up this way: the con-
cept of Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" standing either alone, or
in conjunction with the Bill of Rights' freedoms otherwise grafted
onto the Fourteenth Amendment, obviously suggests sufficient
141 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
142 Griswold 381 U.S. at 486.
143 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J. concurring).
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concern for an individual's interest in privacy and autonomy to
support an implied Right Of Privacy; this implied Right Of Privacy
was the constitutional foundation for the Griswold v. Connecticut de-
cision killing a state ban on contraceptives; Roe v. Wade is "like"
Griswold in that both cases involve sexual intimacy; the Right Of
Privacy recognized in Griswold therefore extends to the sexual inti-
macy central to the abortion question posed by Roe, and so forth
(more on Roe's legal foundation in Section IX's look at constitu-
tional law).
Equally reasonable legal arguments contrary to Roe's majority
ruling can be and are made. For instance, there's the argument
that Roe is quite "unlike" Griswold in that only Roe involves a fetus.
But such arguments simply prove the point that legal reasoning,
like legal doctrine in general, does not dictate appellate results.
Legal reasoning can only help judges choose between competing
precedents. Reliance on past trends of decision does, however,
feed experience and structure into the courtroom mix, and is a
powerful debating point. But, in the end that's all precedent is: a
debating point! Law school's lesson is, again, that to write down
The Law of the appellate courts is to write in the sand.
Given the failure of the rule of law to rule us by words alone,
cases consequently must be decided ultimately on extra-legal - so-
cial and moral - grounds. Knowing early in law school how short
The Law falls in keeping judges above the fray permits budding
legalists to focus more energies on the moral-political-economic
consequences of legal operations. Law, seen as social engineering,
invites into legal learning and practice a needed concern for realis-
tic techniques for dealing with the political element in judicial gov-
ernance. The deficiencies inherent in legal reasoning leave a
vacuum to be filled, with the insights and methods of political sci-
ence, economics, psychology, and statistics.
VI. TORTS IN A DiEvm's NUTsHELL
A. Modern Rise Of Negligence Doctrine
The following sketch of first-year torts shows newcomers to
lawspeak the bare bones of personal injury law. Any other first-year
subject would do as well for a general introduction to the legal
mind-set. The vocabularies of first-year torts, contracts, property,
and procedure vary, but the underlying legal process by which doc-
trine and judicial discretion merge into courtroom decision is simi-
lar whatever the legal field.
This unifying legal process explains why law students can an-
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swer bar exam questions on subjects not studied in law school.
Learning to talk the language of torts is a language skill readily
transferable to wills, evidence, and even The Law of oil and gas.
Law graduates preparing for a bar exam subject neglected in law
school, let's say bills and notes, need only learn a little bills and
notes vocabulary, and then plug these new terms into their Juris
Doctor learning.
Law school's division of legal doctrine into neatly arranged
subdivisions is slightly artificial anyway. The split of doctrine into
such topics as workers' compensation and conflicts of laws is help-
ful in the same way that a table of contents helps bring order to a
world history text. But for the practicing lawyer, whose clients have
problems that span the legal globe, the law school split between
torts and contracts frequently gets lost in the shuffle.
The following look at tort doctrine shuns the narrow body-of-
rules approach common to the legal encyclopedia. In avoiding the
rule-oriented approach in favor of a broader overview of the litiga-
tion process in tort law, my aim is to help beginners more quickly
cope with casebook lore. Although it's perfectly respectable to
present torts or any other first-year subject in the form of a list of
rules and exceptions to the rules, torts is a poor subject for such
blackletter treatment. So unruly is personal injury law that a stu-
dent could memorize all the doctrines surrounding Negligence liti-
gation and yet have little understanding of the complexities that
appellate judges discuss in opinions.
Historically, tort law is the new kid on the block. Property and
contract learning go almost back to disputes about who slept where
and with whom in stone age caves. Yet, even in the 1770s, when
American colonists sent British lawyers home and put judicial
robes on a homegrown set of lawyers, there was little tort law to
administer. On neither side of the Atlantic was a single treatise on
tort law published before 1850. Before 1850, say historians, Negli-
gence was the merest dot on the law. 4
Once upon a time, in a primitive day before there were even
doctors for tort lawyers to sue, English people made do without
tort law by arranging to have God available tojudge accident cases.
God presided over what the early English called trial by ordeal, 4 - a
procedure through which God pointed out the wrongdoers re-
144 See HALL ET AL., supra note 79, at 178-80.
145 See, e.g., ROBERT BARTLETr, TR4UL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL
ORDEAL (1986); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-43
(1771).
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sponsible for paying damages. In trial by ordeal, an alleged wrong-
doer was subjected to some unpleasantness, such as having an arm
immersed in boiling water.46 If the scalded arm failed to heal, this
was God's sign that the lame-armed litigant was indeed a wrong-
doer and liable for damages.'
47
Trial by ordeal proved satisfactory as long as people believed
that God would point out, by healing the burns of virtuous liti-
gants, the path to justice. A variation on trial by ordeal, which was
outlawed in England only in 1819,146 was called trial-by-battle. In-
stead of a contest of words, litigants fought each other with, among
other quasi-legal weapons, swords.' 49 The swordplay in trial by bat-
tle continued until God tired of the sport and pointed with an au-
thoritative finger to the party at fault - the wrongdoer through
whose chest the opponent's bloodied sword protruded.1
50
Trial by swordplay in merry old England, by the way, is how
the plaintiffs' lawyer first made his entrance. This trial-by-battle ad-
vocate was hired on as a "champion" to match swords on behalf of
his litigating client. Today, this tort "champion" uses verbal darts
to champion the cause of the injured in adversarial common law
battle.
Not until the middle of the last century, when engines and
machines began to replace horses and buggies, did tort law, and
Negligence doctrine in particular, become a growth industry.'
5'
Machines, less manageable than the plodding horse, soon began to
maim and cripple people. The early railroads helped create a
strong economy, but left along their tracks thousands of injured
and dead. Victims of the new machine age increasingly looked to
the courts to ease their pains with jury awards.
Compensation under a Negligence regime was slow, however,
in coming to accident victims. A hundred years ago, before liability
insurance and skilled plaintiffs' lawyers were common to the legal
scene, few accident victims won Negligence suits. And jury awards,
when granted, were modest. History reveals that nineteenth-cen-
tury trial and appellate judges resisted any large scale shifting of
personal injury costs over to railroads, factories, or other enter-
prises springing up out of the industrial revolution. The industrial
revolution after the Civil War was just beginning to get up a head
146 BArrLrT, supra note 145, at 4.
147 BaA.TETT, supra note 145, at 4.
148 See I.W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 308-10 (1969).
149 BA~TLE.r, supra note 145, at 110.
150 BAR Err, supra note 145, at 103.
151 KEETON ET AL., supra note 69, at 160-61.
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of steam. Free enterprise, concluded the political, business, and
legal establishment, should be allowed to develop unfettered by
too many costly tort awards.1
52
Of course, juries sat in Negligence cases back then as they do
now, and presumably jurors then as now felt sorry for severely in-
jured workers and others seeking accident damages. But, as this
chapter teaches, the judiciary ultimately ran the tort show, and a
conservative judiciary ran a pro-business Negligence show up until
World War II. In essence, then, judges, by taking cases away from
juries through rulings, for instance, on the adequacy of proof, can
veto pro-plaintiffjuries. The liberal exercise of this jury veto power
by business-oriented judges early in this century finally led labor
leaders to accuse these legal priests of laissez-faire capitalism of
subsidizing industry with the spilt blood of workmen.
Turn-of-the-century judges were so tough on injured employ-
ees seeking tort relief that a whole new political movement evolved.
This pro-worker movement eventually led to a partial abolition of
the tort system, and to replacing Negligence doctrine in the work-
place with a nation-wide system of workers' compensation.
153
Workers' compensation is paid to injured workers even in the ab-
sence of employer Negligence. Under workers' compensation, any
on-the-job injury is covered automatically by government-required,
employer-financed insurance that pays injured workers, not mil-
lions, but most medical expenses and a big chunk of lost wages.
When, in the mid-century, political attitudes shifted, and liabil-
ity (for Negligence) insurance became almost universal, defendant-
minded judges were replaced with risk-spreading, enterprise-liabil-
ity, pro-plaintiff judges. Today, as a result of a more liberal judici-
ary having invited sympathetic jurors to take charge of Negligence
awards, personal injury law works more often to compensate in-
jured plaintiffs."5 The extent of this turnabout in Negligence liti-
gation, which today gives the accident victim at least an even shot
at winning a jury award, is illustrated by a 1975 California case.155
A small private plane mysteriously crashed, killing all on
board.15 6 The cause of the crash, other than some suggestion that
the plane ran out of gas, remains unexplained. The families of the
152 LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 29 (2d ed. 1977).
153 See Kenneth Vinson, Tort Reform the Old-Fashioned Way: By Trial and Appellate
Judges, 1987 DET. C.L. REv. 987.
154 Id. at 989-90 n.11 (citing Report of the Tort Polioy Working Group).
155 Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1975).
156 Id. at 36.
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dead passengers sued the estate of the aircraft's owner-pilot.157
The traditional common-law policy would have required plaintiffs,
before collecting tort damages, to offer some proof that the crash
was attributable to pilot error. Yet, in this California case, the es-
tate of the owner and pilot of the plane was compelled to pay dam-
ages despite the inability of anyone to explain why the plane fell
from the sky.' 58 Pilot carelessness, although but one of several pos-
sibilities, was simply assumed.'59 The California court blazed a
new legal trail by more or less relieving the plaintiff survivors of any
obligation to prove pilot error.16°
When judges of yesteryear, by rulings on evidentiary adequacy,
restrained juries from freely voting their pro-plaintiff sympathies,
business interests were thereby protected from the threat of a run
of large jury awards. Businesses are no longer insulated from tort
liability; juries have been unleashed; businesses, when possible, buy
liability insurance protection against financial ruin. Nor are pri-
vate citizen defendants, unless protected by liability insurance, free
from the risk of ruinous liability. Many Negligence judgments, for
example, go against the individual driver of a privately or company-
owned automobile. (Intentional torts, by the way, are not the
bread and butter of trial lawyers; although victims of Assault, Bat-
tery, False Imprisonment, and Wrongful Infliction Of Mental Dis-
tress may have good claims, such victims often must suffer an
intentional wrongdoer who lacks reachable assets and whose liabil-
ity insurance only covers Negligence judgments.)
Although auto accident victims ordinarily sue the driver of the
other car, the real and unnamed defendant behind the scenes is
usually a liability insurance company, the deep pocket backing up
the defendant driver. Liability insurance provides the bulk of the
money that today fuels the tort system's lottery-like shifting of acci-
dent costs from the backs of about one out of two accident
victims.'
61
This liability insurance money becomes available to pay for a
victim's injuries only in instances where the insured defendant, in
the opinion ofjudge and jury, has committed a Negligent act. Lia-
bility insurance monies, or else corporate or government treasur-
ies, are the principal sources for tort compensation for not only
157 Id.
158 Id. at 40-41.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 SeeJEFFREY O'CoNNu.i & C. BrN KEL.Y, THE BLAME GAME 119 (1986).
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traffic accident victims, but also in claims involving the two other
most frequent victims of lawsuit-breeding accidents - consumers
of products defectively designed or manufactured, and health-care
patients damaged by careless medical attention. Because most ju-
rors have come to understand that in most personal injury suits an
insurance company or a presumably well-heeled corporation will
pay any tort awards assessed, such jurors may have few qualms
(other than the slight risk of prompting higher insurance premi-
ums or consumer prices) about sticking it to the deep pocket
defendant.
The modem unleashing of award-happy juries is judicially jus-
tified by an unusually candid political rationale dubbed "enterprise
liability."' 62 Enterprise liability means, in the jargon of torts, shift-
ing more of the costs of accidents to business concerns or govern-
ment entities, who presumably are good cost-spreaders. 163 Cost-
spreading is done by using liability insurance and, in the case of
government defendants, taxes to spread accident costs widely over
premium payers and taxpayers.
Under enterprise (loss-spreading) liability, the question of
whether carelessness caused an accident is often still relevant, and
the response of judge and jury is presumably influenced by a de-
fendant's ability to spread losses through liability insurance or
higher commodity prices or, in the case of defendant government
agencies, higher taxes. Spreading accident losses is better econom-
ics and better justice, so current theory goes, than leaving cata-
strophic losses upon individuals and their families.1" Accident
law, in thus taking its cue from shifts in political currents, is a sort
of living law in which judges and juries go with the flow of public
(loss-spreading) demand, defining Negligence (or Strict Liability)
from case to case to fit the politics of the moment.
At one time, tort law's complicated judge-andjury system of
punishing faulty tortfeasors by forcing them to pay damages inter-
ested mainly the trial bar. But, given the current obsession with
suing at the drop of a hat, the business community is now much
concerned with The Law of torts. Business interests have increas-
ingly borne the brunt of larger and more frequent jury awards.
This inflation of business's litigation expenses explains the higher
162 See George L Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STuD. 461 (1985); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 69, at 24 (discussing relative capacity of respective parties to bear or
distribute loss).
163 See generaly Priest, supra note 162.
164 Priest, supra note 162.
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cost and occasional unavailability of liability insurance, and ex-
plains also why the business community has lately become a highly
visible force for legislative tort reform. 165  Business-oriented re-
formers ask legislators to limit Negligence damages, tighten up on
the time allowed for filing lawsuits, require firmer proof of defend-
ant carelessness, cap plaintiff lawyers' contingent fees, require
more trustworthy proof of injury, and in general tinker with the
civil jury system so that damage-suit defendants aren't themselves
victimized by bleeding-heart juries manipulated by the histrionics
of silver-tongued plaintiffs' lawyers. 1
66
There is also the more radical breed of tort reformer, found
usually on law school faculties, who argue that from the point of
view of accident victims, the tort system, even given the expansion
in enterprise liability, is nevertheless an inadequate compensation
system.' 67 Radical reformers remind us that half of all accident vic-
tims, for one reason or another, still go uncompensated; that jury
suits are devilishly expensive and that too little of the liability insur-
ance money actually winds up in the pockets of victims fortunate
enough to win lawsuits; and that in any event the lawyers' high-
priced adversarial system is a nasty, lengthy, tedious business for
litigants to have to suffer through when there are more decent
ways to run a compensation system.1 68 Why not, say these tort dis-
sidents, install a no-fault, automatic-pay system like workers' com-
pensation, adapted to auto accidents and medical malpractice, and
better designed to serve efficiently and fairly the goal of compen-
sating for accidental personal injuries. 69
Nonetheless, personal injury law, despite minor legislative in-
tervention of late, remains much the same common law creation it
has always been. Understanding the fault-based torts process, then,
requires an appreciation of how judge and jury, without benefit of
statutory guidance, determine when in fairness accident losses
should be shifted to a defendant. Such common law adjudication
has over the years produced a special language and a highly com-
plex procedure for dealing with car crashes, defective lawnmowers,
slips on banana peels, medical butchery, and even the launching of
a possum-playing fox.
165 Vinson, supra note 153, at 990-91.
166 Vinson, supra note 153, at 990-91.
167 Vinson, supra note 153, at 987.
168 Vinson, supra note 153, at 987-88.
169 For one of the latest in a long series of proposed no-fault compensation
schemes see STEPHEN D. SUcARmAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
B. Litigation Process In Tort Law
As noted earlier, to learn that the Negligence standard trigger-
ing an auto driver's liability for damages involves a "failure to use
reasonable care" is to learn, given the indeterminacy of "reason-
able care," very little. The complex procedure, moreover, that
judge and jury follow to pinpoint those deficient in Reasonable
Care further complicates the reading of the torts casebook. Begin-
ning students too often minimize the procedural (and human) as-
pects of the litigation process and of appellate opinion-writing.
The chief obstacle torts students must overcome is the bred-to-the-
bone idea that legal mastery comes with rule-learning alone.
Moreover, the fact that there's a separate first-year course in
civil procedure leads overly doctrinaire students to conclude that a
clear line exists separating trial procedure and substantive law.
Torts is in theory a "substantive" law course, a label suggesting
large doses of meaty rules. Yet, setting the mind to look for meaty
substance in the flimsy doctrinal apparatus of tort litigation is a
handicap. Students should focus on the procedure by which judge
and jury flesh out, case by case, the content of so-called substantive
doctrines such as that of Reasonable Care. The torts casebook
mainly shows careful readers the procedure through which judge
and jury share the discretionary power of choosing who deserves
tort awards.
One famous case included in all torts casebooks tells the story
of an injured Helen Palsgraf, who failed in the 1920s to win a Neg-
ligence suit against the Long Island Railroad.1 70 Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R17 1 is famous because of the intricate dance of doctrine
choreographed by Judges Cardozo and Andrews of the New York
Court of Appeals (Cardozo later became a justice on the U. S.
Supreme Court). These two jurists wrote majority and dissenting
opinions explaining to Helen Palsgraf, and to countless law stu-
dents, how The Law and New York's highest court answer her
claim.
Like many casebook cases, the outcome in Palsgraf hinged on
a close appellate vote. The case could easily have been decided in
Helen Palsgraf's favor. In fact, plaintiff Palsgraf won at the trial
court level, and then again when the railroad appealed to an inter-
mediate appellate court. But, the defendant railroad's lawyers per-
severed, and at the end of the appellate line, convinced four of
170 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 69.
171 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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seven high court judges that Helen Palsgraf was a loser in the
blame game called torts.'72
The events that transpired long ago to cause injury to Helen
Palsgraf as she waited on the Long Island Railroad platform for a
train were, at the appellate level, undisputed.17 Palsgraf was hurt
when free-standing platform scales toppled over and fell on her.
17 4
The scales were somehow knocked over when a package of explo-
sives dropped by a nearby boarding passenger exploded.' 75 The
unidentified boarding passenger dropped the package when, in at-
tempting to board a crowded and moving car, he was pushed by
railroad employees attempting to stuff yet another body aboard the
departing train."
Perhaps if Helen Palsgraf could have identified the boarding
passenger with the harmless-looking but accident-causing package,
her lawsuit might better have been aimed at this explosive passen-
ger, if by chance this passenger carrying fireworks to a party had
money in the bank to pay damages. Yet in shopping for defendants
who are neither immune from suit nor judgment-proof, plaintiffs
such as Palsgraf often must take second choices, in this case the
Long Island Railroad. As the case turned out, Helen Palsgraf and
her lawyer could take solace only in Palsgraf's dissenting opinion in
which Judge Andrews argued that plaintiff Palsgraf was denied her
just financial desserts only because the Cardozo-led, pro-railroad
majority lacked keen enough insight into The Law.17 7 And it's to
Cardozo's and Andrews's insights in Palsgraf that we now turn.
Ahead is a tangled web of legal formulas and trial procedure that,
when unraveled, reveals a good bit about the litigation process in
tort (from Latin, meaning twisted) law.
At the outset, keep in mind that the game plan for lawyers
representing accident victims such as Helen Palsgraf is to get the
injured client's case to a jury. The assumption among lawyers
around the courthouse is that damage-suit juries are predisposed
to give pro-plaintiff verdicts.' 78 The defense lawyers for the rail-
road in Patsgraf knew this, and no doubt sought to have the trial
judge, and later the appeals judges, bypass the jury and make the
ultimate (pro-railroad) judgment from the bench. And the way for
172 Id. at 105.




177 Id. at 101-105 (Andrews, J. dissenting).
178 See Vinson, supra note 153, at 989 n.7.
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defense lawyers to accomplish this bypassing of the jury is to per-
suade judges that a case hinges on issues of Law, the sort of court-
room issue to which judges alone supply answers. This all adds up,
in Palsgraf, to subtle legal maneuvering between opposing lawyers
- and between Judges Cardozo and Andrews - over how judge
(Law) and jury (Fact) ought to share the power of judging Helen
Palsgraf's suit for personal injuries. (Law and Fact, remember, are
flexible, stick-on labels that by legal convention carry unconven-
tional meanings.)
Cardozo's opinion tells us that the trial court jury that heard
the story of Helen Palsgraf's accident determined that the railroad,
by virtue of its employees' efforts to crowd another passenger or
two onto a train, was Negligent.179 Based on that jury finding of
what lawyers call Fact, the trial judge awarded Palsgraf damages
against the railroad. s'8 Since the Negligence issue is one of Fact,
and since the jury determines issues of Fact, the lawyers for the
Long Island Railroad couldn't legitimately ask an appellate judge
to forthrightly second-guess the jury's Negligence verdict. But de-
fense lawyers in such a situation can nevertheless attempt to carve
out of Negligence doctrine an issue of Law that delivers to the judi-
ciary an ace with which to trump a jury's pro-plaintiff Negligence
card.
Here again we find surfacing that duality running throughout
The Law. Just as legal rules tend to travel in pairs of opposites, one
for plaintiff, one for defendant, so are trial court issues of Law and
Fact often mirror images of each other. For example, at the Pal-
sgraf trial, after the jury's Negligence (Fact) decision prompted the
trial judge's judgment for Helen Palsgraf, the railroad's lawyers no
doubt appealed that judgment on grounds that Helen Palsgraf
presented Insufficient Evidence (a Law question) at trial to support
the jury's verdict of railroad Negligence - that in other words the
trial judge, because Negligence proof was skimpy, ought to have
intervened and declared the defendant railroad as a matter of Law
liability-free, and thereby prevented Helen Palsgraf's case from go-
ing to the jury.
Although the jury is the official Fact-finder, it's traditionally
the trial judge's job to decide if the trial testimony is adequate
proof to create a genuine question of Fact. If the evidence con-
cerning possible railroad carelessness is so one-sided, in favor of
either litigant, that the judge can see no legitimate room for dis-
179 Paisgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
180 Id.
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pute over whether Negligence existed, her job is to say so and by-
pass the jury. In other words, whether Sufficient Evidence of
(Long Island Railroad) Negligence was introduced at the Palsgraf
trial to warrant giving the Negligence issue to the jury was an issue
of Law for the trial and appellate judges to ponder.
Theoretically, then, the Cardozo-led Court of Appeals could
have justified its pro-railroad decision on the question-of-Law
ground that Helen Palsgraf introduced Insufficient Evidence tojus-
tify asking the jury its opinion on railroad Negligence. Since there
is no litmus test of what constitutes Sufficient Evidence, this eviden-
tial question of Law in effect allows the judiciary wide discretion to
disregard inconvenient jury verdicts of Negligence. Judicial opin-
ions written to explain judicial vetoes on Insufficient Evidence
grounds are notorious for their opaqueness. Such opinions lean
heavily on vague boilerplate definitions of Reasonableness and
make for especially woolly reading.
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf, not one of his clearer literary
efforts, in fact contains language suggestive of an Insufficient Evi-
dence rationale. (Even law teachers aren't sure what Cardozo is
saying.) Cardozo at one point argues that the railroad's efforts to
assist the passenger carrying the explosives, even though Negligent
as to the package carrier, falls short of showing a lack of Reason-
able Care as to Helen Palsgraf.18 So it is possible to read Cardozo
here as consigning plaintiff Palsgraf's case to an Insufficient Evi-
dence grave. But the preferred reading of Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. keys instead on two other legalisms, Duty and Proximate
Cause. Duty and Proximate Cause, like the issues of Negligence
and Insufficient Evidence of Negligence, are opposite sides of the
same coin. Duty is the Law side of the coin; Proximate cause is the
Fact side.
C. Duty Or Proximate Cause
Duty is tort law's doctrinal doorman. When a Helen Palsgraf
knocks on the courthouse door with a Negligence damage-suit
complaint in hand, the trial judge has the discretion to immedi-
ately wave her away without further ceremony, to dismiss, without a
trial, her lawsuit in its infant (paper) stage. Trial judges who in this
way close courthouse doors declare, as a matter of Law, that the
defendant owed the injured plaintiff no Duty to exercise Reason-
able Care under the circumstances presented. This early No-Duty
181 Id. at 99-100.
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dismissal, for policy reasons, of a lawsuit means no day in court for
the injured plaintiff. A No-Duty dismissal is the judicial method of
signaling policy limits to liability regardless of Negligent conduct.
Helen Palsgraf's eventual fate, as it turns out, was just such a No-
Duty dismissal, imposed not by the trial judge, however, but retro-
actively by the Court of Appeals.
For housekeeping purposes, judges need this No-Duty mecha-
nism for use in preemptively closing the door on plaintiffs whose
claims are trivial, incomplete, far-fetched, overreaching, or other-
wise deemed to involve policy deliberations that courts, even
though defendants may be at fault, ought to stay out of. The effect
of this Duty rule in Palsgraf is that even though the railroad was at
fault in boarding passengers, plaintiff Palsgraf nevertheless loses
her case when the Court of Appeals concludes that the railroad, as
to her, owed no legal Duty of care. The precise nature of this thing
called Duty, and just what it is that judges do, intellectually, in de-
ciding if someone such as Helen Palsgraf is owed a Duty (and is
therefore entitled to go to trial on the Negligence issue), is a mat-
ter which The Law pretty much keeps under its hat. Judge Car-
dozo, in his majority opinion dismissing Palsgraf's suit, attempts
only a fuzzy definition of the Duty of Reasonable Care in holding
that the Long Island Railroad owed no Duty to the woman pinned
under the railroad's platform scales.
182
This description of Duty as a judicial doorkeeping device for
early screening of tort claims focuses on the functional role of the
Duty concept. The (No) Duty concept, which Cardozo discusses in
theoretical, substantive, rule-of-law terms, is legal shorthand for
closing courthouse doors on prospective lawsuits judged unworthy
of closer attention by judge and jury. In his Palsgraf opinion, Car-
dozo describes Duty as part of that broad Negligence equation (see
below) that purports to be a blueprint for determining, with neu-
tral principles, the outcomes of accident suits.' 83 Here then is The
Law's - and Cardozo's - principled rationale for closing the door
on claimants such as Mrs. Palsgraf.
Accident victims, first of all, have overcome a major hurdle to
winning their Negligence suits when they prove to the satisfaction
of judge and jury that a defendant auto driver or railroad or fox
hunter injured them by failing to exercise Reasonable Care. Yet, a
Negligent defendant's liability must have limits. Suppose the Long
Island Railroad is Negligent in pushing a passenger with a package
182 Id. at 99.
183 Id.
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onto a crowded car. Suppose further that the boarding passenger's
dislodged package contains a priceless, and fragile, piece of sculp-
ture which falls on the boarding passenger's toe, breaking both the
toe and the sculpture. The Negligent railroad would undoubtedly
be liable for the broken toe, but perhaps should escape liability for
the broken work of art.
This is where Duty enters the picture. The basic Negligence
equation is that although the railroad owes a Duty to use Reason-
able Care in running its railroad, that Duty to be careful exposes
wrongdoers to liability only for accidents Reasonably Foreseeable.
Cardozo in Patsgrafsays that a platform accident such as Helen Pal-
sgraf's can trigger defendant liability only if Reasonably Foresee-
able." 4 This means, therefore, that in the case of the broken work
of art, Cardozo would say the following issue of Duty presents itself:
was it Reasonably Foreseeable that a railroad's Negligence in
boarding passengers would damage something like a priceless
sculpture? This (Law) issue of Duty puts to judges the task of lis-
tening to lawyers disagree over the vague boundaries of Foresee-
ableness, and then judicially legislating (by opening or closing the
courthouse door) liability limits for accidents.
In Helen Palsgraf's case, Cardozo argued that her platform
injury was too bizarre, too remote from the exploding package to
meet the Reasonably Foreseeable test for railroad Duty.18 5 I say
Cardozo "argued" because what is or is not Foreseeable is too elas-
tic a concept to permit certitude from even a legal giant. Few of
The Law's guidelines exude more spring in thejoints than the Rea-
sonably Foreseeable measure for Duty.
In classroom debate, several options are forthcoming for
countering Cardozo's no-Duty release of the Long Island Railroad
from liability. One option is to focus on the elasticity inherent in
tracing Foreseeable consequences, and to argue for stretching
Foreseeability to encompass passengers positioned near platform
scales even though yards distant from exploding fireworks. An-
other option is to argue that the Foreseeability concept is hope-
lessly vague, and that absent meaningful doctrinal reasons for
limiting liability, the court should (for various straightforward eco-
nomic or other policy reasons) extend protection of Negligence
law to victim Helen Palsgraf.
Then there's a third option for dissenting from the Cardozo
opinion, and that's the option taken by the three dissenting New
184 Id.
185 Id. at 101.
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York Court of Appeals judges in Palsgraf This brings us to Judge
Andrews's powerful dissent. Incongruous as it may seem to begin-
ning students expecting more blackletters in their lives, Andrews's
argument for the Palsgrafdissenters represents as valid and authori-
tative a picture of modem Negligence law as Cardozo's famous es-
say on Duty. According to Andrews, the issue in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., begging the pardon of the learned Cardozo, isn't Duty
at all. 1
86
Dissenter Andrews's pro-plaintiff opinion argues that the trial
court jury, not his four misguided brothers in the Court of Appeals
majority, is the proper arbiter of whether the Negligent railroad's
scope of liability ought to extend to Helen Palsgraf's odd calamity.
A stranger to the twisted path of tort law might well wonder where
in the legal world Andrews can find an issue-of-Fact-for-the-jury
with which to trump the majority opinion's No-Duty pronounce-
ment. The Negligence theory of recovery, recall, says that the
Long Island Railroad need pay damages only to those accident vic-
tims to whom it owes a Duty of Reasonable Care, and whose inju-
ries are Proximately Caused by railroad Negligence. Andrews
concludes that instead of Duty, the debate in Palsgraf about the
proper scope of railroad liability ought to be decided as an issue of
Proximate Cause.
This (Fact) issue of Proximate Cause is sometimes, depending
on a court's mood, split into two parts. One part, the cause-and-
effect part, is easy to grasp: was the railroad's conduct in any physi-
cal way connected with Palsgraf's injury? (That the railroad's oper-
ation of its train clearly contributed to the platform scales accident
was, in Palsgraf undisputed.)
1 8 7
The other half of the Proximate Cause issue is complex; this,
the metaphysical "proximate" half, in effect asks whether a Negli-
gent defendant's liability ought to extend to include so freakish an
injury as that suffered by plaintiff Palsgraf. This latter "proximate"
half, although by legal convention tagged a question of Fact, is
clearly a question purely of values. Keeping separate the simple
cause-and-effect form of Proximate Causation from its metaphysi-
cal, scope-of-liability, value-laden twin is a constant struggle
throughout legaldom. The Proximate Cause issue that Judge An-
drews writes about is the scope-of-liability version.1 8 8 The chal-
186 Id. at 102-03 (Andrews, J. dissenting).
187 Id. at 99-101.
188 Id. at 103 ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of con-
venience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to
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lenge for first-year students is to appreciate that Andrews's issue of
Proximate Cause is, lo and behold, the same scope-of-liability prob-
lem that Cardozo labels a Duty issue, the big practical difference
being that Cardozo's Duty, dressed up in question-of-Law garb, cuts
the jury out of helping set liability limits.
Proximate Cause in its simple, cause-and-effect form concerns,
in those rare cases when cause-and-effect is unclear, a dispute
about physical history: was, for instance, the Proximate Cause of
Helen Palsgraf's injuries the railroad's boarding procedure, or
were her injuries Proximately Caused by something else, say a fall
on her way to the station? This causal connection form of the Prox-
imate Cause issue asks only the physical question - what in fact
happened? None of the philosophical messiness of the ought-the-
railroad-to-pay question is here involved. Instead, when cause-and-
effect is at issue, the jury listens to witnesses tell what they saw and
heard, and then the jury makes an educated guess as to the empiri-
cal truth about which historical real world events precipitated the
injury.
Next is an example, drawn from Andrews's dissenting opinion,
of Proximate Cause in its complicated, how-proximate-is-Proximate
form. Here, Proximate Cause is the mirror image of the Duty issue
posed by the Cardozo majority in Palsgraf Both Andrews and Car-
dozo are asking, in legalese, the messy ought question of how broad
a Negligent railroad's liability ought to be under the freakish cir-
cumstances surrounding Helen Palsgraf's misfortune. Here is a
statement of the Proximate Cause issue, stripped of its legal veneer,
that the Palsgraf dissenters answered in favor of Helen Palsgraf:
were the railroad's Negligent boarding actions a Proximate Cause
of injury to Helen Pasgraf in the sense that the railroad ought, as a
policy matter, to be held responsible for the freakish chain of cir-
cumstances leading to the platform scales accident?"1 9
It's this freakishness about the falling scales that, after all,
prompts any hesitation about extending railroad liability. Palsgraf
clearly, once the doctrinal curtain is removed, is a debate over what
ought to be liability policy for this case. And the difference between
couching the ought debate in Duty or Proximate Cause terms boils
down to whether the jury is or is not to play a policy-making role in
Palsgraf In this instance, the New York court split 4-3 in favor of
cutting the jury out of a policymaking role in this case.
trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics.")
189 Id. at 101-105.
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The legalistic measuring stick for both Duty and Proximate
Cause is, notice, the same question-begging inquiry: whether,
under the circumstances of the railroad station explosion, harm to
bystanders on the platform is Foreseeable? Foreseeability, like
Proximate Causation, is one of those more-than-half-empty con-
cepts that The Law pretends deserve rule-of-law status. Judge An-
drews in dissent, however, perceives the shortcomings of trying to
rationally measure railroad liability by so frail a measuring stick as
Foreseeability. Andrews writes that behind the facade of Foresee-
able Causation, the underlying problem is one of "practical poli-
tics" in drawing lines which limit, at some point, Negligence
liability.' 90 Andrews, as would a respectable number of state court
judges sitting then and now, concludes in Palsgraf that the jury
rather than the judge should draw the line placing plaintiff Pal-
sgraf within or without tort law's protection.19
D. Devil's Nutshell
First-year torts is mostly Negligence law, and Negligence law
revolves around the concepts of Duty, Proximate Cause, and that
insufficiency of Reasonable Care that personal injury lawyers call
Negligence. Torts students expect to discover finely-tuned formu-
las lighting up the Duty-Causation-Negligence waterfront. But no-
where is there a sub-set of rules clarifying accident law's vague
axiom that defendants are liable only to victims who fall within the
scope of a defendant's Duty of Reasonable Care, and whose inju-
ries are Proximately Caused by defendant's Negligent conduct.
The reality is that this over-arching platitude leaves up for
grabs just which defendants must pay which bills for which acci-
dent victims. This Duty-Causation-Negligence formula, with its
overlay of Reasonable Foreseeability, is simply the stage on which
the players will perform. This basic Negligence equation glosses
over, and hides from the uninitiated, the fact that The Law of Neg-
ligence is three parts procedure (through which judge and jury ex-
ercise discretionary power), and one part substantive doctrine
(providing limited guidance to judge and jury).' 92
Judge and jury, lacking any clear direction from the Negli-
gence formula, have no choice but to make - not find or apply -
The Law. For this reason, the torts casebook is in many ways a
book of procedure. Once students are able to sift through the obli-
190 Id. at 103.
191 Id. at 105.
192 See Leon Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 YALE L.J. 1029 (1928).
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gatory tributes to the neutral rule of rules, they can see exposed
the procedures by which judge and jury draw the policy lines that
give meaning to Reasonable Care and Foreseeability.
Behind the smoke and mirrors of tort doctrine, two basic ques-
tions arise in an accident case. The first is "what happened," and is
simply a matter of settling on some version of the history of the
plaintiff's suit. The second bedrock question is "who pays," a pure
policy choice over whether to shift accident losses to a defendant.
And it is over this latter ought "who pays" question that The Law
pulls down a curtain of secrecy called Reasonable Foreseeability.
"What happened" and "who pays" are simply plain English
equivalents for the legally-worded issues that lawyers talk about in
Negligence cases. The way the Negligence system works, albeit
under complex doctrinal cover, is that both judge and jury partici-
pate in deciding "what happened" and "who pays." The judiciary,
however, with its power to control what issues the jury decides, al-
ways has the wherewithal to have the last say.
Understanding when and how judges exercise control over ju-
ries is a big part of understanding torts. And to appreciate when
and how judges control juries requires a grasp of how Negligence
doctrine splits up the "what happened" and "who pays" questions
into a complex of legal issues that challenge first-year
understanding.
The Duty concept, for example, which we've learned functions
as a doorkeeper device shutting out freakish or unpolitic claims, is
strictly a policy matter of "who pays." Since the Duty issue is a Law
question for thejudge, the jury is excluded from this portion of the
"who pays" determination (as when Judge Cardozo defined the Pal-
sgraf issue as one of Duty). On the other hand, Proximate Cause
and Negligence, so-called Fact issues by convention left to the jury,
may contain elements of both "what happened" and "who pays."
And since "who pays" is strictly an ought question, it is inaccurate to
view Proximate Cause and Negligence as mere factual matters in-
volving mere disputes about history. In Palsgraf, Judge Andrews's
issue of Proximate Cause was a matter of pure policy."' 3
Another example from Palsgraf of a pure-policy Fact issue is
the Negligence issue. Unless there was a dispute at trial over the
physical details of how passengers were boarded ("what hap-
pened"), the only circumstance in Palsgraf raising a Negligence is-
sue was the moral dispute over whether to label the railroad
193 PalTsgraf 162 N.E. at 103.
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Unreasonable in its boarding practices ("who pays"). With respect,
finally, to Palsgrafian Proximate Cause, such an issue could have
included both a "what happened" dispute (over whether, say,
Helen Palsgraf's hurts were faked), as well as a "who pays" dispute
(about the scope of railroad liability to victims of freak accidents).
Proximate Cause is a doctrinal jungle largely because lawyers
and judges are unable or unwilling to keep separate the historical
or scientific "what happened" element from the political "who
pays" element. This is the same type of confusion generated by lay
persons who, when they say "Jo was a cause" of a car crash, fail to
make clear whether they are making a moral judgment about Jo's
blameworthiness, or merely pointing out thatJo's conduct, regard-
less of her blameworthiness, contributed in a cause-and-effect sense
to an accident. Judges, in instructing juries on the ins and outs of
Proximate Cause, traditionally produce a rhetorical nightmare. Ju-
rors no doubt get little out of the judges' boilerplate definitions of
Proximate Causation. Definitions couched in terms of both histor-
ical fact and of blameworthiness are mixed into an indigestible
stew. The same garbled jury instruction on Proximate Cause is
given regardless of whether the controversy: (1) is about what
physically occurred on the railroad platform or, (2) is about
whether the railroad, no matter the freakish circumstances, ought
to pay damages, or (3) both. Lawyers and judges throw the whole
mess into a single Proximate Cause sinkhole such as the following
model jury charge drawn from Texas trial practice:
Proximate cause means that cause which, in a natural and con-
tinuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent
cause, produces an event, and without which cause such event
would not have occurred; and in order to be a proximate cause
the act or omission complained of must be such that a person
using ordinary care would have foreseen the event, or some sim-
ilar event, which might reasonably result therefrom. There may
be more than one proximate cause of an event. New and in-
dependent cause means the act or omission of a separate and
independent agency, not reasonably foreseeable, which destroys
the causal connection, if any, between the act or omission in-
quired about and the occurrence in question, and thereby be-
comes the immediate cause of such occurrence."9
Such garbled jury instructions - directing the jury to look for
physical cause-and-effect connections through metaphysical "natural
and foreseeable" lenses - disguise the value judgments implicit in
194 CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 342 (William L. Prosser et al. eds., 8th ed.
1988).
104 [Vol. 1:5
LAW AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE
deciding whether to shift accident losses. In this way, a submerged
"who pays" question sneaks the forbidden politics into the courtroom.
Juries, under the cloak of legal conventions about Fact questions, are
thrown by The Law's lack of clear definition into the arms of politics,
economics, morality, psychology, ethics, sociology, and anything else
that tugs on the human conscience, including the stabilizing influ-
ence of notions about precedent and the rule of law.
Students wishing to master the Proximate Cause riddle must re-
sist being misled by coded opinions, and must make their own assess-
ment of what's at the heart of any judicial discussion of Causation. To
appreciate what's at the bottom of Proximate Cause opinions, the
reader must set aside for a moment the judge's talk of Causation met-
aphysics. The task then is to figure out, based alone on the case's bare
factual record and without the court's diverting noises, whether the
court began with a question about what actually happened in the past,
or whether the issue is a post-facto, loss-shifting, ought problem similar
to the "who pays" issue in Palsgraf
It's one kind of job, and a real factual inquiry, to empirically
trace, for instance, the history of the planet's pollution back to the
ape who crawled down a tree, urinated in a stream, and first began to
upset nature's balance. It's quite another kind of job to select, from
among ajungle of contributors, which polluting apes should as matter
of public policy be liable for damages. Confusing history with the
politics of loss-spreading, as is the courtroom custom in cases such as
Palsgraf makes for weak history and poor politics - and causes first-
year students to stumble repeatedly while attempting to get a feel for
such legal legerdemain.
Judge Andrews's Palsgraf dissent talks candidly about how defin-
ing the scope of a tortfeasors's liability in Proximate Cause terms is
akin to tracing the outward spread of ripples on a pond into which a
stone has been tossed. 195 In Palsgraf Andrews considers the liability of
a Negligent driver who, hypothetically, triggers an explosion that,
among other fallouts, causes a startled nurse blocks away to drop an
infant.'96 Andrews talks about the practical politics involved in choos-
ing whether to extend liability to include the dropped infant.'9 7 An-
drews's concern with the ripples on the pond (the extent of the Long
Island Railroad's liability) is obviously a concern over "who pays," de-
spite the Fact label given the Proximate Cause issue.
Most judicial opinions expounding on the Proximate Cause crea-
195 Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J. dissenting).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 103.
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ture are less forthright than Andrews's talk of "practical politics."
Some judges addressing a "who pays" question inexplicably sprinkle
their opinions with Proximate Cause dogma that smacks of a physical
cause-and-effect inquiry about history. Such cause-and-effect lan-
guage suggests, falsely, that even though a Proximate Cause issue be
purely a matter of ought, it nevertheless can be determined through
precise measurements of time and space, as though deciding at what
policy point to limit liability is the equivalent of measuring in a physics
lab the attributes of the atom.
The biggest metamorphosis that the concept of Proximate Cause
can undergo, however, is not the one bridging the gap between histor-
ical factfinding and the practical politics of fixing liability limits. The
biggest metamorphosis is the one engineered by Justice Cardozo in
his majority opinion spelling out Helen Palsgraf's legal downfall.
Take note that the two lower courts that decided Palsgraf against
Long Island Railroad saw the case as a problem in Proximate
Cause.19 Yet with a flick of his pen, Cardozo turned a jury issue of
Proximate Cause into a Duty issue for the court.
Aside from Cardozo's switch in legal name tags and the conse-
quent removal of the jury from the scene, nothing was changed by
Cardozo's calling the Palsgraf issue one of Duty. Beneath either the
Duty or Causation label, the fundamental question (upon which rea-
sonable people surely can disagree) is the same: should the railroad
pay for this freakish accident? Cardozo and his concurring brethren
decided that the railroad needn't pay. Yet, had one additional Court
of Appeals judge voted for Helen Palsgraf, Cardozo's theory on Duty
would have been theory only, and Helen Palsgraf would have taken
home her Proximate Cause jury award.
So who's correct, Cardozo or Andrews? And how does a student
know when to put a freakish accident like Helen Palsgraf's in the Duty
pigeonhole and when to put it in the Proximate Cause pigeonhole?
To these questions of high legal principle, down-to-earth answers are
scarce. Judicial custom, as revealed in casebooks, gives but tentative
answers. In future cases, a latter-day Cardozo and Andrews must con-
tinue this tug of war between Duty-for-the-judge and Proximate-Cause-
for-the-jury.
Juggling labels after the fashion of the Palsgraf court has its coun-
terpart in Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn.99 Tom Sawyer has to strug-
198 222 A.D. 166 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'g 225 N.Y.S. 412 (1927), revd 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928).
199 MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 288 (Heritage Press ed.,
1940) (1887).
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gle to keep life, and Huck, square with principle."° Huck Finn,
possessing a lay mind insensitive to the finer points of legalism, con-
cludes that pickaxes are best for digging under the cabin in which Jim
is trapped. 0 1 Tom Sawyer knows better; he calls for case-knives (table
knives): "It don't make no difference how foolish it is, it's the right
way - and it's the regular way. And there ain't no other way that I
ever heard of, and I've read all the books that gives any information
about these things. They always dig out with a case-knife." 202
After hours of fruitless digging, a light dawns in Tom's legal
mind. He drops his table knife and commands Huck to give him a
"case-knife." Huck tells the rest:
He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He flung it
down and says, "Gimme a case-knife." I didn't knowjust what to
do-but then I thought. I scratched around amongst the old
tools and got a pickaxe and give it to him, and he took it and
went to work and never said a word. He was always just that
particular. Full of principle.
20 3
The Law is full of just that kind of principle, which is why
casebook rationalizations must be taken with a grain of salt. The
flood of words that appellate judges give us for washing down their
decisions contains more than a little "case-knife"jurisprudence. Prox-
imate Cause is a good case study in how lawyers ask legal language to
carry more weight than mere words can sensibly manage.
Over the last century, dozens of adjectives have been tried as tort
substitutes for the evasive Proximate, all in the vain hope that by
changing the adjective The Law could be as principled as Tom Saw-
yer. Some legalists apparently believe the confusion in Proximate
Cause doctrine is in the fuzziness of the adjective "Proximate" rather
than in the double-meaning and the excessive load assigned to the
Proximate Cause concept. The tried but failed substitutes for Proxi-
mate include the adjectives Sole (Cause), Active, Direct, Legal, Effec-
tive, Operative, Independent, Efficient, Preponderating, Foreseeable,
Substantial, and Responsible. No matter which loose adjective pre-
cedes Cause, judge and jury can't avoid having to feed meaning into
the adjectival void.
Proximate Cause, despite Andrews's forthright essay on Causa-
tion's underpinnings in "practical politics," is nevertheless still a




203 Id. at 291-92.
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question for the jury, judges can control the Proximate Cause out-
come by turning the issue into a Law question: whether Sufficient
Evidence of Proximate Cause exists to warrant jury consideration. By
this procedural Sufficient Evidence device, judges, under the seem-
ingly neutral cover of measuring evidential Sufficiency, can and do
legislate the outcomes in tort cases.
Judges who, in explaining their decisions, point toward Proxi-
mate Causation's gloomy comer win no prizes for candor. But from
the point of view of the judiciary, putting responsibility for a decision
on the weak back of Proximate Cause saves having to talk straight
"practical politics," and at the same time enables judges to quietly and
unobtrusively control unrulyjuries. Dean Prosser, to whose hornbook
on torts20 4 weary students go for relief from casebook puzzles, de-
clares Proximate Cause, in the end, a lost cause:
Direct causation, the scope of the risk, the unforeseeable plain-
tiff, the last human wrongdoer, the distinction between cause
and condition, limitations of time and space . . . natural and
probable consequences, mechanical systems of multiple rules,
and all the rest of the rigmarole of "proximate cause," all have
been tried and found wanting ....
For the beginning torts student, the secret of managing the Negli-
gence case is learning how Duty, Causation, and Reasonable Care doc-
trines mesh with trial procedures for farming out the underlying
factual and policy questions to judge and jury; and learning as well
how interchangeable these pseudo-substantive doctrines are. Duty-
Causation-Negligence are somewhat interchangeable because the ba-
sic "who pays" inquiry is common to all three segments of the formula.
The legal system recognizes this without saying so by assigning, as a
measure of Duty, Proximate Cause, and Negligence, the same fools-
gold legal test of Foreseeability.
The railroad, for example, owes a Duty to use Reasonable Care if
danger on its platform is Foreseeable, thereafter the railroad violates its
Duty (Negligence) if it fails to use Reasonable Care to avoid Foreseeable
risks; and such Negligence is a Proximate Cause of injury if injury is
Foreseeable. Yet what is and is not Foreseeable is in good measure in the
eye of the beholder. Such a weasel word simply asks the "who pays"
question in a less than candid, but legal, form.
E. Tort Reform
A crisis periodically occurs in the personal injury world. These
204 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 69.
205 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Pwwisited, 52 MicH. L. Rzv. 1, 32 (1953).
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crises center in the insurance industry that supplies the money
driving the tort system. On occasion, for reasons having to do with
interest rate cycles and with what many deem a litigation explosion,
liability insurance becomes widely unavailable or premiums shoot
up. 0 6 When this occurs, legislatures try to lower litigation costs -
and thereby pacify complaining premium payers - with damages
ceilings and other tort reforms of the sort mentioned earlier.
Torts casebooks touch on these reform matters, and often re-
fer to even more radical departures from common law torts such as
workers' compensation acts and no-fault auto insurance plans.20 7
The following is a brief introduction to one aspect of the ongoing
debate about tort reform - the merits of scrapping or retaining
the civil jury. Since the jury is so integral a part of the litigation
process in torts, beginning students should have some familiarity
with long-standing critiques of that ancient institution.
Juries were popular in colonial times because, in rendering
their verdicts, jurors often disregarded unpopular legislation
drafted by representatives of the English crown.2 0 8 Eighteenth-cen-
tury jurors, both civil and criminal, won the hearts of their colonial
neighbors by ignoring royal edicts and giving down-home verdicts
more in tune with the revolutionary times.2 09 The colonial jury was
revered because, like Robin Hood's merry men, it was an outlaw
band.
More recently, the civil jury has been equated with grass-roots
democracy and the wisdom and impartiality that comes with collec-
tive judgment. Especially in personal injury litigation, the jury is
thought to be a needed antidote to The Law's emotional detach-
ment; the jury can provide human sympathy to the injured in the
form of generous awards. The civil jury and its merits are well-
known, and in many states this reverence for the civil jury takes the
form of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right to jury
trial in personal injury and other civil suits.21 0
Twentieth-century critics of the civil jury point out that most
civil disputes outside the torts area are decided by judges without
206 See DOBBS, supra note 69, at 856-58; O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 161, at 73-
83, 109.
207 See, e.g., CASES AND MATERLALS ON TORTS, supra note 194.
208 See Robert G. Johnston, Jury Subordination Through Judicial Control, 43 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 24, 25-26 (Autumn 1980). See generally Warren Burger, Thinking the
Unthinkable, 31 Loy. L. REV. 205 (1985); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History
of the Seventh Amendment 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973); R. Ben Hogan, III, The Seventh
Amendment, TRIAL, Sept. 1987, at 76.
209 Johnston, supra note 208, at 26.
210 VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 250-51 (1986).
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calling on juries," These critics urge that juries in personal in-
jury cases should also be scrapped because juries are too slow and
expensive, too secretive, too easily misled by cunning lawyers into
awarding outlandish sums, too unrepresentative, too unpopular
among people assigned jury duty, and in sum, too horse-and-buggy
an institution for handling the factual and legal complexities of
modem litigation.212
Plaintiffs' lawyers, pleased with the jury's tendency to side with
their accident victim clients, and confident of the jury's ability to
perform ably and wisely, adamantly oppose reforming, much less
scrapping, the civil jury system."1 All this makes for a heated polit-
ical fight from which editors of casebooks and law professors gen-
erally distance themselves. Nevertheless, readers of the modem
torts casebook would do well to understand that just beneath the
surface of the printed page a battle rages over whether the torts
system and its love affair with the jury is working. Only about half
of the liability insurance dollar, after all, gets into the hands of
injured claimants. And even then, that helps only the lucky claim-
ants, since half of the victims of traffic, medical, and other acci-
dents receive, for one reason or another, no compensation at all
from the torts system.
England, the birthplace of the jury,214 has long since retired
the civil jury in all but a handful of cases.215 English officials deem
the jury too costly, too slow, and too inept (except for criminal
cases, where defendants confront the state both as judge and as
prosecutor) .216 Here in the United States, each time a rash of
211 FRANK, supra note 28, at 170-85;JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TIAL 108-45 (1949).
See also Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Juty Trials Should be Abolished, 60 AB.A. J. 570-74
(1974); Jeffrey O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases?, 58 ILL. BJ. 796-815 (1970);
O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 161, at 23-32; Donald Alexander, CivilJuries in Maine:
Are the Benefits Worth the Costs?, 34 ME. L. REV. 63 (1982); Aron Steuer, The Case Against
theJuy, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 101 (1975). But see Donald P. Lay, Can Our Jury System Suruive?,
TIAL, Sept. 1983, at 50.
212 See sources cited supra note 211.
213 See, e.g., CHARLES W.JOINER, CIVILJUSTICE AND THE JURY 147-53 (1962) (pro-jury
book). See also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 210. The foundation study for much of
the empirical data supporting those who support civil juries is reported in HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). This famous University of
Chicago Law School study of the American jury system is, however, according to some
jury researchers, both flawed, seeJoHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL McCoNvIuLE, JURY TRIALS
6-8, 12 (1979), and biased, see THEODORE LEwis BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLI-
TICS 329, 334 (1970).
214 HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 210, at 23.
215 JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 169 (Facts on File Publications 1988).
216 Interview with Jeffrey Hackney, Fellow and Tutor in Law, Wadham College, in
Oxford, England (July 9, 1994).
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multi-million dollar jury awards and concomitant insurance pre-
mium increases cause another crisis in the Negligence industry, a
few more observers wonder if retaining the expensive jury-based
tort lottery is worth the candle.
Despite its critics, however, the civil jury in the U.S. will proba-
bly continue to withstand the slings and arrows of reformers. But
students of torts may see, as the century closes, a gradual tighten-
ing of the reins on tort juries. This tightening of the reins can
occur either through legislative action, or through the subtle judi-
cial techniques for controlling jury discretion illustrated in this
section.
VII. THE LAw IN TRANSLATION
A. Pierson v. Post"1 7
Pardon for again digging up the long dead fox whose ghost
haunts law school casebooks, but here comes that promised trans-
lation, from Law into English, of the New York Supreme Court
opinion in Pierson v. Post."'8 This is the pursuit of Br'er Fox that
has introduced hosts of law students to appellate legal thought.
Pierson is a good springboard for those Socratic queries with which
professors of property law reduce first-year students to jelly. (New
York's Supreme Court is no longer, by the way, that state's highest
court; although most states call their highest appeals court a
"supreme court," New York now settles for the Court of Appeals.)
Since law school learning is so largely a matter of acquiring a
new language, appreciating fully the nuances of even a single opin-
ion can be a huge step toward obtaining legal prowess. In fact, it's
only slightly farfetched to talk about teaching and learning an en-
tire legal subject by analyzing in excruciating detail the technicali-
ties of a single case, filling in any subject gaps with consideration of
hypothetical questions. The following translation of Pierson v. Post
into plainer English will aid in learning the lawyer's reverse trick of
turning plain English into legalese.
This actual 1805 fox chase case is of legal interest because,
underlying Lodowick Post's claim for damages, is the (property)
issue concerning which hunter was the fox's legal owner.219 New
York sportspersons Post and Pierson, you recall, quarreled long
ago over the remains of a "wild and noxious" fox. 220 Plaintiff Post
217 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 175.
220 Id.
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and his hounds, prior to the fox's demise, had for some time
chased this fox over uninhabited public wastelands.22" ' (This is the
sport that anti-hunter Oscar Wilde called the pursuit by the un-
speakable of the inedible.) Then, as the chase drew near a seden-
tary Pierson, Pierson roused himself to intervene, to slay, and to
carry away Post's "wild and noxious" prey.22 This ungentlemanly
intervention prompted Post to sue Pierson for damages for taking
his "wild and noxious" property.223
On what was surely a slow day in appellate court, even nearly
two centuries ago, the Piersonjudges listened patiently to the fox
hunters' lawyers argue from long, Latin-studded briefs. After delib-
erating on the finer points of The Law of wild beasts, the New York
Supreme Court concluded that Post had suffered no property dam-
age. All but one of the judges agreed that the fox in the end be-
longed to defendant Pierson, despite Pierson's joining the hunt for
the kill only as Post's hounds were closing in.24
Although a fox free in the woods belongs to nobody in partic-
ular, once the fox is captured (or in legal parlance, "occupied"),
the foxjoins the legal list of things to which owners hold title. The
fox then becomes, like Pike's Peak, a hunk of property. A fox, to
qualify as property, must of course have a legally certified title-
holding owner. And it's The Law's job to match up owners and
properties. Pierson shows how The Law does this. Below is repro-
duced most of the original text from the Pierson v. Post opinion
(and, because it's an 1805 opinion, it contains an indecent amount
of Latin, a form of preening that modern judges usually forego).
Interspersed at intervals is my interpretation of what the New York
Supreme Court had on its legal mind. The original text is in the
paragraphs indented in block form. Translation paragraphs are set
221 Id.
222 Id. at 177.
223 Id.
224 Id at 175. Compare with 2 WORLD oF LAw 599-605 (Ephraim London ed., 1960)
(presents excerpt from MoBY DicK illustrating the "fast-fish" and "loose-fish" princi-
ples of whaler jurisprudence: a fast-fish belongs to the party fast to it; a loose-fish is
fair game for anybody who can catch it. But when, in whaler law, is a fast-fish fast?
Who gets Moby Dick if plaintiffs harpoon him, then abandon their vessel in a storm to
save their lives, and later see defendants come along and retrieve Moby Dick,
harpoons and all? Fundamental to all human jurisprudence, Melville reminds, is that
possession is nine-tenths of The Law. Therefore, plaintiffs, who abandoned their ship
and their catch, must in Law lose their fish -just as in precedent, records legalist
Melville, the first gentleman who harpoons the lady and has her fast and abandons
her so that she becomes a loose-fish to be subsequently re-harpooned by a second
gentleman, loses his former fast-fish, "along with whatever harpoons might have been
found sticking in her." Id. at 601.).
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off by italics; the occasional comments in parentheses are simply
asides that, though not strictly part of the translation, help flesh
out the story. Here, then, with due respect to Br'er Fox, is another
autopsy of that long-suffering casebook favorite:
This was an action of trespass on the case commenced in a jus-
tice's court, by the present defendant against the now plain-
tiff.... A verdict having been rendered for the plaintiff below,
the defendant there sued out a certiorari, and now assigned for
error, that the declaration and the matters therein contained
were not sufficient in law to maintain an action.2 5
At trial, Lodowick Post won a jury verdict for damages against defendant
Pierson. Pierson has appealed, arguing that Post's claim is so weak that the
trial judge should have thrown this lawsuit out of court before it got to a jury
trial. (Note that the legal pigeonhole into which Post tried to fit his
damage suit was Trespass On The Case. This ancient tort now has a
new name - Negligence. Once upon a time all of tort law was classi-
fied under either the Trespass label or Trespass On The Case. The
difference in the labels was this: if you threw a dead fox on the road
and scored a direct hit on Lodowick Post, that was a Trespass injury; if,
however, you threw a dead fox on the road and Post came along later
and tripped over the carcass, that was an indirect injury and belonged
under Trespass On The Case. To understand even vaguely why Eng-
lish lawyers of old put such emphasis on distinguishing direct-Trespass
injury and indirect-Case injury would require close reading of ancient
and dusty English materials long ignored in American legal educa-
tion, and in any event a venture unlikely to shed much light. Note
also the opinion writer's reference to "now plaintiff" and "present de-
fendant." Although the case name originally was, because Post was
the trial court plaintiff, Post v. Pierson, when Pierson appealed his trial
court loss he became the "now plaintiff," and the name of the case on
appeal was turned around to become Pierson v. Post. This appellate
practice of arranging the case name so that the name of the party
appealing, the loser in the court below, comes first is still common
practice in most jurisdictions. "Now plaintiff" and "present defend-
ant," and "appellant" and "appellee," are but a sampling of the confus-
ing name tags that opinion writers, unconcerned with readability,
employ in a manner reminiscent of the classic Bud Abbot and Lou
Costello baseball comedy routine called "Who's on First, What's on
Second.")
Tompkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court.... The ques-
tion submitted by the counsel in this cause for our determina-
225 Pierson, 3 Cai. R_ at 175.
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tion is, whether Lodowick Post, by the pursuit with his hounds
in the manner alleged in his declaration, acquired such a right
to, or property in, the fox as will sustain an action against Pier-
son for killing and taking him away?... It is admitted that a fox
is an animal ferae naturae, and that property in such animals is
acquired by occupancy only. These admissions narrow the dis-
cussion to the simple question of what acts amount to occu-
pancy, applied to acquiring right to wild animals?
226
The question is whether Lodowick Post and his dogs got close enough to
the fox to justify our letting a jury make Pierson pay damages for his interven-
tion toward the end of Post's chase. (Incidentally, note Judge Tompkins's
insistence that the question is a "simple" one of "occupancy." Judges
are quick to say that legal issues are "simple." "Simple" belies the pres-
ence of hard choices. Hard choices, once acknowledged, put judges
on the spot, and make difficult the appearance of neutrality. Yet were
the question of "occupancy" really so "simple," the Pierson v. Post dis-
pute would never have gone to trial, much less been appealed. Note,
too, how the unadorned matter of whether in fairness Post, because of
his vigorous pursuit of the fox, should get damages from Pierson is,
once in court, turned into a wooly-headed Law question about "occu-
pancy." The Law wants to know whether Post's close pursuit passed
the test for "occupancy"; if so, Post holds title as a property owner,
and, as a property owner, Post would be, to complete the circle, enti-
tled to damages from Pierson for Pierson's running off with Post's
bushy-tailed property. This judicial quest for the meaning of "occu-
pancy" in Pierson therefore is not unlike the chasing, like a fox of its
tail, of big bushy words around in a circle. Judge Tompkins, by the
way, was the judge on the Supreme Court assigned to write the court's
opinion in which, as we'll see, all but one outspoken member of the
court joined.)" 7
If we have recourse to the ancient writers upon general princi-
ples of law, the judgment below is obviously erroneous. Justin-
ian's Institutes lib. 2, tit. 1, S. 13 and Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, p. 175,
adopt the principle, that pursuit alone vests no property or right
in the huntsman; and that even pursuit, accompanied with
wounding, is equally ineffectual for that purpose, unless the
animal be actually taken. The same principle is recognized by
Bracton lib. 2, c. 1, p. 8.228
A sixth-century Roman treatise writer and two authors of treatises on gen-
eral principles of thirteenth-century English law, whose advice we may or may




LAW AS A FOREIGN LANGUA GE
not choose to follow, wrote that pursuit-absent-a-taking, such as Post's, is good
exercise, but no way to win a wild fox. (Note Judge Tompkins's back-
handed suggestion that the trial judge's ruling that Pierson pay Post's
damages was "obviously" incorrect. "Obviously" is a dead giveaway
that the opinion-writer's conclusion is anything but obvious. In the
heat of legal battle, "obviously" means, at best, "perhaps." Lawyers
and judges who wish to appear confident in argument, but at the
same time assure credibility, sometimes begin their assertions with the
more modest "Few would deny.")
Puffendorf (lib. 4, ch. 6, sec. 2 and 10) defines occupancy of
beasts ferae naturae, to be the actual corporal possession of them,
and Bynkershoek is cited as coinciding in this definition. It is
indeed with hesitation that Puffendorf affirms that a wild beast
mortally wounded, or greatly maimed, cannot be fairly inter-
cepted by another, whilst the pursuit of the person inflicting the
wound continues. The foregoing authorities are decisive to
show that mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but
that he became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and
killed him.2 9
Two other ancient civil law authorities likewise support the idea that afox
belongs to an intervenor who beats a competitor's hounds to the prey.
It therefore only remains to inquire whether there are any con-
trary principles, or authorities, to be found in other books,
which ought to induce a different decision. Most of the cases
which have occurred in England, relating to property in wild
animals, have either been discussed and decided upon the prin-
ciples of their positive statute regulations, or have arisen be-
tween the huntsman and the owner of the land upon which
beasts ferae naturae have been apprehended; the former claiming
them by title of occupancy, and the latter ratione soli. Little satis-
factory aid can, therefore, be derived from the English
reporters.230
Were there English decisions or other authority proclaiming that a closely
pursued fox belongs to the close pursuer, we might agree to damages for Post.
But we find no English cases about foxes on public lands snatched from be-
neath the noses of a hunter's hounds.
Barbeyrac, in his notes on Puffendorf, does not accede to the
definition of occupancy by the latter, but, on the contrary, af-
firms, that actual bodily seizure is not, in all cases, necessary to
constitute possession of wild animals. He does not, however, de-
scribe the acts which, according to his ideas, will amount to an
229 Id.
230 Id. at 178.
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appropriation of such animals to private use, so as to exclude
the claims of all other persons, by title of occupancy, to the same
animals; and he is far from averring that pursuit alone is suffi-
cient for that purpose. To a certain extent, and as far as
Barbeyrac appears to me to go, his objections to Puffendorf's
definition of occupancy are reasonable and correct. That is to
say, that actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire
right to, or possession of, wild beasts; but that, on the contrary,
the mortal wounding of such beasts... [or] encompassing and
securing such animals with nets and toils, or otherwise inter-
cepting them in such a manner as to deprive them of their natu-
ral liberty, and render escape impossible, may justly be deemed
to give possession of them to those persons who, by their indus-
try and labor, have used such means of apprehending them.
23 1
It is true that noted civil lawyers once differed over whether a pursuing
hunter could claim a fox short of actually grabbing its tail. But even so,
Lodowick Post, with his close-pursuit claim, is out of luck; the ancient author-
ity nearest Post's close-pursuit position suggests only that mortally wounding or
throwing a net over a wild fox might suffice to confer ownership.
We are the more readily inclined to confine possession or occu-
pancy of beasts ferae naturae, within the limits prescribed by the
learned authors above cited, for the sake of certainty, and pre-
serving peace and order in society. If the first seeing, starting,
or pursuing such animals, without having so wounded, circum-
vented or ensnared them, so as to deprive them of their natural
liberty, and subject them to the control of their pursuer, should
afford the basis of actions against others for intercepting and
killing them, it would prove a fertile source of quarrels and
litigation.2 s2
If we take this dead fox, or its value, away from intervenor Pierson and
give it to Post, we'd be opening up a can of worms. Everytime a hunter like
Post so much as spotted an elusive but doomed prey, he'd be tempted to sue the
intervenor. (Here Judge Tompkins offers a peace-and-order rationale
to back up the opinion's moldy authorities. The argument that
awarding Post damages might prompt a flood of lawsuits would hold
more water had Tompkins not already admitted to a dearth of fox
hunt precedents.)
However uncourteous or unkind the conduct of Pierson towards
Post, in this instance, may have been, yet this act was productive
of no injury or damage for which a legal remedy can be applied.
We are of opinion the judgment below was erroneous, and
231 Id.
232 Id. at 179.
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ought to be reversed.
2 3
As we've been hinting all along, we conclude that Pierson, rude interloper
though he may be, need pay no damages. Pierson can disregard the contrary
judgment of the wrongheaded judge and jury below.
B. Judge Livingston In Dissent
Tompkins's majority opinion ends with the above announce-
ment that Post loses. But the court record doesn't end there be-
cause we're treated next to a rousing dissenting opinion by ajudge
Livingston. The importance of dissenting opinions cannot be over-
stated. Many a view first expounded in dissent has in the long run
become a majority opinion. For example, a half-century before the
U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educationr?4 ruled "sepa-
rate but equal" schools for black kids unconstitutional because in-
herently unequal, Justice Harlan foreshadowed Brown by dissenting
in the Supreme Court's "separate but equal" approval of a Louisi-
ana statute segregating railroad cars. 3 5 Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion's desegregation rule was, under this analysis, always The Law; it
just took half a century to "find" it.
Judge Tompkins's majority view in Pierson therefore may in
time turn out to be bad Law, a minority position. Should
Tompkins's Pierson ruling on "occupancy" later be discovered to be
what lawyers call "in error," conventional legal theorists will say the
true rule was lying around all the time, merely awaiting judges
more adept 4t "finding" The Law.23 6 Livingston's Pierson dissent,
therefore, is conceivably the germ of The Law of the future.
In addition to paving the way for The Law to be rediscovered,
dissenting opinions also serve to keep majority opinions honest.
Students should beware of the unanimous court opinion in which
judges march in goose step. Unanimity can be misleading. Opin-
ion-writers, like the lawyers they are, tend to fudge their arguments
- on both the case facts and The Law - unless kept honest by a
tough-minded dissenter. Appellate judges tend to be fierce par-
tisans for their judicial views, and naturally shape their rule-of-law
reasoning to convince readers that they "obviously" have a strangle-
hold on legal truth. The law student's best Law-learning exercise is
233 Id.
234 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
235 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896).
236 See generally Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Deci-
sis, PRECEDENT IN Law 73-87 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1989) (discussing the "declara-
tory theory" of law).
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to look for the soft spots always present in an opinion's legal rea-
soning and, if no dissenting opinion is available to exploit those
soft spots, to compose a private dissent showing how the ambiguity
in the rule of the moment permits of a contrary argument.
Opposing lawyers' appellate briefs are the best evidence of
how unbalanced partisan legal debaters can be in shaping legal
materials to point toward preordained conclusions. The ostensibly
objective "opinion of the court" differs from an advocate's brief,
yet it may be mainly a cosmetic difference. Often the court's rea-
sons for decision are little more than a warmed-over version of the
winning lawyer's brief, the rough edges of partisan advocacy
smoothed over with judicial professions of neutrality in deciding
what is, after all, only a "simple question... of occupancy."2 3 1 Un-
til law students learn something about judging the extent to which
a court's formal words involve hype and fudging, as opposed to a
balanced treatment of facts and precedents, reading first-year
casebooks remains a risky enterprise.
As you read Judge Livingston's dissenting treatment of the
scholarly authorities paraded in Pierson v. Post, remember that
judges, although by tradition inclined to travel along the historical
paths of precedent, can always choose in a pinch to blaze a new
road. Judges, however, usually shy from openly and brazenly
changing directions, preferring to squeeze their way quietly and
gingerly around inconvenient precedents. In Lodowick Post's case,
Judge Livingston, if he doesn't blaze a new road, at least extracts
from the moldy authorities enough "occupancy" to give a legalistic
cast to his lonely pro-Post, pro-property vote.
Thinking like a lawyerjudge chooses to think means looking
at old opinions and thinking: which pieces of text can I use in an
argument for giving Post the fox? For giving Pierson the fox? For
cutting the fox in half ? Legal minds fret little about "correct" legal
solutions. Legal minds, for a fee, argue either side. Unfortunately,
the ultimate quest in law school is rarely for any kind of political
truth; the quest is for another counter-argument.
One final matter before beginning the translation of Judge
Livingston's argument that Lodowick Post got close enough to the
fox to "occupy" the beast. Livingston's writing reflects, compared
to the court majority's buttoned-down opinion, a free spirit. This is
often the case in dissenting opinions. First of all, a dissent reflects
the view only of the writer or of a small minority of judges. It's
237 Pierson, 3 Cai. K. at 175.
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easier to write clearer, more vigorous prose when writing for the
few rather than the many. The larger the committee drafting a
report, the denser the prose. Individual writers such as Livingston,
shorn of responsibility for pleasing felowjudges, can tap into their
private reservoir of passion. Such a "personal" opinion tends to be
more readable than the opinion of the court. Since a judge agi-
tated enough to draft a dissent often brings to the task considera-
ble passion, such passion produces on occasion a message with bite
written in down-to-earth prose. Legal literature, because of dissent-
ers' sound and fury, is much the richer.
Here, then, is the bulk of Judge Livingston's vivid, crisply writ-
ten opinion in Pierson v. Post, together with a translation that Liv-
ingston might with some justice object to, give or take a few
anachronisms, as unnecessary:
Livingston,J. My opinion differs from that of the court.... This
is a knotty point, and should have been submitted to the arbitra-
tion of sportsmen, without poring overJustinian, Fleta, Bracton,
Puffendof, Locke, Barbeyrac, or Blackstone, all of whom have
been cited; they would have had no difficulty in coming to a
prompt and correct conclusion. In a court thus constituted, the
skin and carcass of poor reynard would have been properly dis-
posed of, and a precedent set, interfering with no usage or cus-
tom which the experience of ages has sanctioned, and which
must be so well known to every votary of Diana. But the parties
have referred the question to ourjudgment... [The fox's] dep-
redations on farmers and on barn yards have not been forgot-
ten; and to put him to death wherever found, is allowed to be
meritorious, and of public benefit. Hence it follows, that our
decision should have in view the greatest possible encourage-
ment to the destruction of an animal, so cunning and ruthless in
his career. But who would keep a pack of hounds; or what gen-
tleman, at the sound of the horn, and at peep of day, would
mount his steed, and for hours together, "subjovefrigido," or a
vertical sun, pursue the windings of this wily quadruped, if, just
as night came on, and his stratagems and strength were nearly
exhausted, a saucy intruder, who had not shared in the honours
or labours of the chase, were permitted to come in at the death,
and bear away in triumph the object of pursuit? WhateverJustin-
ian may have thought of the matter, it must be recollected that
his code was compiled many hundred years ago, and it would be
very hard indeed, at the distance of so many centuries, not to
have a right to establish a rule for ourselves. In his day, we read
of no order of men who made it a business, in the language of
the declaration in this cause, "with hounds and dogs to find,
start, pursue, hunt, and chase," these animals, and that, too,
1996]
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without any other motive than the preservation of Roman poul-
try; if this diversion had been then in fashion, the lawyers who
composed his institutes would have taken care not to pass it by,
without suitable encouragement. If anything, therefore, in the
digests or pandects shall appear to militate against the defend-
ant in error, who, on this occasion, was the foxhunter, we have
only to say tempora mutantur; and if men themselves change with
the times, why should not laws also undergo an alteration?
238
Although these two hunters should have spared this court their trivial
haggling over the spoils of the hunt, I vote to affirm the jury's award of dam-
ages to Post and his hounds. Had Post and Pierson put their quarrel to a vote
offellow sportsmen, the sportsmen no doubt would have condemned Pierson for
snubbing the gentlemanly custom of giving the hunter, whose hounds jump
and pursues, the chance to run down his prey. In any event, killing foxes
benefits chicken farmers. Therefore, Post and other keepers of hounds should be
encouraged in their devotion to the hunt - and protected from interlopers such
as Pierson who seek the prize earned by another's pursuit. AsforJustinian and
his moldy crowd, those ancients knew nothing offox hunts, English or Ameri-
can; had the Romans followed the hounds, Roman law would have protected
close pursuit. In any event, the failure of aged treatises to equate close pursuit
with ownership doesn't settle the matter. Everything changes with time, even
The Law.
It may be expected, however, by the learned counsel, that more
particular notice be taken of their authorities. I have examined
them all, and feel great difficulty in determining, whether to ac-
quire dominion over a thing, before in common, it be sufficient
that we barely see it, or know where it is, or wish for it, or make a
declaration of our will respecting it; or whether, in the case of
wild beasts, setting a trap, or lying in wait, or starting, or pursu-
ing, be enough; or if an actual wounding, or killing, or bodily
tact and occupation be necessary. Writers on general law, who
have favored us with their speculations on these points, differ on
them all . . . After mature deliberation, I embrace that of
Barbeyrac as the most rational, and least liable to objection. 9
I've studied the authorities cited, and unlike my fellow judges, Ifind little
agreement about whether close pursuit stamps the pursuer as tentative owner.
Of all the scholarly opinions put forth by counsel, Barbeyrac's, which favors
Post, appeals to me.
Now, as we are without any municipal regulations of our own...
we are at liberty to adopt . . . the learned conclusion of
Barbeyrac, that property in animals ferae naturae may be ac-
238 Id. at 180.
239 Id at 181.
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quired without bodily touch or manucaption, provided the pur-
suer be within reach, or have a reasonable prospect (which
certainly existed here) of taking what he has thus discovered an
intention of converting to his own use.
24°
Since there's no local legislation covering fox hunts, we judges need not
wony overmuch about legal niceties. Lodowick Post, before Pierson came along,
was close on the fox. Reasonably close is good enough in horseshoes, as well as
in The Law according to Barbeyrac.
When we reflect also that the interest of our husbandmen, the
most useful of men in any community, will be advanced by the
destruction of a beast so pernicious and incorrigible, we cannot
greatly err, in saying that a pursuit like the present, through
waste and unoccupied lands, and which must inevitably and
speedily have terminated in corporal possession, or bodily seisin,
confers such a right to the object of it, as to make any one a
wrongdoer, who shall interfere and shoulder the spoil. The jus-
tice's judgment ought, therefore, in my opinion, to be
affirmed.24'
As I've said, foxes are destructive beasts. Gentlemen and hounds of the
chase should be encouraged. If by affirming Post's lower court judgment for
damages, The Law gets stretched a bit, it's for a good cause.
C. The Law In Action
And there you have it, The Law in action. Appellate debates
rarely lend themselves to ready answers deducible from the law li-
brary's morass of authorities. In cases on appeal, the opposing
briefs usually contain solid reasons for decision either way, includ-
ing selected pieces of The Law pointing - both ways. Opinions
such as Pierson reveal that The Law's logic and stability is balanced
by The Law's elasticity and capacity for altering direction.
Judges Tompkins and Livingston passed that poor fox back
and forth in the name of The Law, but not even the heavy sprin-
kling of Latin legalisms can disguise the human shapes at work be-
neath the surface of printed page. Pierson v. Post, on first reading,
may appear to be a case in which authoritative Latin texts speak
with finality in a single clear voice as to the inadequacy of merely
close pursuit. Before the first law school year of casebook reading
concludes, however, student readers will view Post's fruitless follow-
ing of the hounds as only the beginning of a never-ending chase of
a creature most wily.
240 Id. at 182.
241 Id.
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VIII. ANOTHER PIECE OF THE LAw iN TRANSLATION
A. Ghassemieh v. Schafer
4 2
Eighth-grader Elaine Schafer played a poor joke on her art
teacher, Karen Ghassemieh. As Ms. Ghassemieh was attempting to
sit down, Elaine, intending not an injury but a prank, pulled her
teacher's chair away.24 Ghassemieh fell to the classroom floor and
hurt her back. The resulting litigation spawned Ghassemieh v. Scha-
fer, an intermediate appellate court opinion from Maryland review-
ing on appeal the judgment of a Baltimore County trial court.
244
Teacher Ghassemieh sued her prankster pupil on a tort theory of
Negligence.2 45 Following a trial at which the jury gave Schafer its
verdict, Ghassemieh appealed, and lost again. 246 In Ghassemieh, the
Maryland court explains that even though the injured Ghassemieh
had a valid complaint about the trial judge's conduct at her trial,
she nevertheless failed to follow the rules for perfecting an appeal,
and therefore was disqualified from having the merits of her ap-
peal considered.24 7 Portions of the Ghassemieh v. Schafer opinion
are here reproduced in paragraphs block-indented, interspersed
with passages in italics translating the opinion's lawyer English into
something closer to the language of the street. The opinion opens
with a review of the trial judge's conduct of the trial:
B. Original And Translation
At the close of the evidence, each side moved for a directed ver-
dict.... The appellee's [defendant Schafer's] motion was pred-
icated on a claim that the evidence established a battery, an
intentional tort, and not negligence, as alleged. Both motions
were denied. With respect to the defendant's motion, the [trial
judge] ruled: "As to the motion of the defendant, the Court will
deny that motion, but I will include in the instructions the defi-
nition of a battery and let the jury make the determination
whether this in fact was, if it was a negligent act on the part of
the defendant or if in fact it was a battery, which would certainly
not be encompassed in the action brought by the plaintiff in this
case, but I would allow that to go to the jury by way of
instruction."
248
242 447 A.2d 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).




247 Id. at 88.
248 Id at 86.
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Both plaintiff Ghassemieh and defendant Schafer, after the jury heard
testimony but before the jury retired to pick a winner, asked the trial judge to
take the case away from the jury. Both teacher and student, speaking through
their lawyers, argued that no jury was needed because the law permits but a
single outcome; Ghassemieh and Schafer, in other words, both claimed that the
trial judge should recognize each individually as the easy outright winner. In
support of her easy-winner contention, Elaine Schafer insisted that her art
teacher deserved no personal injury damages because Ghassemieh's lawyer filed
the wrong kind of tort action - that not Negligence but an intentional Battery
was the legal banner under which the plaintiff teacher should have proceeded to
court.
The Baltimore County trial judge refused, however, to dismiss the jury
and declare from the bench the name of an outright winner. As to young Scha-
fer's defense that her injured instructor fatally blundered by inartfully suing in
Negligence instead of Battery, the trial judge ruled that it should be not the trial
judge's but the jury'sjob to decide if Schafer's practical joke does indeed amount
in law to a Battery - in which case plaintiff Ghassemieh loses because she
pleaded her lawsuit on the wrong legal theory.
Before the judge instructed the jury, the following exchange
occurred:
MR. CASKEY (counsel for defendant/appellee): "I would move
that the Court present the question to the jury as a question as
to the battery versus negligence issue. I would request that the
jury be given the instructions as to what constitutes negligence
and as to what constitutes battery and to have them answer the
question-do you find that it was negligence, battery, or
neither?"
MR HUESMAN (counsel for plaintiff/appellant): "Well, I
think, Your Honor, before I respond to that, I guess a lot would
depend on exactly the way the questions are phrased."
249
After the trial judge decided the case should go to the jury for decision, the
lawyers for Ghassemieh and Schafer met with the judge to help decide on the
verbal form for asking the jury its judgment. Lawyer Caskey, defending stu-
dent Schafer against a charge of Negligence, was no dummy. Caskey spoke up
to make sure the trial judge explained to the jury that Negligence and Battery
theories are distinct legal creatures, and that his client Schafer's little joke, if a
Battery, couldn't also be Negligence. (Defense lawyer Caskey no doubt
hoped with the jury's help to have Ghassemieh's suit for Negligence
thrown out of court on a jury finding that Ghassemieh's omitted but
proper - and exclusive - theory of recovery was for Battery. And by
the way, Ghassemieh's lawyer in all likelihood had good reason for
249 Id.
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pleading Ghassemieh's damage suit in Negligence and ignoring the
more plausible Battery theory - perhaps because the statute of limita-
tions had run out on a Battery claim, or perhaps because liability in-
surance existed covering 13-year-old Schafer's liability for damages in
Negligence but not in Battery.)
Lawyer Huesman for plaintiff Ghassemieh, responding to Schafer's push
for jury instructions on Battery, told the trial judge he was unsure how to
respond. (As events proved, what slow-off-the-mark Huesman should
have argued to the trial judge was that Negligence and Battery aren't
always distinct legal creatures, and that since pulling out the teacher's
chair could legitimately be deemed Negligence as well as a Battery,
therefore a mutually-exclusive Battery jury instruction would unfairly
prejudice Ghassemieh's case for Negligence.)
In the instructions which immediately followed, the court began
by saying: "The case before you is an action based on a claim of
negligence ... " The court then instructed on battery, as
follows:
"The Court has indicated that this is an action in negligence. A
battery is an intentional touching which is harmful or offensive.
Touching includes the intentional putting into motion of any-
thing which touches another person or the intentional putting
into motion of anything which touches something that is con-
nected with or in contact with another person. A touching is
harmful if it causes physical pain, injury or illness. A touching is
offensive if it offends a person's reasonable sense of personal
dignity."
"If you find that the defendant acted with the intent to cause a harmful
or offensive touching of the plaintiff and that that offensive touching
directly or indirectly resulted, then this constitutes a battery and your
verdict must be for the defendant, as this suit has been brought in
negligence and is not an action in battery."
250
The trial judge told the Baltimore County jurors that they must reject
Ghassemieh's suit for Negligence if they judge Schafer's practical joke to be a
Battery - that Battery trumps Negligence. To constitute a Battery, instructed
the judge by way of definition, Schafer need only have intentionally put into
motion events causing teacher Ghassemieh a harmful contact.
At the conclusion of the instructions, trial counsel for the plain-
tiffs (appellants) excepted as follows:
"Also, we except to that portion of the charge with regard to the definition
of battery.... We believe that it is necessary to show that the
defendant actually intended to harm the plaintiff and we believe on
250 Id.
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the basis of the defendant's own testimony that she did this as a
joke, that she had no intention to commit bodily harm." The
trial court overruled all objections. With respect to the battery
objection, the court did not address the definitional point
raised, but said:
"The battery instruction, the Court felt was appropriate in view
of the fact that this is an action in negligence, and if the jury
would find from hearing the testimony in the case that in fact
there was a battery and not negligence, it may very well have the
opportunity to make a determination in favor of the
defendant."
251
Wen the trial judge finished instructing the jury on the elements of a
Battery, Ghassemieh 's lawyer, Huesman, protested to the judge that Battery was
no proper part of this case because Schafer's practical joke clearly evidenced no
intent to harm her teacher, and intent to harm, said lawyer Huesman, is a
necessary ingredient for a Battery. The trial judge ignored or misunderstood
this objection to his definition of Battery, and thereafter merely reiterated his
opinion that Negligence and Battery are mutually-exclusive theories of recovery,
and that a jury finding of Battery would condemn Ghassemieh's Negligence
case to the scrap heap. (The jury, says the opinion in Ghassemieh v. Scha-
fer in a passage here omitted, eventually returned a verdict relieving
student Schafer of any liability for her teacher's injured back.252 The
general form of the jury's verdict leaves unclear just how the verdict
was reached. One possible basis for the jury's pro-Schafer decision -
other than a finding of no Negligence committed by the youthful
prankster - may of course have been the jury's conclusion that a Bat-
tery occurred, and that therefore Ghassemieh's claim of Negligence,
given the trial judge's edict that Battery and Negligence cannot over-
lap, must go out the window. The appellate court next discusses
teacher Ghassemieh's appeal of her trial court defeat.)
The gravamen of the plaintiffs' appeal is that the trial court
erred in giving the following portion of the instruction on bat-
tery quoted above:
"If you find that the defendant acted with the intent to cause a
harmful or offensive touching of the plaintiff and that that of-
fensive touching directly or indirectly resulted, then this consti-
tutes a battery and your verdict must be for the defendant, as
this suit has been brought in negligence and is not an action in
battery."
251 Id. at 86-87.
252 Id. at 90.
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In support of this principal contention, appellants maintain
that:
"(1) The mere fact that the evidence adduced may have estab-
lished that the defendant acted intentionally in pulling the chair
out from under the appellant, Karen B. Ghassemieh, does not
preclude recovery of damages for a cause of action in
negligence....
(3) To permit the defendant to escape liability for her tortious
conduct merely because she acted intentionally, rather than
negligently, would be fundamentally unjust and contrary to pub-
lic policy."
253
In asking the intermediate appellate court to reverse her trial court defeat,
Ms. Ghassemieh's argument is that the trial judge mistakenly told the jury that
pulling the chair out from under her, f a Battery, could not at the same time be
the sort of unreasonable behavior worthy of the name of Negligence. Ghas-
semieh insists that even though her student's prank was an intentional act,
justice requires that Ghassemieh's plea of Negligence be deemed an alternative
to Battery as a basis for recovery of damages. (The legal textbook, note,
divides tort theories of recovery into intentional (Battery) and unin-
tentional (Negligence) wrongs. The legal beginner might think it
simple to keep separate Negligence and Battery, and to wonder why in
Ghassemieh v. Schafer there seems so much confusion. The problem is
that law students and lawyers alike can never quite be certain what
makes for "intentional." Schafer's intentionally pulling the chair away
was also unintentional in so far as Schafer intended her teacher no
harm; some would say that such a lack of intent to harm negates Bat-
tery. On the other hand, intentionally driving a car above the speed
limit may well be Negligence, despite the obvious intent to do wrong.
What this suggests is that student hopes of nailing down the meaning
of "intent" once and for all, in a legal system in which the meaning of
"intent" is forever shifting, is doomed.)
We are confronted with a threshold consideration not raised by
the appellee and, therefore, neither briefed nor argued but es-
sentiallyjurisdictional: Was the appellants' objection to the bat-
tery instruction, quoted above, a sufficient predicate for their
position on appeal? They now argue:
"The instruction given by the trial judge was improper because
if the jury had found that the defendant acted intentionally in
pulling the chair out from under the appellant, Karen B. Ghas-
semieh, it could nevertheless have awarded damages for
negligence."
253 Id. at 87.
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And further:
"Thus, a finding of gross negligence or of willful and wanton
misconduct may impute a finding of intentional conduct. Con-
sequently, a finding that the appellee had acted intentionally
would have been fully consistent with the allegations of the dec-
laration charging negligence. The trial court, therefore, erred
in instructing the jury to the contrary. While it is clear that [ap-
pellee] intended to pull the chair out from under Mrs. Ghas-
semieh, it is equally clear that she did not intend to injure Mrs.
Ghassemieh ... ."254
We judges must first of all decide if the trial court loser, plaintiff Karen
Ghassemieh, followed proper legal procedure for appealing the error of which she
accuses the trial judge. Did she, in other words, make an appropriately-focused
objection during her trial to the trial judge's telling the jury that Battery and
Negligence are mutually-exclusive grounds for recovery of damages? Appellate
court procedure requires that Ghassemieh, to be able to complain on appeal to
some aspect of the trial judge's conduct of the trial, must have objected during
the trial hearing to the particular judicial error she now wishes to raise. Nor is
it enough in this case that Ghassemieh did in fact object to one aspect of the
trial judge's Battery instruction; the question is whether Ghassemieh's earlier
objection at her trial - to a definition of Battery that dispensed with an intent-
to-harm element - suffices to permit her to complain for the first time on
appeal about the very different matter of the trial judge's declaring Battery and
Negligence to be mutually exclusive?
Now according to legal convention, defendant Schafer herself should have
raised this question of whether Ghassemieh's trial objection lacked sufficient
focus for appeal purposes. Yet in neither her appellate brief nor in appellate
argument did Schafer call this court's attention to Ghassemieh's tardiness in
complaining of the jury instruction about Battery and Negligence being always
alien to one another. We nevertheless are in this instance going to consider on
our own initiative the matter of whether, during the trial of this case, plaintiff
Ghassemieh jumped through the appropriate hoops and so qualified to have her
appeal heard on its merits.
Our problem arises from Maryland Rule 554 (Instructions to the
Jury) (1982 ed.), particularly subsections (d) and (e) concern-
ing, respectively, "objection" and "appeal." Subsection (d) pro-
vides in part:
"If a party has an objection to any portion of any instruction
given, or to any omission therefrom, or the failure to give any
instruction, he shall before the jury retires to consider its verdict make
254 Id.
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REViEW
such objection stating distinctly the portion, or omission, or failure to
instruct to which he objects and the ground of his objection."
And subsection (e) provides in its entirety:
"Upon appeal a party in assigning error in the instructions, shall
be restricted to (1) the particular portion of the instructions given
or the particular omission therefrom or the particular failure to
instruct distinctly objected to before the jury retired and (2) the grounds
of objection distinctly stated at the time, and no other errors or assign-
ments of error in the instructions shall be considered by the appellate
court. "255
This requirement that trial court objections to jury instructions, to consti-
tute a proper groundwork for appeals, be narrowly focused, is bottomed on
Maryland's written rules for appellate procedure, in particular Rule 554. Rule
554 insists that "the grounds of objection [be] distinctly stated at the time"2
6
and forbids an appellant from adding other objections later during the appeal.
Trial counsel for the plaintiffs did not object, as appellate coun-
sel now objects, to any instruction on battery, but only to "that
portion of the charge with regard to the definition of battery."
Trial counsel was objecting to the court's definition of battery as
an "intentional touching which is harmful or offensive.. . ."
Trial counsel never stated as a basis for his objection that no
instruction on battery should be given because this was an ac-
tion in negligence. The objection at trial was simply that the
definition of battery lacked an essential element, i.e., the de-
fendant actually intended to harm the plaintiff. However, intent
to do harm is not essential to a battery. The gist of the action is
not hostile intent on the part of the defendant, but the absence
of consent to the contact on the plaintiff's part. Thus, horse-
play, pranks, or jokes can be a battery regardless of whether the
intent was to harm.
Trial counsel never argued to the trial court that, as contended
at oral argument before us, negligence and battery are not mu-
tually exclusive, or that a single intentional act can be the basis
for both battery and negligence, or that the jury could award
damages for negligence even if a battery had also been proved.
Only on appeal do appellants make clear their challenge to the
instruction that "this suit has been brought in negligence and is
not an action in battery" and if battery were found, "your verdict
must be for the defendant." The trial judge was not given to
understand that the plaintiff really objected to any instruction
on battery. The judge reiterated his negligence versus battery
255 Id. at 88.
256 Id.
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instruction in explaining why he felt the battery instruction was
appropriate, and the plaintiff did not object.
Thus, the objection below did not reach the broader issue raised
on appeal, and under Rule 554(e) it "may not be considered by
the appellate court."
2 5 7
Plaintiff Ghassemieh's objection at trial that the juiy instruction on Bat-
tey lacked an essential intent-to-harm ingredient was the wrong objection.
Ghassemieh should have objected at trial to the jury being told by the trialjudge
that Ghassemieh 's theory of Negligence would be trumped by a jury finding of
Battery. Because Ghassemieh waited until she appealed to make this objection,
her tardy claim, under Rule 554, "may not be considered by the appellate
court. " 258 Incidentally, Ghassemieh 's assertion that Battery requires intent to
harm is, in this court's judgnent, bad law; horseplay and practical jokes, after
all, can trigger batteries despite a batterer's innocent intent.
IT] he presence of an intent to do an act does not preclude neg-
ligence. The concepts of negligence and battery are not mutu-
ally exclusive....
We see no reason why an intentional act that produces unin-
tended consequences cannot be a foundation for a negligence
action. Here, an intentional act - the pulling away of the chair
- had two possible consequences: the intended one of embar-
rassment and the unintended one of injury. The battery - an
indirect offensive touching, a technical invasion of the plain-
tiff's personal integrity-was proved. However, a specific in-
struction on negligence - namely, that the defendant had a
duty to refrain from conduct exposing the plaintiff to unreason-
able risk of injury and breached that duty, resulting in her injury
- was not requested. Nor was any exception made to the gen-
eral negligence instruction that was given. Nor did the plaintiff
at trial take the unequivocal position that she was proceeding on
a theory of negligence, notwithstanding the co-existence of an
intentional act, i.e., a battery. In sum, appellants are asserting
now the arguments they should have made at trial. Such hind-
sight can avail them nothing.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPELLANTS TO PAY THE
COSTS.
2 5 9
Not that it will do plaintiff Ghassemish any good at this point, given the
tardiness of her objection to the trial judge's procedure, but we do happen to
believe she's right as rain about Battery and Negligence being alternative ways
to approach this lawsuit. The trial judge was, we think, wrong in telling the
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 89-90.
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jury that Battery trumps Negligence. The concept of "intention" should not, in
the legal mind, a prison make; there's no reason, given the elasticity of "inten-
tion," that defendant Schafer's practical joke can't be at the same time an
intentional-harmful-touching as well as intentional-conduct-creating-unrea-
sonable-risk-of-unintended-injury. Nevertheless, under Rule 554, we must close
our ears to Ghassemieh's appeal; the trial court's judgment in favor of the
defendant student and practical joker is affirmed.
IX. THE LAw FROM THE MARBLE PALACE
A. The Constitution And Original Understanding
Constitutional law is the showcase for The Law's fusion of cus-
tom, experience, wisdom, fantasy, lawyer logic, and moral fine-tun-
ing at its most grandiose. Front and center is the text of the U.S.
Constitution, from which U.S. Supreme Court Justices cite scrip-
ture and verse for their Olympian pronouncements. In addition,
each of the fifty states has its own constitution, a supreme legal text
under which state judges rule their subjects. Each of the fifty states
therefore has its separate body of constitutional law made up of
state appellate interpretive decisions that, except where trumped
by The Law of the federal constitution, constitute fifty state ver-
sions of'judicial supremacy. Just as judges have the final say in the
meaning of a litigated statute or common law principle, so do the
provisions of a state or federal constitution mean, no more or no
less, than what judges say they mean.
First-year instruction in federal constitutional law principles
introduces students to The Law as proclaimed on decision days at
the U.S. Supreme Court Building. This is the occasion when the
Justices file into the public red-velvet chamber of their marble pal-
ace and, with somber formality, offer up their freshly-minted opin-
ions. The pomp and ceremony surrounding decision day is The
Law's high mass, lending credence to the Court's reputation for
highmindedness and impartiality.
If the U.S. Supreme Court were truly as politically impartial as
the red-velvet presentation of Court opinions suggests, then the re-
placement of retiring Justices would have no heavy-duty political
ramifications. Yet the Supreme Court is so obviously a big-league
player in shaping the nation's political life that presidential nomi-
nations to fill Court vacancies often trigger major political battles
pending Senate confirmation. The Justices' reading of the fram-
ers' vague and ambiguous master blueprint, given the U.S. practice
of judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation,
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propels the Court, willing or not, headlong into the political
thicket.
Even so, Court members feel they must promote the pipe
dream of judicial neutrality. The obligatory salutes in Court opin-
ions to neutral principles, and the pomp and ceremony of decision
day, promote The Law's reputation for disinterestedness, and keep
the public half-convinced that the justices are never creators, only
restrained discoverers, of The Law. Yet for the legally alert, it's too
late in the day to pretend that the rhetoric of blindfolded disinter-
estedness is much more than a figleaf.
Experienced Supreme Court watchers, expert at stripping
away pretenses of antiseptic purity in Constitution-reading, recog-
nize that constitutional law doctrines are, like lesser forms of legal
rhetoric, a form of code. This red-velvet code manages to mask
somewhat the elasticity inherent in Court determinations about
which appeals to hear, which phrases in the Constitution's text to
resuscitate, which competing Court precedents to follow, and
which among equally attractive constitutional doctrines to stress in
drafting opinions. The first-year constitutional law student must
learn to swim in pseudo-legal policy waters weighted down with
such judicial dead weight as the great ChiefJustice John Marshall's
pronouncement, with a straight face, that courts are "mere instru-
ments of the law, and can will nothing."" Marshall's "mere instru-
ments" mythology comes to us today reinforced with an array of
Courtly procedures and verbal chants that create a fantasy land
through which first-year students must pass on their way to terra
f t a.
The U.S. Constitution, despite The Law's publicized aversion
to the politics of the street nevertheless had a tainted, highly polit-
ical, birth. Its drafting took place with a supremely political flaunt-
ing of proper form. The fifty-five delegates to the 1787
constitutional convention in Philadelphia were sent there by the
thirteen state legislatures, after all, merely to patch up the coun-
try's ground-breaking Articles of Confederation, not to draft a new
charter for federal government. 61 Yet a new charter came out of
that runaway convention in which the upright George Washington
presided and father-of-the-Constitution James Madison kept then-
secret notes. And it's that new charter's abstract, imprecise lan-
guage that, even after two hundred years of debate, continues to
prompt fierce disputation about the framers' cloudy intentions. As
260 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
261 Richard S. Kay, The legality of the Constitution, 4 CONsr. COMMENTARY 57 (1987).
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robed leaders in a continuing national constitutional debate,
Supreme Court Justices annually issue their mind-gumming judg-
ments about the master blueprint's current meaning, adding to a
growing mountain of constitutional doctrine that first-year students
can but sample in casebook form.
The starting point for debating the meaning of the Constitu-
tion's seven brief articles and twenty-plus amendments traditionally
focuses on the framers' (and ratifiers') Original Understanding of
the shape of the federal system they were constructing. This Origi-
nal Understanding, if you take Court opinions at face value, was
and is the touchstone for judicial interpretation. Original Under-
standing theory, which many find comforting, holds that the closer
the Justices stick to an Original Understanding reading, the greater
the protection against Justices reading their personal political val-
ues into the framers' phrases. Original Understanding bolsters the
idea of a limited role, in a democracy, for life-tenured judicial in-
terpreters of constitutions. Justices, unaccountable at the ballot
box, are obligated, as neutral-principle watchdogs, to exercise judi-
cial veto power in the name of constitutional interpretation only
when backed by Original Understanding. Original Understanding
isn't the sole theory about the proper constitutional role for ap-
pointed-for-life federal judges. Original Understanding is, how-
ever, the theory of interpretation that leads to bromides about
judicial self-restraint being the path to judicial virtue.
Original Understanding theory builds on the premise that the
framers were prescient enough to provide clear enough directions
to enable compliant judges to be Law-finders rather than Law-mak-
ers. The popular appeal of a Constitution that can be compared to
an architect's detailed blueprint is obvious. To appear to extract
from the framers' hallowed words a comprehensive Original Un-
derstanding serves much the same purpose as when religious sages
extract spiritual truth from Holy Writ. Citizens wary of the some-
times unsavory give and take of legislative infighting among elected
representatives are comforted by the thought that something bet-
ter than politics as usual guides The Law's managers.
Yet no lawyer, not even arch-conservative Judge Robert Bork,
whose unyielding commitment to Original Understanding cost
him a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court, believes Original Under-
standing can alone settle the constitutional puzzles that confront
the Justices. Original Understanding often plays but a ceremonial
role in the Supreme Court's fleshing out of the Constitution. Con-
stitutional litigation raises issues in which the framers' deep ambi-
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guities defy Original Understanding solutions. While Original
Understanding is far from irrelevant in the Court's work, nods to
Original Understanding often serve mainly as a sort of prayer with
which to open Court services.
The vagueness inherent in constitutional concepts of Inter-
state Commerce, Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free Speech
compels Supreme Court Justices to decipher such abstractions by
looking outside constitutional text and history. Even if eighteenth-
century dictionaries existed, reading with any precision the minds
of the framers is out of the question. The framers held no finely
drawn collective vision of the future. Our Constitution-makers
were never of one mind. No Original Understanding can make
clear the modem application of the Bill of Rights. In any case,
even had those responsible for putting the Constitution together
possessed a collective Original Understanding relevant to current
issues, the trustworthy historical materials for digging out any such
eighteenth-century consensus are wafer thin. This is why constitu-
tional interpretation must in the end come down to constitutional
creation.
The 1787 convention was a closed-door affair: no reporters.
The less-than-half of the fifty-five delegates who regularly attended
the Philadelphia sessions hammered out in private what was very
much a compromise document. The Constitution came out of a
fierce convention struggle between proponents of a strong central
government and those preferring a looser confederation of power-
ful sovereign states. What we don't know, because no complete,
reliable account of convention proceedings is available,262 is ex-
actly what was said and done to hammer out a consensus national
blueprint.
Virginian James Madison was one of several convention dele-
gates who kept private notes. Years later he dug out those conven-
tion notes and revised them. After Madison's death, several
decades after the Constitution's ratification, his notes were finally
published. 63 Today, Madison's notes are a key source of informa-
tion from which accounts of the Constitution's framing have been
fashioned.
Other delegates likewise, years after the Constitution's ratifica-
tion, released their fading memoirs or issued recollections of bits
262 John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses Of Histoty In Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 31 U. CH. L. REv. 502, 504-06 (1964).
263 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897 (James D. Richardson ed.
1896).
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and pieces of convention history. Yet from such evidence drawn
from memoirs and private notes it is best to remember: old men
forget; moreover, they can have opportunistic memories. Aside
from the question of how credible these tardy revelations may be,
one revelation emerges from this checkered history: the framers
had no Original Understanding apart from the understanding re-
flected by the text of the Constitution. Rather than preserving con-
vention history, the framers chose to leave only one piece of
history, one document, relevant to constitutional interpretation,
and that's the text of the seven articles to which they signed their
names in 1787.
Even had the Philadelphia framers preserved trustworthy
records evidencing a fixed vision for the future, there's the addi-
tional difficulty of what to do about the tangle of nation-building
ideas held by that secondary category of founding fathers, the hun-
dreds of delegates to the 1788 state ratification conventions. How
should the mind-set of state delegates attending the various con-
ventions be factored into the constitutional interpretation equa-
tion? This is a question largely left unanswered, and, here again,
because the spotty history of the debates at the state ratifying con-
ventions has never been thought helpful as a guide to interpreta-
tion.2 Even during the thirty-four-year reign of ChiefJustice John
Marshall (who, as a state convention delegate in Virginia, helped
ratify the Constitution), Original Understanding, in the sense of
who thought about what in 1787-88, came infrequently to the aid
of Supreme Court interpreters. Original Understanding in sum is
one, but not the only, ingredient of a constitutional decision.
Though Original Understanding fails to make constitutional
interpretation a strictly historical operation, consensus among the
framers on some general points did exist. The framers agreed the
national government needed taxing powers, plus the power to
make treaties and go to war. Also agreed was that giving to Con-
gress a power to regulate interstate commercial activity was the
only way to avoid economic rivalry between states that would
weaken the nation. The economic interests of gentlemen farmers
(such as Virginia's Washington and Madison) and their cousins,
the bankers, were also the obvious reason for adding a Contracts
Clause forbidding state legislatures from relieving the debtor class
of their debts.
But if there was agreement in Philadelphia on these points,
264 SeeJefferson H. Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C.
L. REv. 949 (1993).
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there are key areas in which the Constitution stutters and stam-
mers. Nowhere in the text, shockingly, is there mentioned which
branch of the federal government is to have the last word on what
a disputed constitutional text means. The Constitution doesn't say,
despite Supreme Court claims to the contrary, that the Court may
exercise veto power over any state and federal legislation the Jus-
tices think conflicts with constitutional directions. If, as many be-
lieve, there was an Original Understanding that theJustices were to
have the last word (known as the power of judicial review), the
framers chose to omit from their text this design for judicial
supremacy.
Legal historians believe that some framers favored giving the
last word on constitutional interpretation to non-elected Justices,
that some framers opposed making lifetime justices the final au-
thority on constitutional meaning, and that some framers kept
mum about their preferences. Perhaps the issue of judicial
supremacy was thought too controversial in 1787 for inclusion in a
document the framers were trying to peddle nation-wide as the lat-
est thing in representative government. In any event, not until 1803,
when the Supreme Court decided Marbu7y v. Madison,65 did the
Justices establish the Court as the final authority on the meaning of
the Constitution.
In the Marbuty case, the Court for the first time vetoed (part
of) an act of Congress deemed inconsistent with the Constitution.
The statute that the Justices declared unconstitutional (setting up
the system of federal courts) was enacted in 1789 by a Congress
that included many of the framers of the Constitution.266 In Mar-
buiy, typically the opening case in constitutional law casebooks, the
Court conveniently spied, hidden between the lines of the Consti-
tution, its authority to render definitive interpretations of murky
constitutional passages. ChiefJustice John Marshall's opinion for a
unanimous Court, for readers familiar with Federalist politics of
that era, has a Machiavellian cast. Marshall offered a meager ra-
tionale for its assumption of broad judicial review powers.
John Marshall had been Secretary of State in the Federalist
administration of John Adams. 267 As President Adams left the
White House in 1801, he named Marshall to head the Supreme
Court and, from that jurisprudential foothole, to hold as best he
265 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
266 William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J.
1, 32.
267 Id. at 3.
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could the Federalist fort against the incoming Republican on-
slaught. 68 Chief Justice Marshall, a good soldier, defended well
the Federalist fort, using his great influence over his fellowjustices
to remold the Supreme Court into a dominant force in national
politics. Marbuiy v. Madison's strained reading of Congress's and,
as we shall see, the framers' text, was the cornerstone of a Marshall
Court that thereby armed itself with judicial review power over the
other branches of both federal and state governments.
2 69
The Marbury dispute was on the surface a fight over filling a
low-level judgeship. In fact, as numerous historians have explained,
it was a Washington, D.C. tug-of-war between outgoing Federalist
(President John Adams) and incoming Republican (President
Thomas Jefferson) administrations. 7 ' William Marbury, a Federal-
ist lame duck judicial appointee, asked the Supreme Court (with-
out bothering to start with a lower-level court) to take original
jurisdiction of his case and order the new Secretary of State, James
Madison, to give Marbury his judgeship.271 Madison was part of the
incoming, anti-Federalist Thomas Jefferson administration. 72 The
Marbury judgeship controversy required that the Supreme Court
construe a piece of the federal Judiciary Act of 1789 concerning
which cases the Court can hear only on appeal, and which cases
can be filed originally at the marble palace.
27
The Judiciary Act was the original congressional blueprint de-
tailing which cases the Supreme Court would have original or ap-
pellate jurisdiction to hear.274  Congress assumed this job of
allocating the Court's jurisdiction because the Constitution merely
lists, without purporting to be exhaustive, a handful of cases for the
Court's original jurisdiction, such as lawsuits between states. 75
Marbuy, which is the creation, in every sense of the word, of Chief
Justice John Marshall, entered the history books because the Mar-
shall Court purposefully misread the 1789 Judiciary Act's list of
original jurisdiction cases.
John Marshall's Marbuiy claimed, by a severe twisting of the
text, to find in the Judiciary Act an attempt by Congress to add
mandamus lawsuits such as Mr. Marbury's to the Constitution's list
268 Id. at 3-4.
269 See generally id.
270 See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 6.
271 Van Alstyne, supra note 266, at 4-5.
272 Van Alstyne, supra note 266, at 4-5.
273 Van Alstyne, supra note 266, at 13-14.
274 Van Alstyne, supra note 266, at 14.
275 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 2.
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of original jurisdiction cases. Having mangled the Judiciary Act,
Chief Justice Marshall then, conveniently, faced the first of two
constitutional issues upon which he longed to render an opinion.
The first issue was whether Congress had constitutional authority
to tell the Supreme Court to entertain original jurisdiction cases in
addition to those on the Constitution's short list in Article III of
original jurisdiction cases. Marshall, in order to reach this constitu-
tional Article III issue, chose, for political reasons, to misread Con-
gress's Judiciary Act. Those political reasons relate to presidential
politics and to the ChiefJustice's championing of a more powerful
role in the national government for the Supreme Court.
276
After Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury insisted that Congress
intended, in its Judiciary Act, to confer additional original jurisdic-
tion on the Court, Marshall next judged that Congress cannot con-
stitutionally add to the constitution's brief list of Supreme Court
original jurisdiction cases. The Judiciary Act as thus misread, the
Chief Justice opined, conflicts with the Constitution. Article III of
the Constitution, of course, doesn't actually say that the Constitu-
tion's short list of original jurisdiction cases is exclusive; Article III
can easily be read to permit - in fact invite - Congress to add to
the list. But John Marshall, according to conventional historical
wisdom, wished to find a conflict, because by so doing the Court
now faced the ultimate issue Marshall so wished to exploit. For
now Marshall had a platform for preaching judicial supremacy to
his political antagonists in the White House and in Congress. The
Chief Justice's ultimate issue: who has the last word on the mean-
ing of the U.S. Constitution?
Since the Constitution stands mute on judicial review powers,
opinion-writer John Marshall was forced to wing it in explaining
why judges can invalidate, in the name of the Constitution, federal
and state legislation. Marshall in Marbury legally reasons that "obvi-
ously" the Court must be the supreme Constitution-interpreter be-
cause the Constitution is a written legal document, and because
lawyer-justices know best what The Law is. Furthermore, Marshall
argues, the Constitution commands that Justices swear an oath (as
do most government officials) to obey constitutional commands,
and Justices so sworn have no choice but to strike down statutory
departures from the constitutional design.277 So, Marbury con-
cludes, it's the Court's prerogative to tell Congress it can't add to
Article III's original jurisdiction list and force the Court to take
276 See generally RODELL, supra note 132.
277 See Marbuwy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175-78.
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original jurisdiction of Mr. Marbury's mandamus request: there-
fore Mr. Marbury's application for mandamus was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction at the Supreme Court level. 78
The genius of John Marshall's Marbury decision is that the
Court refuses, because of a presumed lack of constitutional juris-
diction, to order Republican Secretary of State Madison to deliver
Marbury's judgeship, an order that in any event the Republican
Administration would have snubbed. The Court in Marbury v.
Madison, in short, reads the Judiciary Act of 1789 to say What it was
never intended to say - that the Court must accept original juris-
diction over cases like would-be Judge Marbury's. Then the Court
similarly gives the Constitution a one-eyed reading to say that the
framers barred Congress from doing what Congress never tried to
do (add to the Court's original jurisdiction). Then to top it all off,
the Marbury opinion takes it for granted that the Constitution, de-
spite its silence on the subject, makes the Court the number one
interpreter of the framers' wishes. Marbury against Madison, nev-
ertheless, is still good Law - and great Federalist politics.
Although Marbury's tortured rendering of the framers' text is
no ringing tribute to Original Understanding, the steep slide away
from a constitutional law keyed, at least in theory, to 1787-88 inten-
tions, came much later. Today much of constitutional law study
concerns justifications other than Original Understanding for the
gloss the Supreme Court regularly affixes to the Constitution.
Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,79 for example, a case in-
volving debtor relief legislation passed during the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s, is one of many Supreme Court cases in which the
framers' intentions, even though for once clear, counted for little
or nothing.
The Minnesota legislature in the 1930s sought to help out
strapped debtors by forcing creditors to extend the time for paying
off mortgages.2 80 Minnesota creditors yelled foul and pointed with
their lawyers at the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.28 1
The Contracts Clause bars state legislation that would interfere
with pre-existing contractual obligations such as mortgage payment
schedules.8 The Contracts Clause, remember, was a big item in
Philadelphia in 1787 because, ever since the Revolutionary War,
278 Id. at 180.
279 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
280 Id. at 402.
281 Id. at 404.
282 Id.
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state legislatures had been upsetting commercial expectations by
too cavalierly letting citizen debtors off the hook.
The Supreme Court in Blaisdell hemmed and hawed about
Original Understanding. But in the end a New Deal Court said
that despite the Contracts Clause ban on "impairing the obliga-
tions of contracts," it was okay for Minnesota to impair the obliga-
tions of these Minnesota mortgage contracts. 28 3  During the
national economic crisis of the Great Depression, state laws slowing
down mortgage foreclosures were part of a popular effort to soften
the blows of financial catastrophe for farmers and others. The na-
tion-wide economic collapse persuaded the Court in Blaisdell to
read the Contracts Clause out of the Constitution. In so doing, the
Justices explained that Original Understanding is not the only
guideline for interpretation:
It is no answer to say that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our
time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at
the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that
the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and out-
look of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement
carries its own refutation... as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote, "The case before us must be considered in the light of
our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago."
284
If, therefore, what was said two hundred years ago is only advi-
sory, as Blaisdell suggests, then Original Understanding needs help
from some other theory of constitutional interpretation.
B. A Living Constitution
A legal regime supporting contradictory theories about how
the Constitution ought to be read is par for the legal course. The
Law, after all, beneath its semi-illusory body of fixed rules, nurtures
a much more fluid body of competing arguments. Under this sys-
tem, then, Original Understanding theory vies with Living Consti-
tution theory for the Court's favor. Living Constitutionalists see
the Justices as delegates to an ongoing convention, rewriting the
Constitution for each generation. Original Understanders, on the
other hand, see the Justices as automatons programmed to play,
without variations, the symphony composed by the framers. What
283 Id. at 447-48.
284 Id. at 442-43 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
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this boils down to is that when you find in constitutional law a slice
of truth, watch out lest you find on the flip side a contrary truth.
Supreme Court opinions, out of respect for The Law's con-
servative leanings, play down the Living Constitution element in
the Justices' work. Despite increasing recognition of the political
nature of the Court's role in American political life, the symbolic
power of marrying the Justices to Original Understanding will not
die. Thus, this judicial struggle to explain Living Constitution deci-
sions with Original Understanding slogans makes for a casebook
replete with insincere rhetoric. Justices, because of the pressure
they're under to give lip service to the rule of law, cannot avoid
writing vague, insincere opinions denying that judges must read
life into the Constitution's anemic words. As George Orwell states
in "Politics and the English Language," the great enemy of clear
language is insincerity."' 5
Consider, for a moment, the seating of a hypothetical relative
of the great Oliver Wendell Holmes on the current U.S. Supreme
Court. Let's call her Olivia Wendy Holmes. How should this latter-
day Holmes confront the political dimensions of her justiceship?
Justice Olivia Holmes, let's assume, is a former U.S. Senator of lib-
eral persuasion appointed by a president anxious to move the
Court leftward. Olivia Wendy Holmes, though like her namesake a
legal realist and fully aware that neutral decision-making is the stuff
of dreams, knows also that legal fashion demands that, once robed,
she make a public display of dropping partisan passions.
As Senator 0. W. Holmes, she voted a left-of-center agenda on
social welfare, affirmative action, progressive taxes, abortion rights,
environmental protection, and civil liberties. As Justice Holmes,
why should she vote any differently? Given that her judicial votes
on free speech, abortion, and the death penalty must ultimately
come down on one side or the other of the political equation, can
Holmes the Justice eclipse Holmes the Senator?
As a new Justice, Olivia Wendy Holmes will enter a sedate
Supreme Court environment far removed from a freewheeling
U.S. Senate where reading the will of the people and partisan poli-
tics are often one and the same. In the marble palace, constitu-
tional case law offers at least minimal guidelines for appellate
decision. Even Original Understanding can point Justice Olivia
Wendy Holmes in the general direction of decision. Then there's
the goal shared by all Supreme Court Justices: keeping intact the
285 GEORGE ORwELL, Politics and the English Language, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF
GEORGE ORWELL 127 (Harcourt, Brace, & World 1968).
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Court's reputation for self-restraint through a public display of de-
votion to precedent and rule-of-law reasoning. A new Holmes, like
the old, must cast votes and judicial rhetoric in a way designed to
keep the Court out of political hot water and to preserve the
Court's limited amount of political goodwill. Yet, despite these in-
stitutional restraints, Olivia Holmes, whether in judicial or senato-
rial dress, would likely vote much the same ticket, which in all
likelihood is just what politicians who might engineer such a
Holmes appointment to the Court would have in mind.28 6
Although waving the rule-of-law flag will never disentangle the
Supreme Court from the politics inherent in interpreting vague
constitutional clauses, the Justices on the other hand are handi-
capped in making the policy choices their pseudo-interpretive job
demands. This is because the Court, by convention a Law-finding
rather than a Law-making body, lacks the information-gathering
apparatus that helps legislatures shape policy. The Court is thus
forced to look to brief-writing lawyers to serve as a substitute legisla-
tive staff of sorts. Yet lawyers trained to see The Law as separate
from politics are poorly equipped to think (and research) in broad
policy terms about abortion, discrimination, unfair trade practices,
censorship, crime and punishment, and the like.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has for two centuries, by vot-
ing its collective conscience, played a leading role in setting na-
tional economic and social policy. The Court's many policy-
packed decisions "interpreting" one of the Constitution's most im-
portant and most malleable clauses, the Commerce Clause,28 illus-
trate well the nature of Living Constitution jurisprudence. The
Commerce Clause grants authority to Congress to regulate com-
merce among the states. The framers' purpose was to make the
nation a single economic unit. Congress's job under the Com-
merce Clause is to outlaw economic rivalry between the states that
might stunt national growth. Included in what the Constitution
leaves unclear, however, is just how much space, if any, the Com-
merce Clause leaves for individual states to regulate commercial
activity that congressional legislation fails to reach. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,28 8 a cornerstone case that involved steamboat competition
in New York State waters, the Court almost cut the states entirely
out of the regulation business.
The Gibbons v. Ogden opinion, authored by Chief Justice John
286 See RODELL, supra note 132, at 9-10.
287 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, d. 3.
288 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Marshall, recites how the New York legislature granted to a steam-
boat operator (who carried passengers from New Jersey to New
York) a monopoly on entering New York's Hudson River.289 An-
other steamboat operator, a competitor barred from the Hudson,
objected. The plaintiff-competitor persuaded the U.S. Supreme
Court in Gibbons that New York lawmakers are constitutionally
barred from passing out a monopoly for Hudson River steamboat-
ing.29 ° Marshall's opinion in Gibbons at first hints at the possibility
that the Commerce Clause shifts all power to regulate interstate
commerce to the federal government, forever tying the hands of
state legislators. But then the Gibbons Court hedged, and eventu-
ally voided New York's monopoly legislation by using a constitu-
tional rationale that stepped more lightly on states' rights toes.291
The Gibbons opinion notes that Congress, in the pre-steamboat
years of the Republic, had set up a licensing system for maritime
shippers along the Atlantic seaboard.9 2 This federal licensing sys-
tem was apparently a tax exemption device involving local versus
foreign shipping, and had nothing to do with right of access to
local (Hudson River) waters. But this federal tax exemption stat-
ute nevertheless fit nicely into the Gibbons rational for why New
York can't restrict Hudson River steamboat traffic. According to
Chief Justice Marshall, the Congressional tax exemption statute
and the New York steamboat monopoly statute, oddly enough, con-
flicted 29 (Marshall, you recall from Marbury v. Madison, was a
great one for finding a tempest in any teapot.) Marshall then
pointed to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
says that federal statutes trump inconsistent state statutes. New
York's "conflicting" monopoly statute, ruled the Justices, is there-
fore unconstitutional - and New York's waters are therefore open
to steamboat competition.29 4
Gibbons v. Ogden's battle of the steamboats left unclear
whether, in instances of non-regulation by Congress of particular
segments of commerce, a state can constitutionally fill that vacuum
with state regulations. But before the nineteenth century was out,
the Supreme Court fleshed out the bony Commerce Clause with a
Living Constitution compromise in the Port of Philadelphia
289 Id. at 6.
290 Id. at 239-40.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 2.
293 Id. at 42, 238-240.
294 Id. at 238-40.
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case. 295 In question was a Pennsylvania state regulation requiring
that local harbor pilots be hired to guide ships into the port of
Philadelphia. 96 Congress had no legislation regulating such mari-
time matters. The issue, given the general grant to Congress of the
commerce power, was this: could the state of Pennsylvania legislate
the hiring of local pilots on ships entering the port of Philadelphia
in the absence of Congressional action?
With their answer the Justices added a little more gloss to the
Constitution. This judicial creativity was necessitated by the states'
need to know how much their hands were tied by a Commerce
Clause that granted authority to Congress without specifying what
powers remained at the state level. The Court in the Port of Phila-
delphia case - under which Pennsylvania's local pilot requirement
passed constitutional muster - decided that when Congress
doesn't act, a state can intervene to regulate "local subjects"; on the
other hand, "national subjects" demanding the uniform treatment
that only Congress can provide were stated to be matters exclu-
sively within federal control." 7 This constitutional formula, typi-
cally, leaves the precise meanings of "local subjects" and "national
subjects" to be worked out in the future, case by case. In the in-
stance of hiring harbor pilots for the Port of Philadelphia, the
Court concluded that hiring local pilots is a "local subject" consti-
tutionally fit for state rather than federal legislation. 98
The all-important question on the flip side of the Commerce
Clause is what are the boundaries of Congressional authority when
it comes to exercising its broad power to control interstate traffic?
In no other constitutional area has Original Understanding taken
more of a beating than in this Commerce Clause area. Over the
last century the Supreme Court has endorsed an almost limitless
range of Congressional activity aimed at furthering the framers' vi-
sion of a national economic unit - and at furthering other social
goals as well. Just how far the notion of federal regulation of com-
merce can be extended is indicated by recent proposals in Con-
gress for legislation guaranteeing access to abortion.
The abortion controversy is, of course, related in no way to the
eighteenth-century problems of interstate commercial rivalry that
gave rise to the Commerce Clause. Yet modern Commerce Clause
opinions have so extended the reach of Congress's commerce
295 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (1 How.) 299 (1851).
296 Id. at 300.
297 Id. at 320-21.
298 Id.
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power that lawyers can easily draft constitutional justifications for a
federal abortion statute. Generally accepted principles of constitu-
tional law have long legitimated social, as opposed to commercial,
regulation by Congress in the name of the Commerce Clause. Re-
call that the Commerce Clause began legal life as part of a constitu-
tional compromise between framers committed to a powerful
central government and those bent on preserving broad state pow-
ers. As a result of constitutional adjudication over the intervening
years, that compromise has shifted toward a Washington-centered
regulatory state. A racially segregated barbeque restaurant operat-
ing in Birmingham, Alabama, discovered long ago the reach of fed-
eral commerce power. '  The Supreme Court held that Congress
could integrate Ollie's Barbeque because some of the chickens O1-
lie barbequed were originally hatched in neighboring Missis-
sippi °0  In fact, Congress routinely, in the name of regulating
commerce, regulates a variety of social matters, including various
forms of discrimination, gambling, child labor, and sex. 1
How one feels about the Supreme Court's role in legitimizing
the federal regulatory system depends ultimately on one's political
views. In the years just before and after the turn of the century, a
conservative, pro-business Court vetoed, in the name of Original
Understanding, a variety of Congressional restrictions on business
enterprise. This was a Court whose members believed passionately,
as did much of the country a century ago, in an unfettered free
market economy. Free market Justices accordingly read the Com-
merce Clause narrowly to limit Congress's ability to intervene in
the market. During this earlier period, acts of Congress axed by a
pro-business Court included legislation restricting child labor 0 2 as
well as legislation aimed at preventing business monopolies.
303
Then came the Great Depression. When stubborn laissez-faire
Justices continued their anti-federal regulation ways in the face of a
newly-elected New Deal administration pushing for national con-
trols over the economy, a constitutional slugfest ensued. When the
political in-fighting (including President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
threat to pack the Court with New Deal Justices) abated after 1937,
the Supreme Court, with an eventual influx of Roosevelt-appointed
299 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
300 Id. at 304-305.
301 See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 6.
302 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
303 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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Justices, did an about-face.3 0 4 The dam constructed by the earlier
Court to hold back the federal regulatory state broke, and the
Commerce Clause was outfitted in modem dress suitable for a cen-
trally-controlled national economy. Constitutional interpretation,
as the Court's back-and-forth reading of the Commerce Clause il-
lustrates, has a way of accommodating, like other departments in
The Law, to the felt needs of the time.305
C. Due Process Clause
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments promise that neither
"life, liberty, [nor] property," shall be taken by federal or state gov-
ernments without Due Process.3 °6 The earlier Due Process Clause
contained in the Fifth Amendment was the part of the Bill of
Rights that commanded the federal government to give citizens a
fair hearing before sentencing them to prison or appropriating
their cattle. Due Process at the birth of the Bill of Rights meantfair
procedure, nothing more, nothing less.30 7 When in 1868 the aboli-
tionist framers of the Fourteenth Amendment limited a state's abil-
ity to deny life, liberty, or property, here again fair procedure for new
black citizens was the framers' principal aim.308
Due Process, in this procedural sense, is at the center of
Supreme Court cases naming which criminal suspects can be
searched without a warrant and which recipients of government
entitlements are entitled to notice and hearing before payments
are reduced. But then there's another kind of Due Process that for
the past century the Justices have been extracting from between
the lines of the Constitution. Lawyers call this Substantive Due
Process. Under Substantive Due Process, the Justices examine the
statutory handiwork of federal and state legislatures to see if legisla-
tive policy, even though procedurally adequate, nevertheless fails to
satisfy the Court's economic or social conscience. The first-year
casebook devotes entire chapters to Substantive Due Process. Roe v.
Wade's abortion ruling, for example, is a piece of Substantive Due
Process. So, for that matter, are Court decisions overturning state
censorship of speech or state strictures on religious freedom.
304 See Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy: 1933-1946, 59
HArv. L. REv. 645 (1946).
305 Id.
306 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
307 See Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855).
308 E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GovERNMENT 114 (1948) ("The 'due process'
clause, which had been intended originally to consecrate a mode of procedure. ).
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The metamorphosis of the Due Process Clauses into a Living
Constitution program for Supreme Court review of substantive leg-
islative policy has been gradual. Like the development of common
law Negligence, Substantive Due Process originated as a judicial
boost to the free enterprise spirit of the industrial revolution. A
pre-World War I, laissez-faire Supreme Court protected business by
creating a Substantive Due Process doctrine for vetoing state or
federal statutes that didn't figure into the free market picture. Be-
tween 1890 and 1937, Court majorities ruled that the Due Process
Clause barred state legislatures from, among other matters, setting
maximum railroad rates;"°9 from imposing consumer protection
controls on mail-order insurance companies;310 from enforcing
minimum wage acts;-"' and from punishing employers who keep
bakery workers at the ovens more than sixty hours a week.31
This economic, free enterprise form of Substantive Due Pro-
cess eventually, like other symbols of the laissez-faire era, suc-
cumbed to FDR's New Deal. The liberal New Deal Court of the
late 1930s and 1940s viewed with alarm its predecessor's Substan-
tive Due Process promotion of laissez-faire ideology. The New Deal
Court, feigning shock, wondered aloud about the mangled inter-
pretation given by an earlier laissez-faire court to the Original Un-
derstanding of Due Process.313 Yet, in short order, liberal Justices
would commence to reinvent Substantive Due Process, this time as
a euphemism for a progressive, mid-century Court program pro-
moting civil rights and liberties. The modem Court's abandon-
ment of pro-business Substantive Due Process and substitution of a
civil liberties version of Substantive Due Process has prompted the
current debate about the proper role of the Court in areas such as
freedom of expression, abortion, and affirmative action.
Discomfort about proper judicial roles is reflected in Substan-
tive Due Process opinions in constitutional law casebooks. Substan-
tive Due Process opinions employ imaginative, if laborious,
rationales for conclusions. To begin with, note how the Supreme
Court concocted its modem Substantive Due Process gloss by re-
casting the Bill of Rights. The first ten amendments to the Consti-
309 The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
310 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
311 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
312 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
313 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ( "[The] day
is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause [to] strike down state laws, regu-
latory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.").
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tution, which limit congressional control over speech, religion, and
so forth, are not the people's only Bill of Rights. A second Bill of
Rights, according to the Supreme Court, is hidden deep within the
generalities of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which restrains state encroachment on civil rights. This sec-
ond, subterranean Bill of Rights provides the rationale for the
Court's constitutional review of the judgments and statutes of state
courts and state legislatures challenged as violative of free expression,
religious freedom, sexual privacy, or some other civil liberty.
The key constitutional concept in recasting the original Bill of
Rights to cover actions of state government is found in the single
word "liberty." The Reconstruction Congress, in drafting the Four-
teenth Amendment as an antidote for badges of slavery, wrote that
"liberty" can be taken only after a person receives "due process."
In that single word "liberty" the Court, over the past half-century,
has located those civil rights the Justices believe deserving of pro-
tection against unsympathetic state officials. In the best tradition
of Original Understanding, two liberal New Deal Justices once
tried to make the case that the Fourteenth Amendment's broad
language was intended to incorporate all of the original Bill of
Rights as additional protection for individuals against state in-
fringements on civil liberties. 314 But later historians conclude that
there is no more historical support for such a Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporation claim than there is for the idea that laissez-
faire capitalism is part of the "liberty" or "property" protected by
Due Process. 1 5
If, therefore, modern civil liberties decisions such as the Roe v.
Wade 3 16 abortion decision represent good judicial government,jus-
tification lies outside Original Understanding. One rationale for
freeing up abortion rights draws on a Court theory developed in
earlier Due Process cases which condemned state actions thought
too restrictive of personal freedom. This theory is that the "liberty"
protected by Due Process encompasses something called "funda-
mental rights." 17 "Fundamental rights," like the Substantive Due
Process doctrine of which it's a part, is defined, so to speak, in
terms of which claims for civil rights and liberties garners the votes
of five of nine Justices. The Roe majority concluded that the right
to choose abortion early in a pregnancy is a "fundamental right"
314 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J. dissenting).
315 C. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Origi-
nal Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 132, 137-39 (1949).
316 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
317 Id. at 153.
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and that statutes outlawing early abortion deprive reluctant
mothers of a "fundamental" Right Of Privacy derived from the
Constitution's "liberty."
318
A slightly different rationale exists for a constitutional Right
Of Privacy that has a stronger Bill of Rights flavor. This is the Right
Of Privacy rationale spotlighted by Justice William 0. Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut,19 the earlier contraceptive case. This Gris-
wold version of the origins of the Right of Privacy is favored by
those who deem "liberty" and its vague natural law-based "funda-
mental rights" too wishy-washy a constitutional foundation. This
Griswold reasoning derives from earlier Fourteenth Amendment
decisions involving the First (free expression), Fourth (bar against
unreasonable searches), and Fifth (self-incrimination protection)
Amendments, and concludes that the Right Of Privacy is an off-
shoot of the privacy vibrations given off by (the Fourteenth Amend-
ment version of) the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
When the Griswold Court ruled that married couples must be
permitted to buy condoms, it spoke of "penumbras, formed by em-
anations" from the Bill of Rights. 2 0 In something of a nose-thumb-
ing at Original Understanding, Justice Douglas wrote that
constitutional principles need have no precise textual home base
in the Constitution.32 ' Douglas notes that Freedom Of Associa-
tion, for example, has been adopted into the Constitution by pig-
gybacking astride Free Speech.3s The freedom to travel across
state boundaries and to choose a private rather than a public
school education are likewise orphaned principles adopted into
the constitutional family. 23 So why not, asks Justice Douglas, a
Right Of Privacy?
According to Justice Douglas - a former Yale law teacher,
noted environmentalist, author, humanitarian, poker player in
FDR's White House, and sophisticated dealer in legal wizardry-
various pieces of the Bill of Rights give off subtle rays that form
"zones of privacy."32 4 These privacy zones promote freedom from
prying eyes - and from there it's a short Griswold step toward pro-
tecting sexual life from government snooping and censoring.
Thus, does Griswold's Bill of Rights privacy zones lead to Roe, and to
318 Id. at 154.
319 381 U.S. at 484-86.
320 Id. at 484.
321 Id. at 482-86.
322 Id. at 482.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 485.
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the abortion debate between right-to-lifers (Original Understand-
ing) and freedom-of-choicers (Living Constitution) that promises
to enliven the twenty-first century.
For law students, the trick to reading the likes of Roe is to ap-
preciate that abortion and other such political issues, just because
they've been turned into legal issues, haven't lost their political
character. When Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissents in Roe
on Original Understanding grounds, the Roe reader can best un-
derstand Rehnquist by keeping in mind the code mentality that
pervades judicial talk. Rehnquist's (anti-abortion) tribute to Origi-
nal Understanding, like his more liberal colleagues' tribute to the
"emanations" 25 and "zones"326 of a Living Constitution, simply re-
flects the way judges argue politics. As in politics, so in The Law
are opposing forces constantly at work breeding contradiction and
change.
In the abortion controversy, perhaps neither right-to-life nor
freedom-of-choice advocates will escape some kind of government
compromise between their polar positions. Likewise, in constitu-
tional law, theories of Original Understanding and of a Living Con-
stitution will continue to share the legal stage, as they did in 1992
when the Supreme Court revisited Roe in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,327 and decided, five to four, to
overturn and, at the same time, to affirm the Roe precedent.
The Court in Casey gave lip-service to Roe by stating that it was
not to be considered overturned .32  Then the Court majority pro-
ceeded to sadden Roe supporters by seriously undermining Roe.
Many of the restraints placed on pro-life state legislatures by Roe's
original tri-semester rationale were relaxed in Casey,329 freeing the
states to place additional limits on access to abortion. And thus did
the Court effect its compromise between Original Understanding
and a Living Constitution. Roe was, in name, retained so that the
Court might avoid appearing political in overturning under public
pressure the twenty-year-old Roe,3ss a judicial salute to stability, his-
tory, and Original Understanding. On the other hand, the Casey
majority worked its Living Constitution will by taking a sizable step
in a right-to-life direction.
325 Grisw0/d, 381 U.S. at 484.
326 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
327 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
328 Id. at 845-46.
329 Id. at 869-73.
330 Id. at 853-56.
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D. Professors Of Legal Craftsmanship
The Supreme Court opens each term with a call to God to
"save this Honorable Court." This call to God is no idle gesture.
The Justices, perched as they are in a position to tell all official-
dom, from the President on down, what they can and cannot do,
are on the hot seat. Sometimes the Justices make choices that en-
rage the multitudes, as they did with the decision banning prayer
in public schools.331 When Court prestige, propped up by rule-of-
law gospel, falters, those first to the Court's rescue are usually law
school professors of constitutional law.
Maintaining public confidence in the nation's high court is a
job law professors of late take to naturally. This is partly because
academic lawyers are usually card-carrying Living Constitutionalists
at peace with the modern Court's civil liberties thrust. Like peda-
gogical mother hens, these professor-guardians of the Court advise
the Justices on tactics for maintaining a low profile through convo-
luted legal reasoning. Professors write articles certifying that the
Justices' elaborate theories of constitutional interpretation are the
rule of law incarnate. Thus is a Living Constitution kept somewhat
under wraps by a legal community that steers clear of unseemly
politics, activist usurpation, or tell-tale signs of social engineering.
Doctrinal-minded professors sensitive to partisan blemishes on
The Law's disinterested face become distressed when Court opin-
ions display something they call "sloppy legal craftsmanship."
Sloppy craftsmanship is the label put on judicial handiwork such as
Justice Douglas's Griswold reliance on blatantly fuzzy "emanations
and zones." Such reliance on mere "emanations" perhaps comes
too close to the slipperiness of the politician; "emanations" don't
sound like the rule of law. A vocabulary of "emanations" and "pri-
vacy zones" exposes too vividly the Court's debt to a Living Consti-
tution. Douglas would have done better, say censors of sloppy legal
craftsmanship, to tie his Right Of Privacy to the more formalistic
"fundamental rights" subsumed under Due Process "liberty.""
3 2
The more conventional sounding "liberty" keeps the cat ofjudicial
legislation better contained within the legalistic bag.
Justices themselves occasionally fret in public about the
Supreme Court's image. One Justice, for example, will accuse an-
other of using rhetorical devices in an opinion to achieve, of all
things, non-neutral ends. Yet the Justices know, as do professors of
331 See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
332 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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legal craftsmanship, that rhetorical devices are what The Law is all
about.
Finally, there is Bishop Hoadly who, in a sermon preached
before the English King in 1717, declared: "Whoever hath an abso-
lute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who is
truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the person
who first spoke or wrote them."
3 3 3
Beginning law students, then, as they submit to the tutelage of
professors of legal craftsmanship, must somehow swallow Bishop
Hoadly's cynical pill without at the same time throwing up Justice
Douglas's "emanations and zones."
X. CONCLUSION
This article's peek into that policy-political underworld operat-
ing beneath the body of rules is part of a wider literature. Over a
half-century ago, a handful of writings taking The Law to task be-
gan to surface, a few of which are mentioned in the footnotes to
this article. In addition, current legal academics, starting from
three somewhat different places, all on the left of the political
center, are building a body of scholarly work that builds on realist
perspectives.
The first such group, mainly middle-aged professors who cut
their legal teeth during the dissident 1960s, are proponents of a
scholarly wave called critical legal studies. "Crits" find the policy-
political underworld beneath legal doctrine too conservative, and
strive to substitute a liberal "crits" agenda.3 - Two newer but simi-
lar groups explore The Law's policy-political underworld under the
banners of feminist theory and critical race theory. These new
wave scholars also see The Law as a form of code, a code that dis-
guises contests over values touching on gender and race.
The real fun of law school is in discovering the exciting, value-
laden, fluid system of courtroom government that is often ob-
scured by staid language. Standard guides on how-to-succeed-in-
law-school perhaps give valuable advice on study habits and exam-
taking, but these primers shy from exposing the word-magic and
the half-truths so central to legal life. Of course various methods
exist for slaying the law school dragon, 3 ' but it's a shame that
33. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 119-20 (1909).
334 See HALL ET AL., supra note 79, at 552-54. See generally KAmvs, supra note 109, at
14 ("First, we reject the idealized model and the notion that a distinctly legal mode of
reasoning or analysis characterizes the legal process or even exists.").
335 See GEORGE ROTH, SLAYING THE LAW SCHOOL DRAGON (2d ed. 1991).
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some students never see past the rules to the politics hidden in the
basement.
The best bet is to use common sense and decide for yourself
what study methods and materials, not to mention long-range
goals, best suit your needs and temperament. Some students, for
example, may profitably work within a group; others, to achieve an
understanding of the subtleties of the lawyers' code, need to work
things through on their own. In any event, it's unclear how differ-
ent methods of study - memorizing patchwork principles, sifting
through self-made or commercial study outlines, reading law re-
views, perusing old exams - will affect grades. Given that law stu-
dents are generally evenly matched in industry and in ability to
cope with legal language, it's unfortunate that most law faculties
continue the tyranny of grades.
Law professors keen on helping beginning students cut
through the bramble bush of legal doctrine also face a few drag-
ons. First, there's the tension between the lure of the blackletter
and the temptation to give political explanation for decisions; a
tension that professors sometimes tip-toe politely around. Also
complicating life for law teachers is pressure, on the one hand, to
make law school a trade school in the mechanical nitty-gritty of law
practice; and pressure, on the other hand, to make law training a
broader grounding in the art of shaping government policy. And
for those law professors who deplore the fierce, dehumanizing con-
test for high marks on exams, there's the sad realization that grade
reform is blocked by the insistence of law firm hiring committees
that the survival-of-the-fittest grading system be preserved.
James White, author of The Legal Imagination,3 3 6 talks about the
challenge of carving out in interesting fashion "your own intellec-
tual life in the law.""3 7 White explores how a decent human being
can become a lawyer without becoming a bloodless, hyper-legalis-
tic, have-gun-will-travel son of a bitch - except Legal Imagination
sets the discussion on a higher plane. White, along with public
interest lawyer Ralph Nader, 3 8 is a leader in a small movement
336 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (abr. ed. 1985) (1973) (originally
cast as a course book for law students, this work contains valuable insights into the
legal process, interesting comparisons between law and literature, and guidelines for
writing - decently - about legal subjects).
337 Id. at xxi.
33 Nader complains of a too-narrow legal education modeled on Harvard Law's
"brilliant myopia." Such focusing on legal minutiae, says Nader, goes hand in hand
with the "escape from responsibility for the quality and quantity ofjustice in the rela-
tionships of men and institutions [which] has been the touchstone of the legal profes-
sion." Nader, supra note 25.
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that in recent years has called for an injection of civic passion and
humanism into The Law and into the law schools. 3-9 The question
is, how can we legal types stay alive to the world of feeling in a land
of Acceptance, Fee Simple Absolute, Nolo Contendere, and Proxi-
mate Cause? Does The Law's heavy dose of formalism permit us to
stay attuned to something grander than "brilliant myopia"?
Certainly some law students risk imprisonment by their newly-
acquired language. Law school has been called the deep-freeze of
university emotional life "where old men in their twenties go to
die." 4 ° White urges law students to cling to their creativity and
individuality by artistically controlling legal language, just as the
sculptor must learn to do with clay: "You may feel that you are
controlled by your material, as indeed you are. But compare the
pianist, who is told what notes to play, in what order, how long and
how loud; yet art is surely possible there. " 341
Understanding law school means appreciating that the lan-
guage is coded, that an underworld of politics is hidden in the
basement, and that law school is a place where an active imagina-
tion and independent thinking can be rewarding.
339 See WHrrE, supra note 336, at xxi-xxv.
340 Paul Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Eduatin, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 460 (1970).
See generally KAzuo ISHiGuRo, TiH REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989) (protagonist buder so
dehumanized by his professional standards and jargon that he cannot relate to female
co-worker).
341 WHrrE, supra note 336, at xxv.
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